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ABSTRACT
DETERMINANTS OF THE GENERALIZED TRUST RADIUS IN SCRIPTED
FRAGILE SUB-SAHARAN AFRICAN STATES
by Anthony Thomas Caito
May 2018
Trust between strangers does not come easily in collectivist societies governed by
coercive institutions and subject to unstable market forces. More than one-third of all
states are fragile, yet the trust literature has shown little interest in explaining the
variability of generalized trust among them; instead fixating on social capital, the
consequence of the expansion of generalized trust, putting the cart before the horse and
leaving unexamined many of its causes. The enhanced accuracy of the reconfigured
World Values Survey trust question has generated new research opportunities to address
this concern. This dissertation advances the trust literature through identifying,
measuring, and explaining the full social effect on generalized trust in fragile states
through group proximity and civil society power differential. Sociological
institutionalism and social capital theory provide the theoretical framework for modeling
and explaining structural social effects leading to the improbable expansion of
generalized trust in the highly scripted fragile sub-Saharan African states of Burkina
Faso, Ethiopia, and Nigeria. These purposefully deviant and least likely test cases are
examined using within- and cross-case analysis of necessary and sufficient conditions
through most similar multiple comparative case analysis, affirming or confirming most
hypotheses. The expansion of generalized trust requires sustained and usually
incentivized positive inter-group interaction. In fragile states, most inter-group
ii

interaction is conflictual and occurs through civil society because individuals have little
capital with which to engage in the market and the state is dysfunctional. The
generalized trust radius is likely to widen the more proximate and consociational its civil
society is, regardless of how fragile the state is. This dissertation enlarges and
strengthens the social explanation for generalized trust variability in fragile states, filling
a significant gap in the literature and establishing a research design and model for future
research to replicate in other fragile regions.
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CHAPTER I - INTRODUCTION
Dine with a stranger but save your love for your family.
—Ethiopian proverb
Is it possible for strangers to trust each other in highly collectivist societies
governed by fragile state institutions and unstable market forces? Many in the trust and
fragile states literature say no (see Bratton 1989, 428; Lowenkopf 1995, 104; Posner
2004, 246). This dissertation, in agreement with Kaplan (2008, 4), challenges this
assumption and claims a society’s social network composition determines much of the
extent of generalized trust between strangers in fragile states.
Trust, having confidence one’s expectations will be met (Hardin 1992, 152-3), is
the fuel that, along with incentivized or coerced self-interest, drives social interaction.
While individuals may credit trust to institutions, physical matter, or unobserved forces,
this research is concerned with the determinants of the extent of generalized social trust.
Social trust requires human interaction, which is dependent on close physical,
technological, or social proximity. Social proximity occurs in two phases: initial and
sustained. Self-interest prompts initial interaction (Miller 1999, 1057), consisting of a
mixture of basic human needs, cultural attraction, selective incentives, and capital
exchange, while generalized trust: shared co-operative norms (Fukuyama 2001, 8), based
on non-cultural intrinsic and instrumental interests, drives sustained interaction.
The fragile state is a socio-political organism established by a social contract
which has diminished “control over its territory” (Di John 2010, 10) and contested
“monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory” (Weber 2015,
136). Its social contract has eroded, though not to the point of collapse or failure, nor
1

irreparably. It suffers from capacity, security, and legitimacy gaps (Eizenstat et al., 2005,
134–146) and is either “unable or unwilling to provide core services to its people”
(Vallings and Moreno-Torres 2005, 24), leaving many interests unmet. Fragile states
lack many of the necessary preconditions for the production of generalized trust; this is of
concern because state fragility levels are high and relatively stable (Bandura 2008, 17,
85; Marshall and Cole 2008, 12) particularly in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), ensuring their
perpetuation.
Much of the trust and fragile states literature fails to recognize that fragile states
come in many complex varieties with some types providing more optimal generalized
trust conditions than others (Call 2010, 316). Some in the trust literature (see Delhey et
al. 2011; van Hoorn 2015) recognize this diversity; however, focus their analysis on
cultural, economic, and political factors, while subordinating social effects. This
dissertation extends and strengthens this line of inquiry by producing an enhanced model
for examining the function of generalized trust in fragile states through the effects of a
society’s social network composition, defined as the configuration of and relationship
between social inputs that produce social network structures.
Sociological institutionalism and social capital theory together provide the most
suitable theoretical framework for analyzing the determinants of the generalized trust
radius (GTR): the extent that shared co-operative norms (Fukuyama 2001, 8) based on
non-community intrinsic and instrumental interests permeate society. Institutional
isomorphism is the homogeneity of social structures and processes between
organizational units under similar constraints (DiMaggio and Powell 1983, 157), and
institutional scripts are protocols for seeking interests (Shweder 1991, 98). Within this
2

theoretical framework, institutional isomorphism and scripts explain how social networks
form, are composed and persist to affect the GTR in fragile states.
A society’s social network composition, as much as its state security and contract
institutions, individualism-collectivism levels, and inter-state market forces, determines
whether groups are forced or incentivized to interact to meet interests and whether the
outcome is increased or decreased generalized trust (Posner 2004, 242). The trust and
fragile states literature rightly assume most fragile states produce narrow GTR, yet has
not pursued an explanation for fragile states that deviate from this typical outcome. The
test case of interest is subject to the same negative environmental factors as typical fragile
states and results in some of the same expected adverse outcomes, yet exhibits a
relatively wide GTR. No region has more fragile states than sub-Saharan Africa (SSA)
(Goldstone 2004, 454; Herbst 2004, 302). This dissertation employs a deviant, least
likely case selection method and most similar, multiple, and comparative case analysis
method to address how social network composition affects the GTR in the test cases of
Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, and Nigeria and control cases of Zambia and Zimbabwe.
The examination of fragile states matters because, in a globalizing world, one
state's problems readily become other states' problems, destabilizing regions in the
process. The GTR matters because trust’s outward expansion, more than its intensity
level, determines access to the positive externalities of expanding social networks and
increased access to physical, human, and social capital (Fukuyama 2001, 13; Morrone et
al. 2009, 5), and the avoidance of the negative externalities of information asymmetry
and moral hazard associated with a narrow GTR (Harrison 1985, 7).

3

Research Questions and Hypotheses
This research builds upon Fukuyama’s (2002) principal operational question for
fragile states: How fragile must states become and in what configurations, before
generalized trust is no longer able to expand (2002, 32). The state constrains much of
what is possible in society—if the state is fragile, so too should be the society…most of
the time. However, statist theories emphasizing security and contract institutions, alone,
do not explain all that constrains the GTR. The literature requires distinct theory and
models for fragile states on the verge of collapse or failure from those that are reasonably
functional (Posner 2003, 239; Rotberg 2004, 1-2). The examination of social
determinants, in addition to the statist, cultural, and market variables, has the potential to
close a significant gap in the literature.
The intersection of trust and fragile states provides fertile ground for many
pertinent research questions. This research is limited to questions addressing the
structural determinants of the GTR in fragile states, leaving the balance of agent-centered
and non-fragile state questions to future research. The four related research questions are
as follows:
1. How does social network composition affect the generalized trust radius in
fragile states?
2. How do institutions affect the generalized trust radius in fragile states?
3. How does culture affect the generalized trust radius in fragile states?
4. How do inter-state market forces affect the generalized trust radius in fragile
states?

The hypotheses for each research question are as follows:
H1: Increasing fractionalization, proximity, and power differential widen the
generalized trust radius in fragile states.
4

H2: Increasing state security and contract institutions widens the generalized trust
radius in fragile states.
H3: Increasing individualism widens the generalized trust radius in fragile states.
H4a: Increasing trade, FDI, and FPI widen the generalized trust radius in fragile
states.
H4b: Decreasing remittances, non-military aid, and military aid widen the
generalized trust radius in fragile states.
The hypotheses are operationalized for measurement and testing as follows and
are defined and clarified later:
•
•
•
•
•

Dependent Variable: [Generalized Trust Radius]
Test Variable: Social Network Composition [Fractionalization],
[Proximity] and [Power Differential]
Control Variable: Institutions [State Security and Contract Institutions]
Control Variable: Culture [Individualism]
Control Variable: Inter-State Market Forces [Trade], [FDI], [FPI],
[Remittances], [Non-Military Aid], and [Military Aid]

This research produces four contributions to the trust and fragile states literature.
First, it confirms and enhances control variable arguments and confirms the inclusion of
the test variable through the sociological institutionalism and social capital theory
theoretical framework, which produces an enhanced theoretically generalizable model for
analyzing structural determinants of the GTR in highly scripted fragile SSA states.
Second, it validates and advances the World Values Survey new trust question battery
and Delhey et al. (2011) generalized trust radius measurement through the development
of two concepts. The trust composition models the optimal balance of in-group,
generalized, and institutional trust for creating environments conducive to the widening
of the GTR. The trust differential demonstrates the variability of GTR potential and
realization among fragile states. Third, by identifying, modeling, and measuring a fuller
social effect on the GTR, it reveals generalized trust patterns across test cases, explains
5

fragile states’ transition from unipolarity to multipolarity, and describes incentivization
structures present in fragile state civil society networks. This dissertation is a unique and
original contribution at the intersection of the state, society, institutions, and trust, which
fills a critical gap in the trust and fragile states literature.
Theoretical Framework
The analysis of trust in the social sciences has been a multi-disciplinary effort
with economics, political science, psychology, and sociology each cutting different paths
through the trust literature, resulting in inefficiency and duplication of efforts. For a
concept with substantial explanatory power, the literature is quite disappointing (Delhey
et al. 2011, 800). The advancement of this literature requires, where permissible, an
inter-disciplinary integration of theories, data, and findings. Synthesis is beginning to
occur at the intersection of political science and sociology where the sub-disciplines of
political sociology, comparative politics, and social organization converge. Bridging this
gap in the literature are several related theories under the umbrella of sociological
institutionalism and social capital theory that together posit there is predictability within
complex systems of interaction.
Institutions have been defined as “the underlying rules of the game” (North 1990,
3) and “formal and informal rules and norms that organize social, political, and economic
relations” (1990, 3).
Institutions are durable, socially constructed “cognitive and symbolic
schemes” (Bevir 2006, 374), that shape (North 1990, 3) and constrain
thought, interest, and behavior through formal and informal sanctions and
incentives (Voigt 2013, 7).

6

While individual behavior is usually rational, institutional outcomes are often
unintentional, regulating products of recurring social interaction; repeated interactions
produce institutions. Therefore, formal and informal institutions are by definition,
enduring. To combat deinstitutionalizing forces, they must be adaptive. Effective
institutions delineate social expectations, while weak institutions are enforced
capriciously. Individuals desire clear expectations as they seek to meet their interests and
perpetually—usually tacitly—assess their environments to ascertain formal and informal
institutional jurisdictions, to determine and weigh incentives and sanctions for various
behaviors.
The majority of the social sciences was not convinced that institutions mattered—
again—until Meyer and Rowan (1977) and DiMaggio and Powell (1983) advanced
theory on the isomorphic transfer of institutions. Following this theoretical innovation,
many in the institutionalism literature increasingly—and rightly—assume institutions
governing inter-group interactions are highly scripted. Institutional theories, particularly
the sociological institutionalism branch of neo-institutionalism, have become standard
analytical lenses in comparative politics and public policy (Radaelli et al. 2012, 539).
Sociological institutionalism examines how the social structures of rules and norms,
which govern behavior, develop and become embedded in society (Scott 2004, 18) as
scripts, attempting to describe and explain when, how much, and under what conditions
institutions matter.
Social capital theory, advanced by Putnam (1995), Lin (2002) and Fukuyama
(2002) on the foundations of Granovetter (1973), Bourdieu (1986), and Coleman (1988),
has convinced the social sciences that social networks and trust matter because
7

institutions are embedded in social networks. Social capital is one form of capital.
Modern conceptions of capital originate from the natural law tradition as advanced by
Locke and Smith. Locke’s (2014 [1690], Chapter V, Paragraph 33) labor theory of
property aligns with natural law’s assertion of the human right to own that other than
oneself, claiming a person’s labor, when mixed with material, creates property. Capital
is “that part of a man's stock which he expects to afford him revenue” (Smith 1977
[1776], Book II, Chapter I) and surplus value (Marx and Engels 2012 [1867], 84) created
by human investment in resources of value to society (Lin 2005, 3). It may take various
forms embodied in material elements, finances, cultural embeddedness, knowledge,
skills, and social connectivity.
The social capital theory explains the emergence of generalized trust and the
social capital creation processes. Social capital is the surplus stock of networkembedded (Son and Lin 2008, 330) wealth, power, and reputation (Marsden and Lin
1982, 132, 205) that may be accessed, captured, and mobilized by network agents for
collective action (Lin et al. 2001, 29, 185) through investment in and promotion of
uncoerced cooperative social relations (Fukuyama 2001, 7). It is “a capability that arises
from the prevalence of trust in society…” (Fukuyama 1996, 26). While the creation of
social capital is vital for realizing the full array of positive externalities, the widening of
the GTR, resulting from reciprocated trust between strangers, is a precondition for its
creation (Fukuyama 2000, 99), and therefore the focus of this research.
Following these advances in sociological institutionalism and social capital
theory, the fragile states literature, advanced by Posner (2003) and Rotberg (2004), has
made initial progress in disaggregating fragile states. Delhey et al. (2011), through their
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new GTR measurement based on the World Values Survey (WVS) new 6-question trust
battery, has made possible the alignment of the literature at the intersection of trust and
fragile states. The reactivation of this discourse has provided the needed intellectual
space for modeling the function of the GTR in fragile states.
Methodology
A recent methodological debate has reinvigorated, yet divided the trust literature:
how generalizable across countries are the WVS trust questions. Because past trust
research has been prone to overgeneralization (Delhey et al. 2001, 787), this dissertation
delimits its case selection and analysis to a single socio-culturally similar region (SSA)
where there is a concentration of fragile states and where the concept of trust is likely to
be interpreted similarly.
The selected dependent, test, and control variables are defined and operationalized
here. The dependent variable [Generalized Trust Radius] is an outcome of social network
composition, state security and contract institutions, individualism, and inter-state market
forces. It is operationalized using the Delhey et al. (2011) derivative and transcendent
trust procedure for isolating the extension of in-group trust (derivative) from the GTR
(transcendent) and aggregating its measurement from the individual to the country level.
Transcendent trust is the most accurate proxy for the GTR. The difference between ingroup and generalized trust (trust differential) represents a society’s unrealized
generalized trust potential. Control variables may mitigate this gap through strong
institutions, individualism, and high trade and investment, as may the test variable
through increasing fractionalization, proximity, and multipolarity. Other related
mechanisms that increase inter-group interaction and possibly mitigate the gap include
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unmet interests, selective incentives, opportunities for capital exchange, and external
coercion.
1. This research introduces the test variable Social Network Composition,
operationalized and measured by [Fractionalization], [Proximity] and [Power
Differential]. A society’s social network composition includes its ethnic,
linguistic, and religious fractionalization, physical, technological, and social
proximity, and power differential polarity.
Social Network Composition is the configuration of and relationship
between social inputs that produce social network structure.
Fractionalization is the likelihood that two people chosen at random will
be from different (ethnic, linguistic, or religious) groups.
Proximity is the aggregate physical, technological, and social distance
between nodes in a network or across networks.
Power Differential is the difference in parity between nodes in a network
or across networks.
The product of social network composition, social network structure, is
defined as “influential and persistent sets of interrelationships” (Spillman
1995, 132) and flows between actors (Wasserman and Faust 1994).

This dissertation employs a 2x2 case selection typology to separate the control
and test cases of interest and utilizes several descriptive network measures (transitivity,
propinquity, and cohesion) to provide an analytical language (Emirbayer and Goodwin
1994, 1447) for explaining the effect SNC has on the GTR.
The literature-supported control variables include:
2. Institutions, operationalized and measured by [State Security & Contract
Institutions]
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Security Institutions are state-established rules for providing protection
from real and imagined, internal and external threats achieved by socially
appropriate means, which enables the free exercise of societal values and
the activation of social goods for all populations residing within the
territorial and political jurisdiction of the state.
Contract institutions are state-established legal statutes, bureaucratic
rules, and social conventions purposed to manage assets, real property,
and legal relationships through the penalization or incentivization of
appropriate behavior.

State security and contract institutions are measured using a combination of
World Bank quantitative data on state stability, violence, the rule of law, and corruption
and Voigt’s (2013, 17) qualitative procedure for assessing institution size, embeddedness,
strength, effectiveness, and duration.
3. Culture, operationalized and measured by [Individualism]
Culture is “collective programming of the mind” (Hofstede 2001, 9) that
guides the outworking of personal values held by a common identity group
through “inherited ethical habit” (Fukuyama 1995, 34) and “communityspecific ideas about what is true, good, beautiful, and efficient” (Shweder
2000, 163).
Individualism is the community preference for autonomy, selfdetermination, and a “loosely-knit social framework in which individuals
are expected to take care of only themselves and their immediate families”
(Hofstede 1984, 83).
In-group collectivism is the community preference for dependence,
interconnectivity, and attachment and “the degree to which individuals
express pride, loyalty, and cohesiveness in their organizations or
families” (House et al. 2004, 30).

Individualism and collectivism are the cultural components that most affect the
GTR. They are psychologically internalized feelings that are enacted and experienced
through one’s group(s) and society and are measured at the societal level most accurately
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along an individualism-collectivism continuum by comparing Hofstede (2001) and
GLOBE (2004) country-level data.
4. Inter-State Market Forces, operationalized and measured by [Trade], [FDI],
[FPI], [Remittances], [Military Aid], and [Non-Military Aid]
Inter-state Market Forces are uni- and bi-directional transfers of financial
and manufactured capital between states and societies.
Trade is the bi-directional transfer of financial and manufactured capital,
goods, and services between states and societies.
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is the active uni-directional investment
of financial or manufactured capital in another country’s market.
Foreign Portfolio Investment (FPI) is the passive uni-directional
investment of financial capital in another country’s market.
Remittance is the uni-directional transfer of financial capital from
individuals in a country’s diaspora to individuals in its home country.
Aid is the uni-directional transfer of military or non-military financial or
manufactured capital from one state or non-state actor to another for noncommercial purposes.

Inter-state market forces are measured by qualitative description and a
combination of annualized quantitative World Bank, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and United States Agency for International
Development (USAID) data.
These three control variables constitute the largest effects the trust literature has
found to have on the GTR. Additionally, since fractionalization alone is an insufficient
explanation for the social effects on the GTR, proximity and power differential are
needed additions to the social variable. This dissertation claims that even when security
and contract institutions are weak, society is collectivist, and remittances and aid exceed
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trade and investment, increased fractionalization, proximity, and power differential may
widen the GTR. Therefore, an analysis of necessary and sufficient conditions in the most
unfavorable environments is conducted to isolate the effects of SNC on the GTR.
Due to the disconfirmatory purpose of this research, the complexity of the GTR
concept and the limited number of fragile states with relatively wide GTR, the inference
is limited to the deterministic generalization of theoretical propositions related to welldefined and tightly bound most similar types of cases rather than probabilistic
generalization to a population. While one cannot draw big empirical conclusions from
this small-N examination incorporating a Most Similar Systems Design (MSSD)
(Lieberson 1994, 311), one may infer appropriate theoretical inference because this
research design ensures reliability and construct, internal, and external validity are high.
Structure
This introductory chapter has presented the relevant research questions, claims,
theoretical framework, research context, and methodology for examining the
determinants of the GTR in fragile states. Chapter II organizes and synthesizes the
relevant trust and fragile states literature. Themes include:
•
•
•
•

Defining, disaggregating, and classifying fragile states.
Proxy measures for the GTR.
Theoretical frameworks and methods for analyzing generalized trust.
Independent variable rationales.

Chapter III presents the logic and suitability of the selected methodology and
cases and presents a detailed framework for its implementation. Chapter IV reports the
literature’s most pertinent quantitative and qualitative findings organized thematically by
each variable. Chapter V tests the research hypotheses through within- and cross-case
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analyses of each variable and comparative analysis and synthesis of all variables across
all cases. Finally, Chapter VI provides conclusions and research and policy
recommendations for future research.
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CHAPTER II – LITERATURE REVIEW
Happy families [states] are all alike; every unhappy family [state] is
unhappy in its own way.
—Leo Tolstoy, Anna Karenina
Since the emergence of the modern state initiated by the Peace of Westphalia in
1648, states have existed in increasingly complex configurations, each producing a
unique trust environment. During this period, societies have transitioned from
disconnected feudal fiefdoms embedded in loosely knit empires into a relatively
consolidated inter-dependent global system of states.
The number of states has increased substantially due primarily to rapid
decolonization and the break-up of the former Soviet Union. The number of states has
nearly doubled since the end of World War II in August 1945 (Rotberg 2003, 2). There
were 55 states at the beginning of the twentieth century (Herbst 2004, 304) increasing to
195 (U.S. Department of State) in 2018. Many of the newest states resulting from
decolonization are the most dysfunctional (Rotberg 2004, 1). Fragile, collapsed, and
failed states, primarily concentrated in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) (Goldstone 2004, 454;
Herbst 2004, 302; Puddington and Roylance 2017, 11), will continue to be a concern for
the foreseeable future.
A state’s primary purpose is the provision of stability for its population. To what
or whom is trust credited in states where basic needs of water, food, shelter, and security
are consistently met, and violations of the rule of law are sanctioned fairly and
transparently? Trustworthy institutions underwrite the risk inherent in inter-group
interaction. Groups may lean on strong state institutions to seek interests with potentially
untrustworthy groups. Besides minimally effective security and contract institutions,
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which are essential for the widening of the generalized trust radius (GTR), non-fragile
states also have functioning infrastructure, social service delivery, and economic
regulation institutions. Such institutions serve as a capable second- and third-party
contract agent for their populations. This type of state is stable because it has strong
institutions and has struck a satisfactory balance of generalized and in-group trust.
However, this type of state is susceptible to overdependence on formal institutions,
rendering its generalized trust less able to fill gaps in the rare occurrence of institutional
weakening.
It is a mischaracterization that predatory tyrants lead most fragile states (Di John
2011, 6). Each fragile state has a unique mixture of weak institutions and contexts that
bound what is politically possible for leaders, which requires different coercion and
incentivization strategies to realize developmental goals and produce a congruence of
norms and stability. While coercive strategies may successfully produce minimally
secure environments, they often have the unintended consequence of increasing in-group
trust (Widner 1995, 148) and decreasing generalized trust.
At its logical extreme, societal congruence entails the total loss of group cohesion;
the desired end of totalitarian political systems. To what or whom then is trust credited in
fragile states where many interests go unmet, and the state is unwilling or unable to meet
all of its population’s expectations? In this type of state, elites either benefit from the
state—likely to the detriment of others—or avoid the state, through access to foreign
capital. Individuals prefer to have their interests met by their own group due to the power
of cultural attraction. However, because groups are rarely able to meet all of their
members’ interests in this context, inter-group interaction occurs, even if not desired.
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Where low levels of generalized trust exist, inter-group cooperation requires easily
monitored and enforceable institutions (Chan 2007, 734). Void of a moderate-high
functioning state worthy of institutional trust (Plattner and Diamond 1994, 3) and able to
moderate inter-group interaction, these societies rarely benefit from the positive
externalities of increasing generalized trust. While this is true of the typical fragile state,
there are types of fragile states that have realized more of their generalized trust potential
than the literature recognizes.
This review of the pertinent trust and fragile states literatures is organized
thematically into four sections. The first section provides an extensive background
discussion on the dynamics of trust, interests, inter-group interaction, and the GTR in
fragile states. The second section introduces the joint sociological institutionalism and
social capital theory theoretical framework. The third section delineates the independent
variables: social network composition, security and contract institutions, individualism,
and inter-state market forces. Finally, the fourth section clarifies this dissertation’s
contribution to the literature.
Background
Human development is thus about much more than the rise or fall of
average national incomes; it is about creating an environment in which
people can develop their full potential and lead productive, creative lives
in accord with their needs and interests.
—Damien Kingsbury, Political Development
The social world is best understood through interactions. Individuals expect a
return on their social investments when interacting (Lin et al. 2001, 8), though a form of
capital, be it financial, physical, human, or social. Self-interest is the desire to advance
one’s perceived well-being; this requires regular social interaction within and sometimes
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between groups. The primary drivers of initial inter-group interaction—because groups
do not share cultural attraction—are either incentivized instrumental interests or external
coercion. Even in non-fragile states, where many preconditions exist for positive intergroup interaction, generalized trust is required to sustain positive interaction (Miller
1999, 1057).
The trust literature has developed multi-disciplinarily, segmented between
psychology, sociology, political science, and economics (see Ahn and Esarey 2008;
Bauer 2015; Delhey et al. 2011; Fukuyama 2001; Granovetter 1973; Hardin 1992;
Harrison 1985; Lin et al. 2001; Lundmark et al. 2016; Realo et al. 2008; Torpe and Lolle
2011; van Hoorn 2014; Uslaner 2002; Welzel and Delhey 2015). It has concentrated on
the examination of institutional trust, generalized trust level, and aggregated trustingness
and trustworthiness in non-fragile states while paying less attention to the GTR in fragile
states because developed contexts are more easily accessible. As developing world data
has become more trustworthy, reliable, and available, these literature have begun to
converge.
The fragile states literature has been driven by the international relations (IR) subdiscipline (Büger and Bethke 2011, 28-9) (see Bratton 1989; Call and Cousens 2008;
Chauvet et al. 2007; Coleman 1988; Di John 2010; Easterly 2008; Goldstone et al. 2004;
Kaplan 2008; Lin 2005; Lowenkopf 1995; Migdal 1988; Ncube et al. 2014; Posner 2003,
2004; Rotberg 2004; Vallings and Torres 2005; Woolcock 1998). It has focused on
democratization, institutional failure, and political regimes in developing states, rather
than on trust. Except for Zartman (1995) and Fukuyama (2001), the dearth of
comparative politics literature on state fragility is puzzling since its theories are better
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equipped to address states’ inability “to implement rules, collect taxes and enforce
monopolies of violence” (Lambach 2007, 33). This dissertation returns the examination
of state fragility to the sub-discipline of comparative politics, where the discourse is best
advanced.
The trust and fragile states literature have struggled to agree on conceptual
boundaries, definitions, and measurement criteria, producing disorganized and stunted
discourses (Vallings and Moreno-Torres 2005, 4). The trust literature has long
recognized the need for the objective, universal measurement of its concepts (Morrone
and Ranuzzi 2009, 7), yet has been unable to agree on the boundary between in-group
and generalized trust (Beugelsdijk and Smulders 2004, 2-3; Portes 1998, 7; Sztompka
1999, 42). While the fragile states literature has wrestled with the criteria for
distinguishing between non-fragile, fragile, collapsed, and failed states, entertaining
many competing and overlapping terms to describe similar phenomena.
State Fragility
This dissertation adheres to the Weberian definition of state based on the Lockean
view of the social contract. Weber defines “a state [as] a human community that
(successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given
territory” (Weber 2015, 136). Much of the fragile states literature agrees there are broad
indicators of stateness that determine a state’s legitimacy and condition. Rotberg (2003,
3) provides the following hierarchy of positive state functions: security; regulatory and
enforcement institutions; political participation; social service delivery; infrastructure;
and regulation of the economy. Two of these variables (security and regulatory and
enforcement institutions) serve as control variables for this dissertation.
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The Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States (1933) drafted,
signed, and ratified by seventeen western hemisphere states defines the state in relation to
an equal community of states. Claims of statehood are legitimate as long as they do not
violate the harm principle and infringe upon the rights of other states (Article 3). Peerrecognition is central to this definition, only when there are competing claims of
statehood and sovereignty over the same geographic territory (e.g., Israel-Palestine)
(Article 6). It considers the criteria of a permanent population, a defined territory and
government, and capacity to enter into relations with other states (Article 1), to assess
claims. This method is undoubtedly democratic in theory, although, is vulnerable to
political motivation by the community of states.
States that violate Weber, Rotberg, or Montevideo Convention stateness criteria,
may slide lower on the state fragility continuum; however, the international community
of states is divided over at what point a state is no longer sovereign. Dysfunctional states
that fall below these, admittedly nebulous standards, have been described in the IR-led
fragile states literature as “weak,” “fragile,” or “poorly performing,” with more extreme
and rare cases labeled “failed” or “collapsed” (Torres and Anderson 2004, 5). These
competing definitions over this conceptual territory have confused the literature leading
to misunderstanding of how the GTR functions in dysfunctional states. The once popular
term, “weak state,” has diminished in influence. In 2003, the White House’s National
Strategy for Combating Terrorism (NSCT) report defined “weak states” as lacking the
“capacity to fulfill their sovereign responsibilities” (White House 2006, 78), but since the
2006 report, it has no longer used the term “weak states” (2006, 76).
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When most researchers consider dysfunctional states, they think first of SSA
because it is the most uniformly fragile region (Herbst 2004, 302; Ncube et al. 2014, 2;
Vallings and Torres 2005, 7), having the “most inhospitable conditions for stability and
democracy” (Goldstone 2004, 454). The widening of the GTR requires a minimally
functional state. Collapsed and failed states’ security and contract institutions are so
damaged (Wyler 2008, 4) they require external intervention, often through a United
Nations Peacekeeping Operation or Mission. In failed states such as Afghanistan, Central
African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo, Iraq, South Sudan, Syria, and
Yemen, the state exists but is not in sufficient control. They are unable to, without
assistance, control their territory and are “tense, deeply conflicted, dangerous, and
contested bitterly by warring factions” (Rotberg 2003, 5). Collapsed states such as
Somalia are rare; the state no longer exists, producing “a vacuum of authority (2003, 9)
and groups take on functions of the state such as security and contract enforcement.
The state type of interest for this research is fragile, rather than non-fragile,
collapsed, or failed because the research question requires a context where the widening
of the GTR is unlikely, yet possible. The majority of the state literature and development
practitioners embrace the concept of state fragility while a minority avoid it. They use it
to describe, weigh, and measure multifaceted state dysfunction, while some claim donors
use it to “legitimize their strategic objectives in foreign policy” (Grimm et al. 2014, 205).
The desire to avoid it arises from the potential political fallout from labeling states as
fragile; this position has led the European Union to refrain from its use (Grimm 2014,
262). Some fragile, failed, and collapsed states embrace the concept. Twenty selfdeclared fragile states formed the g7+ in an attempt to influence international
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development donors and the fragile states discourse (Hughes et al., 2014, 2). However,
more than one-third of member states are failed (e.g., Yemen) or collapsed (e.g.,
Somalia), rather than fragile states.
The state literature has had difficulty agreeing on a definition for state fragility
(Kaplan 2014, 15), with some favoring the OECD or World Bank definitions.
A fragile state has “weak capacity to carry out basic governance functions,
and lacks the ability to develop mutually constructive relations with
society. Fragile states are also more vulnerable to internal and external
shocks such as economic crises or natural disasters” (Organization for
Economic Co-operation and Development 2012, 85).
A fragile state is one “facing particularly severe development challenges:
weak institutional capacity, poor governance, and political instability.
Often these countries experience ongoing violence as the residue of past
severe conflict” (World Bank 2012).
While this dissertation appreciates the succinctness of these definitions, both are
ultimately unsatisfying alone because they use static categories to describe dynamic
environments where some state institutions are becoming more fragile and others less so.
The factors predisposing a country to fragility and conflict may be many
and varied, and a very different set of factors—i.e., not merely the same
factors working in the opposite direction— may shape that country’s
pathways into and out of fragility (Woolcock 2014, 11).
This dissertation defines fragile states by building on these definitions and
additional insights from the Fragile States Index (Fund for Peace 2018). A fragile state
has a net diminished capacity to provide stability for its population and interact as an
equal in the international community through a combination of decreased: institutional
functionality, territorial control, legitimate use of force, and provision of essential public
services, rendering it overall more vulnerable to shocks.
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Even this definition is necessarily limited in that it does not indicate which
institutions are diminished, nor how much or if the state as a whole is becoming more or
less fragile. While fragile states may have specific areas of fragility, they are not fragile
across all institutions. Notably, their security and contract institutions are at least
minimally functional; otherwise, they would be considered failed or collapsed. While no
single geopolitical region is culturally, economically, or politically homogenous, many
(30 of 45) SSA states are uniformly fragile, as opposed to non-fragile, collapsed, or
failed. Sub-Saharan Africa has the most similar geopolitical context, institutional
conditions, and developmental constraints. The pan-African experience is relatable
across countries and is, therefore, the most suitable geo-political region for this
examination of generalized trust. This is not to say that SSA lacks diversity; this research
agrees with Allen (1995, 318) who disputes Kaplan’s (1994) overgeneralization of a
single African political culture.
The states literature has made greater advances explaining non-fragile, collapsed,
and failed states than fragile states. These opposing state types clearly violate or adhere
to stateness criteria, while fragile states come in complex varieties. It is therefore
understandable that the literature has opted to examine these easier research targets, while
leaving the fragile states literature in a fragile state itself, with unclear definitions and
measurement criteria. The state literature and development industry have produced
numerous indices of state dysfunction that measure overlapping economic, political,
social, and security factors. None, to date, explain sub-state variation in capacity across
state sectors (Di John 2009, 16), which is essential for assessing trust environments. Of
the four most popular state dysfunction indices—each claiming to measure something
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different—there is a 75 percent overlap of the top 16 most dysfunctional states (Wyler
2008, 32). The Brookings Institution “Index of State Weakness” (ISW) (2008) focuses
more on standard economic measurements of GNI, GDP, inequality, and inflation, while
the other three share a legitimacy, policy, and poverty focus. The World Bank’s
“Harmonized List of Fragile Situations” (HFS) (2016) primarily documents the locations
of UN has Peacekeeping or Political and Peacebuilding Missions, an indication that the
state is likely collapsed or failed rather than fragile. It focuses more on political
institutions while the other three share a political legitimacy and human rights focus. The
Fund for Peace “Fragile States Index” (FSI) (2016) and Systemic Peace “State Fragility
Index” (SFI) (2015), when measuring social factors, share a focus on spillover effects
while the other two focus domestically. Also, the FSI and ISW focus on conflict in their
security measures while the HFS does not include conflict measures at all. Alone, these
indices are less useful for this research, but together, they provide valuable triangulation
of data sources claiming to measure aspects of state fragility.
Table 1
State Dysfunction Indices

Country

Fragile States
Index 2017
(higher = more
fragile)
(N=178)

Index of
State
Weakness
2008
(lower =
weaker)
(N=141)

State Fragility
Index 2016
(higher = more
fragile)
(N=167)

Most
Dysfunctional
Ethiopia
Nigeria
Zimbabwe
Mali
Rwanda

113.9
(South Sudan)
101.1
101.6
101.6
92.9
90.8

0.52
(Somalia)
4.46
4.88
3.44
5.85
4.68
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(Congo, DRC)
19
18
17
16
16

24

Global
Peace
Index
2017
(higher =
less
peaceful)
(N=163)
3.814
(Syria)
2.477
2.849
2.352
2.596
2.227

Fragile
Situations
2017
(lower =
more
fragile)
(N=35)
1.11
(Somalia)
2.76
3.53
-

Table Continued
Burkina Faso
Zambia
South Africa
Ghana
Least
Dysfunctional

88.0
87.8
72.3
69.7
18.7
(Finland)

5.51
5.23
7.50
6.72
9.41
(Slovakia)

16
12
8
11
0
(UK)

2.07
1.786
2.324
1.793
1.111
(Iceland)

N/A

Note: Most recent data from each source is used.
“Fragile Situations” have: either a) a harmonized average CPIA country rating of 3.2 or less, or b) the presence of a UN regional
peacekeeping or peace-building mission during the preceding three years.
Sources: The Fund for Peace “Fragile States Index” (FSI) (2017); The Brookings Institute “Index of State Weakness” (2008); The
Systemic Peace “State Fragility Index” (2016); Institute for Economics & Peace Global Peace Index (2017); World Bank’s
“Harmonized List of Fragile Situations” (2017)
Data extracted from sources on 12/02/17.

While fragile states are unstable, they appear to be stably so, with their relative
FSI index rankings remaining static from 2005 to 2016 (Fund for Peace 2016). For the
minority of states that did fluctuate during this period, more decreased in fragility, but
those that increased in fragility did so more intensely (Fund for Peace 2016). Zimbabwe
dropped ten places from 15th to fifth; Pakistan dropped 25 places from 34th to ninth;
Nepal dropped 15 places from 35th to 20th; and Kenya dropped 12 places from 26th to
14th, all of which worsened following severe currency, electoral, and security crises.
Each of these cases also had an endemic structural fragility that allowed a series of agentdriven economic and political events to plunge them into greater fragility.
Trust
How does trust function in these complex environments with chronically fragile
institutions, rendering them incapable of fulfilling their gap-filling purpose (Plattner and
Diamond 1994, 3)? The trust and state literature claim successful societies have
increasing trust (see Almond and Verba 1963; Arrow 1972; Delhey et al. 2011; Freitag
and Bühlmann 2009; Gambetta 1988; Herreros 2004; Kramer 1999; Stolle 2002;

Sztompka 1999; Uslaner 2002). However, there are multiple types of trust, and the
literature disagrees from where they arise and what causes them. Some in the trust
literature claim trust is primarily a learned behavior gained through cooperative
experiences with others (see Delhey and Welzel 2012; Hardin 2002; Seligman 1999;
Sztompka 1999), rather than an invariable socio-cultural antecedent. This view of trust
does not give sufficient weight to the institutional effects that tacitly shape actor
behavior, though it does challenge the incorrect assumption that there is little to be done
to increase generalized trust in fragile states.
Trust is the confidence a human (truster) has in a physical object, formal or
informal institution, unobserved force, or another human (trustee) (Hardin 1992, 152). It
has an instrumental purpose in all societies, to manage the risk involved with cooperation
and avoidance (Hardin 1993, 362; Luhmann 1988, 95). Trusters choose to credit trust to
trustees because they have a cultural or instrumental interest in continuing the
relationship (Cook et al. 2005, 5) and deem them worthy based on their public reputation.
Reputation, however, is more easily monitored within groups than between groups where
greater information asymmetry makes verification more costly. Without sufficient
verification, groups form myths about out-groups that members adopt uncritically (Mealy
et al. 2015, 394). While it is possible to credit trust to someone not physically proximate,
as consumers and voters regularly do, generalized trust is generated most effectively
through inter-personal interaction (Cook and Hardin 2001, 327; Couch et al. 1996, 305).
Trust is a relatively stable feature of societies. The components of trust,
trustingness of the truster and trustworthiness of the trustee and the structural forces that
drive them, vary greatly between and within societies at the individual level, however,
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when aggregated to the group or society, are relatively stable over time. Individual
antecedent trustingness is a composite of inborn trustingness disposition and formative
developmental context. Poverty and instability are generators of mistrust; the more a
population perceives valued resources to be scarce, the less trustworthy they perceive
others to be (Mealy et al. 2015, 414). From this foundation, individuals rationally
calculate trust choices, limited by their capacity and available information in specific
contexts. Mutual trust reduces uncertainty and ambiguity (McFarlin et al. 1999, 64) and
“increases efficiency in human interactions” (Buskens and Raub 2002, 168 quoting
Arrow 1974). With each mutually-positive self-interest-driven interaction, a truster’s
trustingness of a trustee’s trustworthiness increases, decreasing transaction costs
(Helliwell and Putnam 2004, 1442) and increasing positive externalities and the
probability of future interactions.
Self-Interest
The trust literature often misconstrues interests, positions, and motivations.
Groups avoid interaction unless there is potential to meet an interest that cannot be
satisfied within the group. Although Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs requires revision
(Trigg 2004, 397), it serves as an appropriate rough template to model interest seeking in
fragile states. While individuals may experience less self-interested motives (e.g.,
fairness and aversion to inequality) (Chan 2007, 739), more common self-interests
include:
•
•

Requirements to sustain life (e.g., air, water, food, health, sex, shelter, and
security).
That which improves life (e.g., freedom, capital, employment, power, and
services).
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•
•

That which denotes humanness (e.g., humor, justice, aesthetics,
spirituality, abstract thought, future planning, and conscience).
That which imbues purpose (e.g., identity, love, solidarity, reputation, and
community.

Humans, being subject to the physiological constraints of thirst, hunger, fear,
sexual desire, and thermoregulation (Godsil et al. 2003, 34), are first-and-foremost
motivated by their instincts (Forgas et al. 2005, 2) of pain and punishment avoidance and
pleasure and reward-seeking followed by the desire for community, belonging, and love.
However, because humans are complex sentient social actors that are neither perfect nor
entirely rational homo-economicus, a greater understanding of how different types of
trust interplay with interests is required (Miller 1999, 1053).
Contact Hypothesis
The Stranger is close to us, insofar as we feel between him and ourselves
common features of a national, social, occupational, or generally human,
nature. He is far from us, insofar as these common features extend beyond
him or us, and connect us only because they connect a great many people.
—Simmel and Wolff, The Stranger
Allport’s (1954) contact hypothesis claims that interaction between strangers
reduces prejudice (Mutz 2002, 113). “Contact, under certain specified conditions, will
bring about positive attitude changes; the more people learn about each other, the less
prejudice and the more positive interactions there will be” (Svensson and Brouneus 2013,
565). This theory gets it partially right. Inter-group interaction may lead to either the
strengthening hostile feelings (Forbes 1997, 203) or the reduction of stereotyping and
greater tolerance (Mutz 2006, 164). Interaction, driven by a high tolerance for risk-taking
and the need for met interests outside of one’s group, can either lead to conflict and
violence or cooperation and tolerance; avoidance can lead only to myth-based
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stereotyping of groups based on information asymmetry which results in violent conflict
when interaction does occur. The most positive inter-group interaction outcomes occur
when opposing group members are unaware of the other’s group membership status when
initiating contact (Pettigrew 1997, 174). State policies driven by the contact hypothesis
are likened to prescribed forest management burns, aimed at reducing fuel loads over
time to decrease the likelihood of uncontrollable fires in the future. While there may be
initial tension and conflict by incentivizing or coercing inter-group interaction, done
correctly, it acts as a pressure valve; applying small periodic doses of conflictual intergroup interaction to prevent future violence can be a sound strategy.
Types of Trust
In-group and generalized trusts are two discrete and separately measurable types
of social trust present in and essential to all societies. They have been subject to ongoing
definitional variance among competing alternatives (see Beugelsdijk and Smulders 2004;
Portes 1998; Sztompka 1999). In-group trust—that which is credited within groups—is
contingent on the interest of cultural and ideological solidarity and attraction. Even when
a group fails to provide for its members’ instrumental interests, they are likely to continue
to value in-group relationships as long as their cultural self-interest is met. Generalized
trust—that which is credited between groups—is contingent on the interest of mutual
economic and political benefit (see Freitag and Traunmüller 2009; Newton and Zmerli
2011; Oskarsson et al. 2009; Stolle 2002; Uslaner 2002; Yamagishi and Yamagishi
1994). This dissertation also employs the terms in-group and out-group to distinguish
between individuals’ self-identified group(s) and all other groups respectively. The term
trust level signifies its intensity, while trust radius its outward extension.
29

Table 2
Types of Social Trust
Definition

Preferred
Terms

Yamagishi
and
Yamagishi
(1994)

Alternate Sources/Terms
Putnam
Knack and
(1995)
Keefer
(2000)
(1997)

Uslaner
(2002)

Delhey et al.
(2011)

Trust in
own group

In-group

Knowledgebased
or
Particularized

Bonding
or
Thick

Specific

Moralist

Derivative
or
In-Group

Trust in
other
groups

Generalized

General
or
Generalized

Bridging
or
Thin

Anonymous

Strategic

Transcendent
or
Generalized

Each trust type has a discrete level of intensity and radius of extent, and in-group
trust level is always more intense than generalized trust level because there are
limitations to the extent of feelings of solidarity between groups (Arnett 2002, 776) as
well as the state’s ability to manage pluralism (Yeates 2002, 647). A society that
theoretically had a higher generalized than in-group trust level would risk social
atomization.
Homogeneous groups have many advantages over heterogeneous groups in that
their high in-group trust and reciprocity serve to efficiently limit free-riding (Paldam and
Svendsen 2000, 344) through the mechanism of social sanction (Olson 1965, 62). As
well, their greater network solidarity and cohesion provides greater options for collective
action (Meinzen-Dick et al. 2004, 19), particularly when engaging in the market (Ruben
and Heras 2012, 463). Increasing in-group trust produces direct positive externalities and
efficiencies for the involved parties and indirectly for the whole group, but may
contribute to either negative or positive externalities for other groups. When groups
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pursue collective action through seeking “prestige, respect, standing in the community,
and even the avoidance of social disapproval” (Bratton 1989, 427-8), it regularly results
in negative externalities for other groups (Olson 1982, 23).
The trust literature has long agreed that homogeneous environments predict
trustworthiness and trustingness, but studies often fail to disaggregate in-group,
generalized, and institutional trusts for analysis. Every inter-group interaction is
composed of part in-group, generalized, and institutional trust. The presence of cultural
attraction makes principles more willing to forego instrumental interests. Oppositely, in
the absence of cultural attraction, generalized trust may increase if principles perceive
their interaction to be mutually beneficial. Because institutions make interaction
possible, principles credit some trust to the institutions managing the interaction; the
amount depends on how trustworthy the principles perceive the institution to be. Glaeser
et al. make claims on the positive correlation between homogeneity and trust, stating,
“when individuals are closer socially, both trust and trustworthiness rise” (Glaeser et al.
2000, 811).
…social connection strongly predicts trustworthiness and weakly predicts
trust. In particular, national and racial differences between partners
strongly predict a tendency to cheat one another – Glaeser et al. (2000,
840)
They claim trusting people are trustworthy people and trusting behavior and
trustworthiness are stable individual characteristics. “To determine whether someone is
trustworthy, ask him if he trusts others” (2000, 840). The assertion that it is easier to
credit trust to someone who looks, smells, and sounds like oneself, transfers well from
this research site, Harvard undergraduate classrooms, to SSA. The more dissimilar and
31

disconnected individuals and groups are from one another, the less likely they are to give
the “Other” the initial benefit of the doubt.
This study provides strong support for the joint use of experiments and surveys in
the examination of trust as it finds trustworthiness is “strongly predicted by attitudinal
survey questions about trust” (not trustworthiness), as well as by respondents having
siblings (2000, 840). However, experiments are rarely possible in the examination of
national-level or cross-country political phenomena. The authors’ claims leave open the
possibility of some types of homogeneous environments having low generalized trust and
some heterogeneous environments having highly trusting populations and high
generalized trust, although highly trustworthy populations are less likely. This study
provides support for this dissertation’s examination of how trustingness, generalized
trust, and even trustworthiness may increase in heterogeneous fragile states, through
greater inter-group interaction opportunities—by force, but preferably incentive—to meet
groups’ interests.
Limitations of In-Group Trust
Most individuals’ interests are met through their identity group(s) or the state.
Cultural attraction, driven by “shared norms and values” (Fukuyama 2002, 27),
solidarity, and community self-interest, serve as a powerful social force drawing similar
individuals together to meet interests. Guiding appropriate thought and behavior within
groups are informal institutional scripts consisting of culturally organized common codes
(Parsons 1971, 5), which aid individuals in making efficient judgments about others’
suitability for meeting their interests (DiMaggio 1992, 125), whether it be marriage,
business, or friendship. Within these bounded systems of meaning, values operate rather
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tacitly, where people are unaware of why they value what they do, “they just ‘know’ or
‘feel’ how to do the right thing” (Hofstede 2010, 20).
Goal contagion, the scripted adoption of others’ goals to meet one’s self-interest
of community, strengthens in-group trust. Self-interest drives individual behavior, but
scripts incentivize and reward group members for inferring the goals from other
members’ actions (Aarts et al. 2004, 23-4), providing an efficient template for
appropriate ways of thinking, feeling, and behaving in the pursuit of self-interest. This
social intercourse and resulting positive recognition results in the spreading and
strengthening of community self-interest, ideas, and goals. However, due to information
asymmetry and capacity limits, group members do not perfectly perceive, evaluate, and
adopt others’ goals. Together, cultural attraction and goal contagion ensure in-group trust
intensity is always stronger than generalized trust (see Brewer 1981; Kramer 1999, 5813) and are sufficient to create strong bonds within groups, resulting in a limited form of
social capital and relatively narrow trust radii (Harrison 1985, 7; Uslaner 2012, 194)
across society.
While in-group trust may stimulate social capital between members, for it to
increase further, positive inter-group interaction is required. The more different groups
are, the more they lack cultural attraction, leaving the only drivers of social interaction to
be non-cultural intrinsic and instrumental interests or external force. Groups’ inability or
unwillingness to meet members’ instrumental interests provides a potential sharing
context (Boisot 1995, 119) between groups, though this does not guarantee sustained
cooperation. Selective incentives, including prestige, respect, financial remuneration
(Posner 2004, 241), status, social contacts, and access (Clark and Wilson 1961, 172), may
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serve to motivate collective action and limit free riding within and between groups.
Public goods theory and critical mass theory may also have utility in explaining
collective action spurned by self-interest, and physical, technological, and social
proximity theories may have value in explaining group proximity, which is required for
inter-group interaction to occur (Galaskiewicz and Wasserman 1994, 29).
Social Capital
Social capital’s generation requires instrumentally intentioned agents to be
positioned advantageously in networks (Lin 2001, 11). It is challenging to measure
directly because its analysis requires measurable trust, reciprocity, networks, and
institutions (Ostrom 1994, 323-7). Further, proving causal direction is difficult, which is
why the trust literature has debated the most appropriate proxy measures for it (see Bauer
2015, 2; Dasgupta and Serageldin 2001; Portes 2000, 33; Robinson 2002) and treated it
as both a dependent variable and independent variable. Past inadequate proxies for social
trust and social capital have included “ethnic homogeneity, income inequality, or
religious composition” (Knack 2001, 14).
Generalized Trust Radius
Again, the generalized trust radius is the extent that shared co-operative norms
(Fukuyama 2001, 8) based on non-community intrinsic and instrumental interests
permeate society. It represents a societies’ network connectivity between groups. The
GTR literature subsequent to the release of the 2011 Delhey et al. (2011) new generalized
trust measure (see Bauer 2015; Torpe and Lolle 2011; Van der Veld and Saris 2011; van
Hoorn 2014; Welzel and Delhey 2015) has made improvements to the literature prior to it
(see Ahn and Esarey 2008; Bankston and Zhou 2002, 285; Fukuyama 2001; Granovetter
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1973; Hardin 1992; Harrison 1985; Realo et al. 2008; Reeskens and Hooghe 2008).
Delhey and Welzel (2012) extend and refine the Delhey et al. (2011) argument for the use
of the new trust measure, conducting “the first broadly cross-national study of how
outgroup-trust is generated relative to ingroup-trust” (Delhey and Welzel 2012, 65).
They claim generalized trust is conceptually distinct from in-group trust rather than an
extension of it (see Beugelsdijk and Smulders 2004; Portes 1998; Sztompka 1999) and
ask under what conditions generalized trust emerges independent of in-group trust. They
conclude that the Prerequisite version of Alliance Theory, which considers in-group trust
to be a necessary, but not sufficient, condition of generalized trust (Delhey and Welzel
2012, 46), explains the GTR best.
The trust literature agrees that the widening of the GTR is the foremost
prerequisite and mechanism for the creation of social capital and the positive externalities
associated with it, and is, therefore, its most accurate proxy measure (Fukuyama 2002,
32; Uslaner 2002, 7). Often, when widening, “the [generalized] radius of trust can be
thought of as a type of positive externality because it is a benefit that accrues to the group
[or society] independently of the collective action that the group [or society] formally
seeks to achieve” (Fukuyama 2001, 13). However, generalized trust is only “a very
specific component of social capital” (Hooghe 2007, 711). What is missing in these
claims is actor agency through the mechanisms of reputation and interests. It is more
accurate to measure the GTR through its structural causes (social network composition,
security and contract institutions, individualism and collectivism, and inter-state market
forces) than by its outputs (decreased information asymmetry and increased access to
physical, human, and social capital) (Fukuyama 2001, 13; Morrone et al. 2009, 5).
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The GTR and social capital are amoral (Foley and Edwards 1997, 671), and the
crediting of trust to out-groups does not guarantee the trustworthiness of the out-group
trustee, nor that participants enter into the interaction honestly communicating their
intentions. In fragile states, where many interests go unmet, and the state serves as a
weak intermediary, this is a concern. “Even if trust improves social and political
interactions between dissimilar groups, it is not always good or necessary” (Morrone et
al. 2009, 5). Inter-group interaction does not guarantee the advancement of the social
good, as is evidenced in highly interactive fragile conflict-ridden states where increased
inter-group interaction often produces conflict and violence.

Theoretical Framework
The need for a unified body of theory able to explain trust in fragile states is
considerable. Most theories explain typical cases where fragile states produce fragile
societies (see Caparini 2005; Ikelegbe 2013, 36; Posner 2005, 247) with narrow GTR
(see Bratton 1989, 428; Kaplan 2008, 4; Lowenkopf 1995, 104; Posner 2004, 246).
Undeniably, the trust-fragile states literature’s assumption that the GTR cannot be wide
or widen in collapsed and failed states is sound, although this claim requires extensive
revision for the theoretically rich conceptual space occupied by fragile states.
There is predictability within complex systems of interaction. The joint
theoretical framework of sociological institutionalism and social capital theory enables
the construction of an enhanced theoretically generalizable model for explaining how
institutions embedded in social networks form, constrain behavior, and shape trust
environments through the GTR in fragile states.
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Sociological Institutionalism
The social sciences literature has wavered back and forth and back again from
classical institutionalism to behaviorism to neo-institutionalism, as to how much
institutions matter for the production of trust. Sociological institutionalism explains how
institutions function through the concepts of institutional isomorphism and institutional
scripts. “Sociological institutionalists focus on values and identities, and the ways in
which these shape actors’ perceptions of their interests” (Bevir 2006, 374). Institutional
configurations within states “affect political culture, encourage some kinds of group
formation and collective political actions (but not others), and make possible the raising
of certain political issues (but not others)” (Goodwin and Skocpol 1989, 489).
To follow social scripts is to be human. Institutions govern and shape all social
interaction through scripted practices that are “embedded in structures of meaning and
resources” (March and Olsen 2006, 3). They are also mostly unintentional and enduring,
providing tacit guidance for appropriate thought and behavior. Nonetheless, not all rules
and social conventions are institutions. Institutions are embedded in the group,
state/society, and international levels. Rules that govern one’s self are not institutions
because institutions are social (Voigt 2013, 8) and rules that govern particular families
are rarely institutions because institutions have broad reach throughout a group or
society.
The literature categorizes institutions as formal and informal based on their legal
status. Formal institutions derive from the state in the form of officially sanctioned laws,
while informal institutions derive from identity groups in the form of longstanding
cultural preferences. While formal rules are evident to all, informal “rules may be almost
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invisible to outsiders” (Ostrom 1998, 208) and taken for granted by insiders. Informal
institutions tacitly shape and constrain intra-group expectations, thought, and behavior
through social pressure, while formal institutions conspicuously shape and constrain
inter-group expectations, thought, and behavior through coercion and incentive. In-group
trust allows groups to forego rigid encoding of institutions, but societies—because they
are always more heterogeneous than groups—require more formal, clearly defined, and
inelastic institutions. Formal and informal institutions may complement, compete, or
overlap (Jutting et al. 2007, 9; Leftwich and Sen 2010, 17); though in fragile states, they
are often in conflict. The enforcement of formal institutions is dependent on the coercive
ability and perceived legitimacy of the state.
Competing Non-Institutionalist Theories
Many competing theories claim to explain why post-colonial states tend to
transition into fragile “gatekeeper” states (Cooper 2002, 5) with patrimonial, clientelist,
and rent-seeking political cultures, resulting in institutional instability and weak
bureaucratic capacity (Lockwood 2005, 776), rather than developmental states. These are
categorized as institutional and non-institutional theories for analysis.
The idea of the resource curse has gained support in the non-institutionalist
literature for explaining state fragility (see Frankel 2012; Sachs and Warner 1995;
Venables 2016). However, “it has significant shortcomings in terms of theory and
evidence” (Di John 2011, 167) and is not an appropriate theoretical lens for this
dissertation. Many states, fragile and not, have abundant natural resources, which
account for a large percentage of their exports. The two states with the largest total
percentage of natural resource rents per GDP are Liberia (46.4 percent) and Kuwait (39.1
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percent) (World Bank 2015), each having very different contexts and developmental
outcomes. It is not because economies have sizeable natural resource extraction and
exportation sectors that they are anti-developmental, as the theory claims; petroleumdominated economies are not more prone to state breakdown (Smith 2004, 242). Instead,
global market volatility (see Cavalcanti et al. 2011; Leong and Mohaddes 2011) affects
all non-diversified economies, rendering them vulnerable to shocks in the global
economy. Weak institutions are unable to weather global economic shocks.
Brunnschweiler and Butle (2008) claim that weak institutional configurations that cause
dependence on single export sectors, specifically natural resource extraction and
exportation, are to blame. Uneven development, which some claim originates from an
abundance of natural resources or a natural resource-dominated economy, is instead
caused primarily by institutional dysfunction. Uneven growth is disruptive in that it
increases incidences, intensity, and duration of conflict in the market, state, and civil
society. Some in the literature (see Collier and Hoeffler 1998; Fearon and Laitin 2003;
Ross 2004) claim uneven growth alone is sufficient to produce state failure.
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) found in a study of 48 non-renewable
commodity exporters1 (1970-2014) that unless a state already had stable political
institutions, its adoption of fiscal rules and savings or stabilization funds did not have a
significant effect on its ability to withstand market shocks and reduce procyclicality
(Bova 2016, 4). When measuring natural resources as per capita, only a dozen of this
study’s countries qualify as resource-rich, of which only two, Botswana and Equatorial

1

Non-renewable commodity exporters are resource-rich countries with at least 20 percent of total exports being non-renewable

commodities or making up at least 15 percent of fiscal revenues.
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Guinea, are in SSA. For example, Nigeria’s petroleum export sector, valued at USD 28
billion per annum in 2016, looks less dominant when compared to its population of 177
million (Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries 2017). Another study by
Haber and Menaldo (2011) claims the resource curse literature suffers from an omitted
variable curse; states with increasing natural resource reliance do not become more
authoritarian but rather more democratic and almost twice as many of them become more
prosperous (e.g., Australia, Mexico, and Trinidad and Tobago). Cavalcanti et al. (2011)
find that as petroleum reserves increase, short-term and long-term income levels increase.
Several other non-institutional theories deserve mention and critique. Democratic
instability (see Karl 2000; Rabushka and Shepsle 1972) and democratic transition (see
Acemoglu and Robinson 2001; Lijphart 1999; Linz and Stepan 1996) theories are useful
for explaining challenges experienced in some types of fragile states, although they are
limited in their ability to explain variation across all types of non-democratizing states.
While some argue that global technological and transportation advances have changed
the nature of warfare, the war-based new war theory (see Duffield 2001; Kaldor 1999)
has limited explanatory power for states that are not primarily fragile due to conflict,
violence, and war (e.g., Burkina Faso, Haiti, and Zambia). Post-colonial states have
many institutional design flaws with many founded on a system of boundaries with little
regard for future self-governance (Herbst 2000, 94) or the possible repercussions of
ethnic and religious compositions. Even so, dependency theory (see Herbst 2000;
Nkrumah 1965), closely associated with new war theory, wrongly assumes post-colonial
Africa is a monolithic body politic of weak cookie cutter states with peripheral
economies suffering at the hand of core capitalist countries. Sub-Saharan Africa is not
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homogeneous nor geo-politically and economically powerless; there are 48 unique states
with a variety of institutional compositions.
Competing Institutionalist Theories
Sociological institutionalism offers a more thorough and credible explanation of
trust in fragile states than do other institutionalist theories. It serves as a corrective to
behaviorism’s overemphasis of individual agency (DiMaggio and Powell 1983, 156;
Meyer and Rowan 1977, 340) and redresses classical institutionalism’s descriptive
restrictions and lack of objective analysis of institutional and social interactions. Where
historical institutionalism fails to do so, it explains the gap between macro-level events
and “policy outcomes that are characterized by major breaks and that evolve in a nonlinear fashion” (Uygur and Martinsen 2015, 2). It provides a more comprehensive
framework for examining institution-society interactions than rational choice
institutionalism, which tends to over-aggregate groups for analysis. Finally, it provides a
useful framework for weighing the balance between agency and determinism and
captures the distinctiveness of individual, group, field, society, and institutional
interactions.
The normative, descriptive, and prescriptive emphasis of classical institutionalism
is useful for constructing policy modifications limited to fixed properties of formal
government institutions (see McCloskey 2016; Rorty 1990; Sen 1986), but as positivism
and neo-institutionalism have revealed, this is of limited value when not also considering
individual agency and institutional and social interactions. For example, in fragile states,
where there are many institutional dysfunctions, it is critical to understand how informal
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markets and civil society institutions rise to fill capacity gaps left by the state. Classical
institutionalism is unable to provide this analysis.
Rational choice institutionalism (see Bates et al. 1998; North 1993; Ostrom 1998;
Weingast 1996) oppositely, overemphasizes the utility maximization and agency of
individuals, leaving less room for institutional effects on individual and group behavior.
Instead, much of the capacity of human agents derives from their position in society
(Mahoney 2001, 142, 215; McAdam et al. 2003, 119, 211). Individuals and groups
attempting to behave rationally within the bounds of institutional scripts are more
predictable in market-dominated environments (Kugler et al. 2012, 25), although the
more fragile the state is, the less behavior aligns with rational choice assumptions.
Therefore, rational choice institutionalism is best suited to the limited examination of
strong market-environments, rather than fragile states.
Historical institutionalism (see Huntington 1968; Katznelson and Weingast 2005;
Lieberman 2002; Marcussen 2000; McNamara 1998; Polanyi 1945; Skocpol 1979;
Steinmo 2008; Thelen 2004) is a comparative case study methodology as much as a
theory, one that attempts to measure and trace institutional patterns, “big structures, large
processes, and huge comparisons” (Tilly 1984, 15). Its assumption of an institutionally
determined environment based on historical path dependencies greatly discounts
individual agency. Historical institutionalists claim, “The ‘path not taken’ or the political
alternatives that were once quite plausible may become irretrievably lost” (Pierson and
Skocpol 2002, 6). What the historical institutionalist neglects is that institutional
longevity is dependent on societal legitimacy, which is rooted in script-executing agents
rather than impersonal historical forces.
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Institutional Change
Neo-institutionalism broadly, and sociological institutionalism specifically (see
DiMaggio and Powell 1991; Jepperson 2001; March and Olsen 1984; 1989; Meyer et al.
1997), provides an analytical lens for explaining institutional change in fragile states.
Formal and informal institutions are conservative in that they encourage the status quo,
but they are also susceptible to influence and change, albeit it rarely occurs rapidly.
Formal and informal institutions shape agent choices through the scripting process.
Historical events, such as revolutions, do not occur spontaneously or in a vacuum, instead
agents, often acting through groups following scripts, make choices in particular
institutional environments, which alters future institutional compositions, expanding or
limiting future agent choices in not wholly predictable ways. The more culturally-,
economically-, and politically-embedded institutions become in society, the more
difficult they are to change because, over time, they become interwoven into a web of
interdependent and legitimized institutions. The more developed, modern, and
heterogeneous society is, the more complex its formal and informal institutional
configurations tend to be. In democratic-leaning societies, the presence of many
competing institutions makes large institutional change in any particular direction
difficult; however the more that formal and informal institutions overlap, the easier
change becomes (Piotti et al. 2006, 94). For example, through the legislative process of
the state, society may choose to develop a new formal speed limit statute for cultural,
economic, or political reasons. However, it is the executive bureaucracy that fine-tunes
and implements the statute; law enforcement agencies that enforce it; the judiciary that
interprets it; and society that provides it with continued legitimacy. Institutions are
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endogenous and overlapping, so the development of a new speed limit statute likely
affects other related institutions such as traffic management protocols, automotive safety
regulations, automotive insurance formulas, automotive industry production, law
enforcement hiring, and fuel cost.
The ability to influence institutions takes the form of institutionalization and
deinstitutionalization and varies across fragile states. Individuals, organizations, firms,
and government agencies with varying capacities and competing and divergent interests,
leverage their capital resources, in authoritarian and democratic states alike, to sustain,
transform, or discard existing institutions (Phillips et al. 2004, 657). Through these
processes, formal and informal institutions are continually reconstituting, in part, through
agent inputs (Giddens 1984, 25), although, agent behavior is never entirely predictable
(Leftwich and Sen 2010, 9). Deinstitutionalization is the process of purposefully
weakening institutions and requires greater momentum. The more isomorphism
influences an institution and the more cultural legitimacy it has, the more difficult it is to
deinstitutionalize. Deinstitutionalization takes hold when dominant groups take for
granted their advantaged position and fail to sufficiently reproduce and reinforce their
previously legitimated institutions (Oliver 1992, 564), leading to atrophy and
vulnerability to change. Concurrently, subordinate groups work to delegitimize
prevailing institutions through eroding established laws, cultural practices, and material
artifacts associated with them. Through both mechanisms, prevailing institutions erode
and new institutional forms, incrementally, take their place. Newly prevailing institutions
shape the behavior of agents (DiMaggio and Powell 1983, 147), and institution-driven
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actor behavior reinforces these prevailing institutions (see Thornton 2002), and the cycle
continues.
Isomorphism
The isomorphic principle states that despite myriad social configurations
influenced by economic, political, and cultural inputs, organizational sub-units sharing
similar environments and having similar goals, converge, adopting similar forms, rather
than differentiating themselves. Formal and informal institutions vary in their isomorphic
properties (DiMaggio and Powell 1983, 149) with the former being subjected to greater
isomorphic effects. Informal institutions driven by ideological and cultural uniformity
are affected less, especially when the in-group adhering to them meets its members’
interests.
Isomorphism has three sub-types: coercive, normative, and mimetic. Coercive
Isomorphism states organizations operating within similar domains will be subject to
regulatory forces to which they will be compelled to conform (1983, 150). Normative
isomorphism states that as the interaction of organizations with similar goals increase,
expectations for interaction and standards of practice develop, which aligns the internal
structure and behavior of their similar sub-units. Mimetic isomorphism states that when
organizational environments are uncertain, organizations will imitate efficient, effective,
and legitimate organizations in their respective organizational fields.
Informal institutions are a powerful secondary influencer of formal institutions in
fragile states through shaping local response and adherence to them (Jutting et al. 2007,
7; Migdal 2001, 127, 58). At the societal level, informal institutions are “collective
representations” that define desirable types of social systems (Parsons 1971, 9).
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Societies, through their informal institutions, provide formal institutions meaning and
legitimacy. Formal institutions’ long-term viability is dependent on their sensitivity to
societies’ cultural preferences, moral conceptions, norms, and rules (Scott 1995, 33;
2001, 48). The more incongruent isomorphic forces are from a society’s cultural values,
the less effective and enduring formal institutions will likely be.
Due to increasing global isomorphism, “social, political, and economic
institutions have become larger, considerably more complex and resourceful, and prima
facie more important to collective life” (March and Olsen 1984, 734), yet, fragile states
continue to exhibit strong traditional institutions, which the majority of the fragile states
literature consider detrimental to development (Unsworth 2010, 49). The historic
isomorphic transfer of colonial institutions must be considered when examining the
development of fragile states’ formal institutions, specifically those affecting contract and
legal systems (La Porta et al. 1998, 1126). Political modernization, the movement from a
traditional polity to a modern polity involving the hyper-specialization and
“differentiation of new political functions and the development of specialized structures
to perform those functions” (Huntington 1968, 34), has developed unevenly due to
colonialization and decolonization. As far as institutional cycles are concerned,
decolonization did not occur that long ago. Political modernization can be confusing and
exhausting to those in traditional societies who are not conditioned to having multiple
competing identities and role specialization (Breuilly 1994, 415). Groups once able to
avoid each other are forced to compete for position, legitimacy, interests, and
opportunities to influence the institutional structure of the state to serve their interests
(Mann 1993, 118-9). When measuring modern formal institutional outcomes in fragile
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states, it matters whether the colonizing power was British, Portuguese, Spanish, German,
or Dutch, with British colonies faring better (Landes 1998, 437). However, the claim that
colonial legacy is a strong determinant of modern African underdevelopment is unsound
(Bhattacharyya 2008, 106).
Social Capital Theory
Social networks are worthy of examination, in part, because institutions are
embedded in them, and collective action is generated through them. Social capital
accumulation is “a slow, long-term, internal process of gradual accumulation of the
capacity and the willingness to negotiate, compromise, and shape the political arena”
(Uvin 1989, 171). Putnam (1995) claims, “For political stability, for government
effectiveness, and even for economic progress social capital may be even more important
than physical or human capital” and Lin (2002, 142) asserts, “concepts of power,
dependence, solidarity, social contracts, and multilevel systems do not make sense until
social capital is brought into consideration”. Also, Collier (2002) and Saegert et al.
(2002) go so far as to claim that where all other capital is lacking—which is the case in
most fragile states—social capital becomes a more important currency. This makes the
examination of environments where social capital is created vital.
A widening GTR increases the diversity of the pool of individuals, through which
social capital may be created and exchanged. The potential higher quantity and quality of
social interaction produces the positive externality of expanded social networks,
providing access to further human and physical capital, the foundation for development
(Fukuyama 2002, 34; Morrone et al. 2009, 5). Social capital is somewhat fungible in that
it may be exchanged for other types of capital and political access and may indirectly
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benefit participants’ shared social networks through trust by association, though it is not
entirely transferable between actors.

Empirical Literature
Fragile states have considerable barriers to widening their GTR. The primary task
of this dissertation is to test the independent effects of social network composition on the
GTR in fragile states. The majority of the trust literature recognizes the necessary,
though not sufficient, structural control variables of security and contract institutions,
individualism, and inter-state market forces, as most effective in shaping environments
where individuals interact to meet their interests. These control variables are structural in
that they are persistent and difficult to change without a great deal of social momentum
and time. However, some in the literature (see Welzel and Delhey 2015) curiously move
away from identifying and explaining the causes of the GTR to hypothesize on the effects
of the GTR, as if the trust literature has accepted their human empowerment variable as
the primary, all-encompassing cause of the GTR along with secondary causes of
associational activities and religious pluralism. This claim is a premature assumption.
Delhey and Welzel (2012) downplay the effects of associational activities on the GTR
and claim religious fractionalization, rather than religious pluralism widens the GTR,
whereas Welzel and Delhey (2015) reverse this claim. This internal discourse reveals a
rush to identify the causes of the GTR so that the trust literature may return to focusing
on the consequences of the GTR. Further examination is required to identify under what
conditions social network composition, state security and contract institutions,
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individualism, and inter-state market forces affect the GTR before attempting to explain
its causes.
It is valuable to identify related cultural, economic, and political background
factors even though they do not have a sufficient effect on the GTR for inclusion in this
dissertation. Delhey et al. (2011) incorporate most of the control variables selected for
this dissertation as well as find that Protestant societies, economic modernization,
cognitive mobilization through education and access, social diversity, and quality of
institutions, affect the GTR in some measurable way. They claim the causal relationship
between social heterogeneity and ethnic diversity on generalized trust remains widely
disputed in the literature (2011, 801). Background factors related to generalized trust—
though not sufficiently to its radius—include the following: institutional trust (see
Rothstein and Stolle 2008); satisfaction with democracy and trust in politicians (see
Zmerli and Newton 2008); life satisfaction (see Sønderskov 2010); education (see Huang
et al. 2011); regime type (see Goldstone et al. 2004, 449); and spillover (see Chauvet et
al. 2007, 6). Rotberg (2003) and Dobbins (2007) offer multiple economic and political
background factors that affect generalized trust in fragile states but may exist at lowmoderate levels without affecting the GTR. These include state institutions related to
political participation, social service delivery, infrastructure, economic regulation and
stability, governance, democratization, and development. Hall (1966), Hofstede (2001),
Lingenfelter (2003), Strodtbeck and Kluckhohn (1961), and Trompenaars and HampdenTurner (2011), have developed many competing and overlapping cultural orientation
continuums of phenomena that affect society broadly but not generalized trust
sufficiently. These include goal-relational awareness, spontaneous-strategic interaction,
49

compartmentalized-relativistic ethics, ascribed-achieved prestige, vulnerable-risk-averse,
nomadism-sedentism, and limited-unlimited good. Lastly, while inter-state market forces
affect the GTR in all fragile states, inter-state conflict flows affect it only when security
institutions are weakened to the point of state failure or collapse.
Social Network Composition
The trust literature lacks a social variable that can capture stratification and
network effects to explain the GTR. The closest it has come is through the limited
concepts of social distance, polarization, social segregation, and ethnic, linguistic, and
religious fractionalization. A combination of social distance and polarization is the most
appropriate measure for capturing “the intensity of disagreements across groups”
(Alesina et al. 2003, 164), however, “whether societal conflict is the result of
fractionalization or polarization is largely an unresolved question…” (2003, 178). Social
segregation “refers to the degree to which the various groups of a population actually
interact or not, and under what circumstances. While diversity is a community
characteristic, segregation is a network characteristic” (Hooghe 2007, 719). However,
social segregation has not received much support in the trust literature, which has instead
focused on ethnic, linguistic, and religious fractionalization (see Alesina et al. 2003;
Fearon 2003; Posner 2004; Roeder 2001), favoring the Alesina et al. (2003) ethnic
fractionalization measure as a proxy for social heterogeneity. Most of the trust literature
assumes a negative relationship between generalized trust and fractionalization (see
Alesina and La Ferrara 2002; Anderson and Paskeviciute 2006; Delhey and Newton
2005; Hero 2003), while a minority (see Bjørnskov 2008, 271) rightly challenge this in
particular contexts.
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Fractionalization is measured by the likelihood that two people chosen at random
will be from different groups (Posner 2004, 849), whereas “…polarization is typically
maximized when there are two groups of equal size” (Alesina et al. 2003, 177),
producing a parity and possibly a bipolar power differential. All societies have different
and overlapping ethnic, religious, and linguistic compositions. “The boundaries around
and the meanings attached to ethnic groups reflect pure social constructions” (Nagel
1994, 168) and “ethnicity is constructed out of the material of language, religion, culture,
appearance, ancestry, or regionality” (1994, 152). There are 7,099 living languages
(Simons and Fennig 2017), and as of 2003, there were 819 ethnic groups larger than 1
percent of a given country’s population (Fearon 2003, 36), with thousands more not
meeting that threshold. However, few states (e.g., South Korea and Japan) are considered
nation-states (United Nations 1987) where the nation and state’s boundaries align to form
a relatively homogenous ethnopolitical community. The line between fact and fiction
concerning ethnic groups is often blurred (Davis 1999, 26), making it a difficult concept
to measure. Language is often the glue that helps to hold minority ethnic groups together
amid centrifugal cultural pressure from dominant groups (Luo and Shenkar 2006, 336).
Linguistic separation creates a space for unity, symbolism, identity formation, and
exclusion of the “Other.”
Most fragile states have highly religious populations. Therefore, distinctions
between religious and secular demarcate an essential division in the trust and fragile
states literature (An-Na’im 2002, 60). Olson and Li (2016, 756) and Manglos-Weber
(2016, 18) claim highly religious and heterogeneous societies produce narrow GTR in
SSA, while Putnam (2000) and Putnam and Campbell (2010) contend voluntary
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membership in religious organizations widens the GTR. However, the majority of this
research has been conducted in non-fragile states, “where generalized trust tends to be
higher and active religious membership is less prevalent” than in SSA (Manglos-Weber
2016, 18). The convergence of disparate religious groups in fragile state urban centers
has produced diverse populations but has not guaranteed a more plural-minded citizenry
(Juergensmeyer 2017, 154). Without the aid of strong institutions, highly competitive,
politicized, and polarizing strategies for religious dominance heighten the perceived
value of shared public space (see Hassner 2009).
Bjørnskov (2007) introduces the claim that social polarization, income inequality,
and ethnic fractionalization as measured by Alesina et al. (2003) reduce trust and religion
and political systems affect the formation of trust, clarifying and improving these
assertions in Bjørnskov (2008). The religious composition of a population matters for the
formation of social trust, with many in the literature claiming high population Catholicand Islamic-majority countries are less trusting (Berggren and Jordahl 2005, 13) (see La
Porta et al. 1999; Zak and Knack 2001). Bjørnskov finds that monarchic societies are
seven percentage points more trusting (2008, 276), while post-communist societies are
less trusting (2007, 16).
Bjørnskov claims determinants of social trust fall into two categories: those
affecting the trust radius and those affecting social polarization (2008, 271). He also
agrees with the consensus in the trust literature that fractionalization and social distance
are the most important determinants of social trust (see Bjørnskov 2007; Delhey and
Newton 2005; Knack and Keefer 1997; Knack 2002; Uslaner 2002; Zak and Knack
2001). This claim is sound, yet incomplete. While these concepts intersect with this
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dissertation’s conception of social network composition, they are not inclusive of it,
omitting locational distance (physical proximity), technological proximity, social
proximity, and power differential. Whereas fractionalization measures various types of
diversity, social distance measures how different. He also neglects that a society’s level
of trustingness and the human desire for reputation and interests affect social trust.
The trust literature most often proxies fractionalization via income inequality and
ethnolinguistic diversity, assuming both negatively affect social trust. While rarely
actualized in fragile states, highly fractionalized environments have greater potential
generalized trust than homogenous environments because the likelihood of encountering
a stranger is greater. Bjørnskov claims income inequality is the strongest determinant of
the social trust level (2008, 271). He also rightly suggests political diversity, through a
society’s fractionalized weltanschauung (see Rokeach 1960), negatively affects social
trust, but he mistakenly operationalizes it through measuring which political parties are in
power. He correctly recognizes generalized trust and inequality to be stable over time.
Although he appropriately includes the Kaufmann et al. (2003) Rule of Law variable, he
does not find it significant. He recognizes and attempts to address the possibility of
endogeneity between inequality (Bjørnskov 2007, 16) and education (2007, 7) and
reverse causation of democracy, rule of law, and education, claiming, “…most of the
variables proposed in the literature as determinants of such trust are either spuriously
related to trust or more likely caused by trust” (2007, 15). He also claims democracy, the
rule of law, and education are results of generalized trust, not its cause (2007, 16). While
he concedes that a minimal level of education and the rule of law are required for
generalized trust to exist (2007, 17), he does not find education to be significant. He
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agrees with Knack and Keefer (1997) and Knack (2002), “that trust is created in the
educational system by making individuals better informed and better at interpreting
perceived information” (2007, 7).
Delhey and Welzel (2012) counter to the majority of the trust literature, claim
inequality and ethnic fractionalization do not affect the GTR, and that religious
fractionalization widens it, in agreement with Allport’s (1954) contact hypothesis. In this
view, since a primary byproduct of modernity is broader circles of cooperation (see Blau
1977; Coser 1975; Granovetter 1973; Simmel 1984 [1908]), “dissimilar others are viewed
as a potential source of mutual benefit” (Delhey and Welzel 2012, 51). They claim the
“literature over-estimates the role of voluntary associations and underestimates that of
human empowerment and open-access activities in the generalization of trust” (2012, 65).
They appear justified in downplaying the effects of associational activity since groups
associate for purposes that may decrease generalized trust (e.g., terrorism) as well as
increase it (e.g., inter-faith dialogue). Their argument for the positive effects of human
empowerment on the GTR is interesting but only moderately convincing. They overstate
their claim that religious fractionalization widens the GTR, though it does have the
potential to do so under specific favorable conditions.
Fractionalization measures explain the content of ethnic, linguistic, and religious
group identity, but provide an incomplete explanation of a society’s social network
composition and its effect on the GTR. To advance the trust and fragile states literature,
this dissertation supplements fractionalization with measures of proximity, which defines
the physical, technological, and social distance between groups; and power differential,
which defines the fractionalization of power in society and groups’ relative access to
54

power and resources. There has been little quantitative discourse on physical,
technological, and social proximity and power differential individually and none
comprehensively interacting with all of these concepts, leaving a gap in the literature.
Thus, the unique contribution of this dissertation is to join these concepts together into a
single test variable for explaining the social effect on the GTR.
State Institutions
The state is a “spatially defined territory under a single political authority which
claims the compliance of its citizens for its laws up to the extent of its sovereign
boundaries” (Kingsbury 2007, 58). Weak political institutions are the central driver of
state fragility (Vallings and Moreno-Torres 2005, 7) and low institutional trust.
Generalized trust differs from institutional trust in that, people, not institutions, are the
source of trust. A society’s confidence in institutions is not affected by its generalized
trust radius (Delhey et al. 2011, 798), demonstrating that institutional trust is a separately
measurable phenomenon. Although, oppositely, increasing state security and contract
institutions widens the GTR in fragile states. When security and contract institutions
perform below a certain level, the GTR cannot widen, regardless of how positive social
network composition, individualism, and inter-state market forces may be. Rotberg’s
(2003, 3) nine-part hierarchy of positive state functions and Dobbins’ (2007, xxiii) sixpart nation-building process, rightly elevate the socially legitimated provision of the
public goods of security and enforcement of laws as its principal mandate (Caparini 2005,
73). When a critical mass of society does not consider its state to enforce institutions
flexibly and fairly, providing it with clear expectations for appropriate behavior, then the
state’s sovereignty may be at risk (Alesina and La Ferrara 2002, 210; Rosenblum and
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Post 2001, 12). Minimally functional security institutions (e.g., police, portions of the
military, bureaucratic agencies, and the courts) and contract institutions (e.g.,
bureaucratic agencies and the courts)—products of the executive and judicial branches of
government—can alleviate most problems inherent in governance related to the GTR.
Welzel and Delhey (2015) initially support the inclusion of state institutions
variables in agreement with the majority of the trust literature, but then claim, security,
institutions, social separations, and cultural legacies each become insignificant when
controlling for their human empowerment variable (2015, 893). They agree with Alesina
and La Ferrara (2002) and Axelrod (1986) that when there is a stable order, rule of law,
and low corruption, social interactions become more predictable and agreements reliable.
However, they claim all of these benefits are accomplished through human empowerment
rather than state institutions, leaving only associational activities and religious pluralism
as separately significant variables in their regressions. They do not recognize that the
rule of law, one factor rendered insignificant in their regressions, may widen the circle of
generalized trust because enforcement of contracts reduces the risk of cooperation
(Nguyen and Rose 2009, 166).
Security Institutions
If we are only half secure, we are not secure at all.
—Bernard Brodie, National Security Policy and Economic Stability
National security is an often misunderstood and misused social science concept
(Baldwin 1997, 26). Various overly parsimonious definitions of security have been
proposed such as “the absence of threats to acquired values” (Wolfers 1949, 485) or
updated to “a low probability of damage to acquired values” (Baldwin 1997, 13). A
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minimally secure environment is one where the state has “effective control over its
territory” (Di John 2010, 10) and has a “monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force
within a given territory” (Weber 2015, 136).
A fully developed definition of security must consider security for whom, from
what threats, protecting which values, by what means, and at what cost (Baldwin 1997,
23) and must be defined in reference to what it is not: insecurity. Since insecurity
emerges from inter-state (see Gleditsch et al. 2002; Raleigh et al. 2010; Sarkees and
Wayman 2010) and intra-state (see Salehyan et al. 2012) sources, this dissertation’s state
security institutions variable measures fragile states’ effectiveness in managing both in
regards to their effects on the GTR. Intra-state insecurity: civil war, military coup,
revolution, armed conflict, social conflict and even environmental stress and human
rights abuses, originate from uni-, bi-, or multi-directional hostilities involving two or
more domestic groups, one of which may be the state. Intra-state conflict is increasing
globally, particularly social conflict (Salehyan et al. 2012), while inter-state conflict is
decreasing (Lacina et al. 2006, 674). Inter-state insecurity: inter-state war, militarized
interstate disputes (MID), territorial dispute, conflict spillover, and cross-border
terrorism, originate from uni-, bi-, or multi-directional hostilities involving the state and
at least one other state or non-state actor. Because inter-state insecurity is external to the
state and society, its sources must first circumvent or pass through a state’s security
institutions before affecting society and its GTR. Therefore, security institutions serve as
an intervening variable for inter-state sources of insecurity, while intra-state sources of
insecurity are outcomes of the independent variables, rather than their causes.
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Security must be measurable to know if it, or how much of it, has been achieved.
Fragile states’ security institutions vary in their effectiveness, efficiency, and legitimacy
of means used for providing a minimally secure environment. For states to have
legitimacy, they must be the responsible entity providing the secure environment rather
than an occupying or intervening inter-state military force such as the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO), African Union (AU), or United Nations (UN)
Peacekeeping Operation or Mission. Security is measurable as a dichotomous, ordinal, or
continuous variable. However, because states have multiple security objectives, it is
most profitable to analyze it as an ordinal or continuous variable where societies may be
more or less secure in specific areas of concern along a continuum.
While “absolute security is unattainable” (Baldwin 1997, 15) in any state, the
state-provided establishment of a minimally secure environment is the most important
factor affecting inter-group interaction and the widening of the GTR. “The literature
reflects this position. Again and again, authors stress that a functioning state that
provides basic public order and security is a prerequisite for the existence of civil
society” (Posner 2003, 247). Security institutions act as an intervening variable upon
which all other social goods are dependent (Dobbins 2007, xxiv); without a minimum
level of security, little else is possible in society. At the same time, security is “one of
many policy objectives competing for scarce resources and subject to the law of
diminishing returns” (Baldwin 1997, 19). Regarding all institutions, “…up to a certain
level, the strength of a rule might have positive returns, but once past that level, the
returns may be marginal or even negative” (Voigt 2013, 11). Spending resources on
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security far beyond what is required to meet security goals, limits resources available for
other social goods.
Contract Institutions
Once the prerequisite of a minimally secure environment is established,
minimally encoded and enforced contract institutions that govern access and rights,
especially to land and zoning, are required for a wide GTR (Knack 2001, 1). Regarding
contract institutions, “in many African countries, fundamentals of constitutional order
and state character are at stake” (Boone 2007, 558). Contracts are agreements between
individuals for managing interests including universal requirements for sustaining human
life and security for pursuing the instrumental intentions (Lin 2002, 58) of wealth, power,
reputation, and solidarity. They may take the form of formal regulations, such as zoning
for low-income housing, marriage licensing, and business incorporation or informal
norms regulating community expectations on the treatment of the poor, appropriate bride
prices and dowries, and who has authority to speak on behalf of the group. Contract
enforcement constitutes the foundation of the rule of law (Kaufmann et al. 2009, 4).
Merely being labeled democratic does not attract foreign investment, increase economic
output, prevent military rule, or stop corruption (Schedler et al. 1999, 2), but
strengthening the rule of law (de Mesquita and Root 2000, 230) by increasing horizontal
accountability between institutions, signals to the global community a state’s readiness
for increased responsibility (Schedler et al. 1999, 3).
Global isomorphism shapes the structure of fragile states’ contract institutions,
which tend to persist even when unproductive or a poor fit with the culture and informal
institutions. Increasing global communications and trade increases the isomorphic
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transmission of institutional regimes from non-fragile to fragile states. However, because
these institutions are largely disconnected from—rather than an outgrowth of—
indigenous norms, they rarely embed deeply into or adhere strongly to society.
Contract institutions are effective to the degree that “agents have confidence in
and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement,
property rights, the police, and the courts” (Kaufmann et al. (2007: 4). Fragile political
institutions that produce insecure property rights and capriciously enforce the rule of law,
increase transaction costs and information asymmetry (Bates 2006, 715; Gwenhamo
2012, 593). Functional contract institutions embody legal sanctions that reduce
“incentives to cheat, thereby enhancing trust that agreements will be faithfully executed
by both parties” (Knack 2001, 8). When contract institutions are unclearly encoded,
chronically unenforced, or unevenly and unfairly applied, society’s expectations go
unmet, which incentivizes lawbreaking through vigilantism, corruption, and black
markets, all of which narrow the GTR. Professional and trade associations that crosscut
groups may institutionalize commonly held ethical codes and standards, which can serve
to widen the GTR and reduce transaction costs by efficiently communicating information
about the identity of cheaters (Bernstein 1992, 138).
A primary function of the state is to serve as an efficient and neutral contract
enacting and enforcing agent between self-interested principles. The principle-agent
relationship influences inter-group interaction through defining legal responsibilities and
privileges of principles and agents over resources in society. Functional contract
institutions mitigate the harm principle by providing a limited but common language for
interaction between groups that reside in disconnected networks and may have little in
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common. They also encode for society who may own what (real property and tangible
and intangible personal property) and its legal uses. Properly functioning property rights
provide owners the right to possess, use, manage, and transmit their land; provide access
to capital and security; and protect from state confiscation (Honoré 1961). In their
absence, investments in human and physical capital are often wasted (Gwenhamo et al.
2012, 594). When contract institutions function optimally, the state can force—or
preferably, incentivize—inter-group interaction by reducing the negative externalities of
cost, effort (Hart and Moore 1988, 755), moral hazard (Holmstrom 1979, 74), and
adverse selection (Laffont and Martimort 2002) related to the principle-agent
relationship.
Fragile and non-fragile states alike face contracting challenges, and the more
heterogeneous they are, the more complex. For example, how does the Canadian
government reconcile its Sikh community’s religious duty to wear the Dastar headdress
with legal statutes and industry requirements regulating safety headgear? Should it be
illegal for Sikhs to ride motorcycles without helmets or work on construction sites or
should accommodations be made for their religious convictions? In another example, the
Israeli government has had the complicated task of weighing, not just domestic, but also
international, claims by Jewish, Christian, and Muslim principles, to access the Temple
Mount, also known as Haram esh-Sharif to Muslims. Non-fungible contested sacred
space such as this produces indivisible interests and extreme positioning, where parties
believe there is no substitution or economic or political side payments possible to offset
their potential loss (Hassner 2003, 12-3). In a final example, how should the Nigerian
government weigh the competing claims over access to petroleum revenues? Should
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priority be given to indigenous ethnic groups with historical claims to the producing
lands which are also suffering the majority of the related environmental degradation or
should the revenue be distributed differently throughout Nigerian states?
The cases of principle-agent interactions and possible solutions are numerous.
Fragile states face unique challenges in establishing and maintaining contract institutions
and the rule of law. Because desired resources are scarcer in fragile states and the state’s
capacity to serve as an agent is limited, negative contracting externalities regularly
produce unequal and unexpected contract outcomes. In this context, principles become
more risk-averse, and agents become more concerned with maintaining their power and
legitimacy. In this environment, a moral hazard may occur when one party to a contract
increases its risk, resulting in another party bearing it (Holmstrom 1979, 74). Adverse
selection may occur when unmonitored agents—whose interests deviate from the
principles’—provide asymmetrical information or establish bureaucratic hoops to favor
the state, oneself, or one principle over another (Laffont and Martimort 2002, 29, 33). To
decrease the adverse selection problem, fragile states may, but rarely do successfully,
introduce competition among government agencies, incentivizing them to differentiate
themselves from competing agencies when seeking desirable contracts through signaling
their comparative legitimacy (see Spence 1973). First-, second-, and third-party contract
enforcement mechanisms are present in heterogeneous fragile states, although first-party
mechanisms of cultural pressure are strongest; second-party mechanisms of multiple
contracts between groups are rare and weakly enforced, and third-party institutions are
enforced unevenly. This combination of factors usually produces weak contract
institutions where principles unknowingly agree to inequitable terms because the state
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either fails to fulfill its agentic duties or it takes advantage of its agentic position, both of
which breaks down society’s confidence in its contract institutions.
Individualism
Culture, driven by ethical habit, changes more slowly than ideas (Fukuyama 1995,
40) and much slower than political and economic processes. Rapid political and
economic upheaval does not often quickly change durable cultural values of a group or
society. Culture is the product of groups’ rationality. Individualism encourages all
individuals to exercise their rationality while collectivism specifies bounds of agency to
predefined roles within groups. Culture is the outworking of personal values held by a
community and is primarily the mechanism through which cues for meaningful action are
transmitted (Eriksen 1991, 142). It provides group members with answers—right or
wrong, practical or not—to fundamental questions about the nature of the human
condition (see Shweder 1991) and scripts proper protocols for seeking interests.
We are, in sum, incomplete or unfinished animals who complete or finish
ourselves through culture…Becoming human is becoming individual, and
we become individual under the guidance of cultural patterns, historically
created systems of meaning. – Geertz (2000, 12, 13)
The culture literature better explains collectivism than individualism, in part,
because collectivist cultures, those that are composed of more tribal2 and insular groups,
have been around longer to examine. As well, due to rapid modernization,
anthropologists have dedicated much of the 20th century to the focused examination of
collectivist cultures. The cultural psychology literature has advanced the measurement of
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The terms “tribal” and “tribalism” have been discarded by the social anthropology sub-discipline and replaced with “ethnic group”

(see Ekeh 1990: 660-1).
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individualism and collectivism; however, there is debate whether they are equally
opposite phenomena on a continuum (Fiske 2002, 87). Individualistic and collectivistic
behavior at the individual level is context dependent, but in aggregate, a culture is
consistently more one than the other. There are also varieties of individualism and
collectivism. The Libertarian impulse is wholly different from that of hermitism or urban
isolationism (Douglas 1978, 41), and Familism and institutional collectivism vary on the
unit of analysis to which one is behaving collectively. Nevertheless, individualism and
collectivism are the best measures the literature has produced of the tendency of cultures
in aggregate towards prioritizing in-group interests over those of individuals.
Individualism and collectivism are relatively stable cultural preferences that affect
trust. Trustworthiness and trustingness are separate phenomena. Regardless how
trustworthy a group or society is in aggregate, its level of trustingness remains relatively
stable (Delhey and Newton 2004, 3; Inglehart and Welzel 2005, 255). This is due mainly
to the stability of its position along the individualism-collectivism continuum (see
Fukuyama 1995; Hofstede 1992; Realo et al. 2008; Triandis 2005; van Hoorn 2015;
Yamagishi et al. 1998).
Globalization, through the isomorphic mechanism, is spreading and increasing the
cultural value of individualism (Welzel 2010, 152-3), although, fragile states remain
relatively collectivist. Collectivism promotes bonding within groups and draws a
relatively narrow boundary around those who are deemed desirable to meet one’s
interests, producing higher in-group trust levels and narrower GTR. Oppositely,
individualism promotes bridging between groups and encourages looking beyond one’s

64

family and group to meet one’s interests, producing lower in-group trust levels and a
wider GTR (van Hoorn 2015, 270) in fragile states.
Globalization is pushing collectivist societies towards individualism, yet “in
fundamental ways, the world is becoming more modern and less Western” (Huntington
1996, 78). Some key influencers of this trend are participation in the global market,
formal education, and urbanization. The trust literature recognizes individualism’s effect
on the GTR, even though much of the social sciences avoids cultural factors for more
parsimonious economic and political explanations (see Hirshleifer 1985; Lazear 2000).
This is understandable since “the same cultural attribute can have vastly different
implications for economic progress in different societies or even in the same society at
different times” (Porter 2000, 15), leaving researchers asking if it is even possible to
compare cultural factors across countries.
Individualistic and collectivistic behavior may be context-dependent (Realo and
Allik 2008, 449) as individuals differ in how they perceive themselves, relate to in- and
out-groups, pursue goals, and interests driving their behavior (Triandis 1995, xiv).
Collectivists tend to “attribute events to external causes” (Carpenter 2000, 42) and have
low perceived agency, relying on in-group inputs to assess appropriate behavior
(Oettingen 1995, 153; Triandis et al. 1993, 410). The more one is proximate to culturally
similar people, the more collectivist one’s behavior tends to be, while the more one
interacts positively with strangers, the more one will tend to behave individualistically
because the collectivistic impulse is absent between those members of society.
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Inter-State Market Forces
The advantage to mankind of being able to trust one another, penetrates
into every crevice and cranny of human life: the economical is perhaps
the smallest part of it, yet even this is incalculable.
—John Stuart Mill, Principles of Political Economy
Inter-state market forces permeate increasingly porous modern states, affecting
generalized trust in fragile and non-fragile states alike. International political and
economic governing bodies such as the UN, World Trade Organization, World Bank, and
the IMF, along with multinational corporations and non-governmental organizations, will
continue to affect the domestic affairs of states. Fragile states are more sensitive to
external shocks, making them more susceptible to external control. They repel the GTRwidening market forces of trade, FDI, and FPI and attract the GTR-narrowing market
forces of remittances, military aid, and non-military aid. They can survive but not thrive,
with minimally functional economic institutions. Nonetheless, the GTR can widen in
some fragile states with the right SNC configuration even if each control variable is
having a narrowing effect on the GTR.
Globalization has been a mixed blessing for fragile states; it has enhanced the
individual citizen’s absolute, and sometimes relative, access to resources, while at the
same time diminishing the state’s sovereignty. Sub-Saharan Africa’s globalization
experience has been substantially different from that of the West. It does not have the
benefit of industrial and technological advancement built on 400 years of Enlightenment
reasoning; rather it has borrowed models of “Cold War politics and Keynesian-style
economics” (Moore 2001, 910) that are overlaid onto a collectivist foundation.

66

Those groups less able to meet their members’ instrumental interests are affected
most by globalization, while dominant groups have greater access to market resources
through connections to government power. Potential gains from globalization require
domestic adjustments of social values and practices (Chan 2007, 751), and skillful
calculated risk-taking. Low-income fragile states are at a disadvantage and necessarily
take on more risk than middle- and high-income states, though they are usually not as
calculated. Neo-capital theories that appreciate the importance of culture on
globalization, rightly “stress the interplay of individual actions and structural positions in
the capitalization process” (Lin 2002, 18).
External actors who choose to engage in fragile state markets expect a positive
return on investment. Trade partners expect better terms of trade and consistent access to
quality products; investors expect to increase their capital; remitters expect increased
quality of life for their in-country friends and family; non-military donors expect
influence in shaping policy in the receiving state; and military donors expect the
protection of their military, economic, and political interests in the region. How fragile
states interact with these actors as competitors or collaborators, determines differentiated
group access to capital, which affects the GTR.
Together, trade, FDI, and FPI proxies a state’s connection to the global market.
Trade indicates what productive capabilities a state owns; FDI and FPI reflect the global
market’s opinion of a state’s potential. However, official trade data is unable to capture
unrecorded capital flight and illicit financial flows, in the form of trade misinvoicing and
same invoice faking because illegal activity is more difficult to track and measure in
fragile states. Trade affects the GTR by spreading values that are economically
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beneficial (Bhagwati 2004; Serionne 1766, 384). Relatively equal distribution of
globalization gains across a society, increase social stability (Jackson and Wolinsky
1996, 62), and generally widens the GTR. Oppositely, if social inequality rises above a
certain level, trade, along with all other market forces, will narrow the GTR (Chan 2007,
738; Polanyi 1945, 163; Rodrik 1997, 20-1).
Trade requires fragile states have something the market values; however, it does
not have to be raw material, physical or financial products or services. Trade partners
often find related value in human and social capital or in establishing trade partnerships
for political or competitive advantage. The decentralization of global value chains has
provided opportunities for fragile states to engage the global market through labor and
trade. States that do not have balanced trade, beneficial terms of trade, the ability to tax
trade, or diversified exports are more susceptible to market volatility, global economic
crises, and uneven economic development. Institutional gaps in these areas are
detrimental to exports (Mold and Prizzon 2010).
Foreign direct investment (FDI) and foreign portfolio investment (FPI) increase
productivity and growth (Havranek and Irsova 2011, 21), but global market isomorphism
determines that they flow primarily between high-income countries. Foreign investors
guided by global economic institutions are loath to risk capital in fragile states if the
return on investment is not high and sure (Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development 2013, 69) and if strong security and contract institutions do not exist to
protect their investment. Therefore, because investors are hesitant to engage in fragile
states, FDI and FPI do not have the opportunity to affect the GTR as much as does trade.
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In practice, they add additional growth to already strong economies, rather than sparking
growth in fragile economies.
Remittances are a critical lifeline in collapsed and failed states where basic needs
regularly go unmet. While they also reduce development volatility in fragile states for
some, they also reduce potential inter-group interaction. When receiving groups have
their needs met externally by their diaspora, they may forego inter-group interaction,
inhibiting the potential widening (or narrowing) of the GTR. Globally, trackable formal
remittances received are more than double that of official development assistance (ODA)
(World Bank 2011), only second to FDI (Zanamwe and Devillard 2009, 73). However,
remittances are primarily sent through informal channels (2009, 73), making reporting of
total amounts difficult. The better educated and wealthiest of fragile state citizens often
seek better opportunities in higher GDP countries where they form a diaspora from which
they transfer currency to their home country friends and family. Because of this,
remittances are not spread equitably throughout the receiving population. Remittance
sending is a collectivist behavior driven by the remitter’s desire to strengthen in-group
bonds by investing in and increasing the absolute and relative (financial, physical,
human, and social) capitals and well-being of non-proximate culturally similar people.
Oppositely, FDI investing is an individualist behavior driven by the desire to receive a
financial return and increase one’s well-being. “Remittances are not profit-driven, but
are compensatory transfers” Chami et al. 2005, 55). Dependence on remittances may
reduce recipient motivation to participate in wage labor, and where remittances are
highest, they may disrupt the economy through increased inflation (Zanamwe and
Devillard 2009, 73).
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The more extensive a diaspora, the more remittance inflows are likely to increase.
Remittance flows indicate the stability and growth of the sending country’s economy and
volatility and decline of the receiver’s. Because they are countercyclical, relatively stable
(Frankel 2009, 5), and usually flow from high to low GDP economies, it is not surprising
that “there is a robust negative correlation between remittances and GDP growth” (Chami
et al. 2005, 55). High remittance flows lull receiving governments into a false sense of
security, relying on them to buffer external economic shocks (Ratha 2005, 168) without
prompting them to improve their services (Ebeke 2011, 90). “When remittances exceed
6% of GDP, they fully absorb the positive effect of trade openness on government
consumption” (2011, 110). Further, if remittances reduce the recipient’s labor supply or
labor market participation, they have not only a negative correlation with GDP growth
but also a direct adverse effect (Chami et al. 2005, 77).
Most developed countries had the time and space to build up their economies
while protecting critical industries until they were globally competitive (Stiglitz 2003,
16). This has not been the case for most fragile states, which have been subject to
premature capital market without adequate social safety nets, resulting in reversed
stability, poor terms of trade, and reliance on bilateral, multilateral, tied, project, and
military aid.
High-income states disburse military and non-military aid to high conflict fragile
states in strategic regions to protect their economic and geopolitical interests. Since the
end of the Cold War, most military aid has originated from the United States with the
purpose of protecting its economic and political interests in fragile states and strategic
regions (e.g., Israel). Non-military aid in the form of grants, low-interest loans, aid for
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trade, and debt forgiveness has two purposes, to ensure a compliant government and
protect neighboring countries from potential spillover, which can disrupt global markets
if in a strategic region. However, humanitarian disasters occurring in non-strategic
regions are often left to fester longer (e.g., Rwandan genocide).
When fragile states’ primary connection to the global economy is through aid,
global politics gains greater influence over domestic politics (Beck 2006, 249),
potentially weakening their already fragile sovereignty. Aid is often inconsistent from
year-to-year as donor states reallocate funds as their interests change. This inconsistency,
resulting in neoliberal shock therapy in receiving countries, may unevenly distribute aid,
increasing domestic inequality. This trend was evident in the 2000s, where every fragile
state experienced at least one aid shock (Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development 2013, 62). As with remittances, when group interests are met through
external aid, incentives for inter-group interaction decrease, inhibiting the potential
widening (or narrowing) of the GTR. As well, “…the empirical evidence suggests that
civil society groups sponsored by resources from outside the community tend to be
unreliable vehicles for generating trust among their members” (Posner 2003, 244).
Beyond a point, as state conditions improve, there are diminishing returns and eventually
negative returns on aid. Fifty years and 2.3 trillion dollars of aid later, the literature is
unsure of aid’s positive effect (Easterly 2006, 4).

Contributions to the Literature
Fragile states have not been high on the trust literature’s research agenda. Delhey
et al. (2011) have dislodged this literature from a decade of relative dormancy through
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the development of the more accurate and theoretically sound transcendent out-group
measurement of the GTR, which has made available new research opportunities. This
dissertation continues their momentum by presenting a new sociological institutionalismsocial capital theory theoretical framework and model for explaining variation, patterns,
and limitations of the GTR in different types of fragile states. While the statist variables
(security and contract institutions) are essential for the explanation of the GTR,
individualism and inter-state market forces, deserve increased attention and social
network composition warrants inclusion. This gap in knowledge is filled through
challenging existing theoretical assumptions about the function of the GTR in fragile
states, developing the trust differential measure, and constructing the SNC, a causal
variable the literature has incompletely formed thus far, leaving it susceptible to omitted
variable bias. This framework differentiates between institutional rules, norms, scripts,
and isomorphism associated with fractionalization, proximity, and power differentials
and their effects on reciprocity and transitivity within and between group networks to
produce variation in the GTR.
Table 3
Contribution to the Department Variable Literature

In-Group Trust

Level

Radius

Trust
Conceptual Development
Hardin (1992)
Fukuyama (2001)
Generalized Trust
Measurement
Welzel and Delhey (2011)
Level
Radius
Explaining the Effects on
the Generalized Trust
Radius
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Institutional
Trust
Level

Radius

Table 4
Contribution to the Theoretical Framework Literature
Theoretical Framework
Institutionalism
Classical
Sen (1986)
Rorty (1990)

Historical
Skocpol (1995)
Thelen (1999)

Rational Choice
North (1990)
Ostrom (2003)

Sociological
Meyer & Rowan (1977)
DiMaggio & Powell (1983)
March & Olsen (1984)

Social Capital
Theory
Social CapitalNetworks
Granovetter (1973)
Putnam (1995)
Fukuyama (1999)
Lin (2001)

Development of a Joint Theoretical Framework

Table 5
Contribution to the Independent Variable Literature
Test Variable
Social Network Composition (Caito 2018)
Fractionalization
Proximity
Power Differential
Roeder (2001)
Collier (1998)
Lijphart (1969)
Alesina et al. (2003)
Diamond (2000)
Horowitz (1985)
Fearon (2003)
Galaskiewicz and
Posner (2004)
Wasserman (1994)
Ethnic Linguistic Religious Physical Technological Unipolar Bipolar Multipolar
Social
Explaining the Full Social Effect on the Generalized Trust Radius

This chapter synthesizes the trust, fragile states, institutionalism, and social
capital theory literature, explaining how they have thus far viewed, defined, and
categorized state fragility and the GTR. It assesses the claims of rival theoretical
frameworks, methodologies, and variables for modeling trust in fragile states. The
subsequent Methodology Chapter constructs the most suitable methodology and model
based on the foundational literature presented here.
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CHAPTER III - METHODOLOGY
Now, here, you see, it takes all the running you can do, to keep in the same
place. If you want to get somewhere else, you must run at least twice as
fast as that!
—Lewis Carroll, Through the Looking Glass
It is time for the trust literature to turn its focus towards the examination of the
generalized trust radius (GTR) in fragile sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) states. Fragile states
(e.g., Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Zambia, and Zimbabwe) are more productively
examined separately from non-fragile (e.g., Botswana), failed (e.g., Chad), and collapsed
(e.g., Somalia) states, as their institutional, cultural, market and social environments
differ greatly.
This dissertation demonstrates how it is possible for trust to increase between
strangers in highly collectivist societies governed by fragile, yet functional state
institutions and unstable inter-state market forces. An enhanced theoretically
generalizable model founded on sociological institutionalism and social capital theory
provides explanatory power through testing of the new social network composition
variable.
The four related research questions of interest are as follows:
1. How does social network composition affect the generalized trust radius in
fragile states?
2. How do institutions affect the generalized trust radius in fragile states?
3. How does culture affect the generalized trust radius in fragile states?
4. How do inter-state market forces affect the generalized trust radius in fragile
states?
The hypotheses for each research question are as follows:
H1: Increasing fractionalization, proximity, and power differential widen the
generalized trust radius in fragile states.
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H2: Increasing state security and contract institutions widens the generalized trust
radius in fragile states.
H3: Increasing individualism widens the generalized trust radius in fragile states.
H4a: Increasing trade, FDI, and FPI widen the generalized trust radius in fragile
states.
H4b: Decreasing remittances, non-military aid, and military aid widen the
generalized trust radius in fragile states.
The hypotheses are operationalized for measurement and testing as follows:
•
•
•
•
•

Dependent Variable: [Generalized Trust Radius]
Test Variable: Social Network Composition [Fractionalization],
[Proximity], and [Power Differential]
Control Variable: Institutions [State Security and Contract Institutions]
Control Variable: Culture [Individualism]
Control Variable: Inter-State Market Forces [Trade], [FDI], [FPI],
[Remittances], [Non-Military Aid], and [Military Aid]

The balance of this chapter provides a rationale for the selected mixed
methodological framework, which includes deviant, least likely case selection, most
similar multiple comparative case analysis, control, test, and dependent variables,
boundary specification, and data selection.
Research Design
Method Selection
This dissertation does not claim to resolve the ongoing probabilistic-deterministic
methodology debate in the social sciences sparked by King et al. (1994). The subsequent
works of Beach and Pederson (2016), Bennett and Checkel (2014), Collier (2011),
Fairfield (2015), Goertz and Mahoney (2012), Goertz (2017), Ragin (2013), and
Seawright (2016) provide an extension of this debate and inform the methodological
choices for this dissertation.
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The broader a theory’s domain is the less detailed analysis of it is possible
(Keohane 1986, 188). This research advances the trust and fragile states literature
through middle-range theorizing, which is recognized as the most fruitful approach for
theory, methods, and policy development (see Boynton 1982, 29-68; Jentleson 2000,
133-135; Ragin 1992; 2000). The mixed methods literature has wrestled over when a
probabilistic or deterministic methodology is most appropriate. Many social phenomena
are only measurable in probabilistic terms due to the difficulty of directly observing their
outcomes (Lieberson 2000, 209-10). This is not a concern for the analysis of the GTR
and its causes as fractionalization, proximity, power differential, security and contract
institutions, individualism and collectivism, trade, investment, remittances, and aid are
each observable and measurable. When making claims on human populations, “law-like
generalizations” (Gomm et al. 2000, 98) are rarely possible; when phenomena are rare, as
wide GTR is in fragile states, the sample of available cases is reduced, making
probabilistic generalization less likely. The “danger of error in drawing general
conclusions [to populations] from a small number of cases must not be underestimated”
(2000, 98). Further limiting the number of cases is a requirement of the dependent
variable. Accurate analysis of generalized trust requires that populations interpret the
concept of trust similarly, limiting this research to a single socio-culturally similar region;
a regional study of SSA retains the highest number of potential country-level
observations. The most suitable research design within these constraints is to infer
deterministic generalizations to theoretical propositions through deviant, least likely case
selection and most similar multiple comparative case analysis. This approach is well
suited to manage complex causal relations and avoid the methodological pitfalls that
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afflict case-based researchers who commonly overgeneralize their findings (George and
Bennett 2005, 261).
Among political scientists and political sociologists (see Collier 1991; Eckstein
1975; George and Bennett 2005; Goertz and Mahoney 2012; Goldstone 1991; Hall, 2000;
Laitin 1995; Lijphart 1968; 1984; Lipset 1959; and McAdam et al. 2003), the
comparative method has become a widely used and respected method.
…we emphatically believe they [case studies] are essential to the
development and testing of social science theory…because they are
simultaneously sensitive to data and theory…case studies are more useful
for these purposes than any other methodological tool. – Achen and Snidal
(1989, 167-8)
However, some methodologists claim the most similar version of controlled
comparison should be abandoned as a stand-alone research method because it fails to
eliminate rival explanations (Teune and Przeworski 1970, 34). Some counter this claim
stating, “The value of Mill’s methods is in their capacity to eliminate a limited set of
alternative causal statements” (Savolainen 1994, 1217). Reliable small-N causal
inference is most likely to occur when the (Plümper et al. 2010, 3, 5):
•
•
•
•
•
•

sample size from which cases are selected is large;
variation of the test variable is maximized;
variation of the control variables are minimized;
test variable has a stronger effect on the dependent variable than do control
variables;
correlation between the test and control variables is minimized;
dependent variable is not dichotomous.
The methodological literature referenced for the dissertation recognizes that a

mixed-methods research design combining within- and cross-case analysis provides the
most comprehensive necessary and sufficient explanations of social phenomena (Goertz
and Mahoney 2012, 87, 230) (see also Beach and Pedersen 2013; Blatter and Blume
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2008; Blatter and Haverland 2012; Mahoney 2008). Necessary, meaning causes must be
present for an outcome to occur, but the outcome does not always occur when it is
present and sufficient, meaning an outcome always occurs when it is present but can also
occur in its absence. “If measurement error is low, even a single case can falsify a
hypothesis that posits necessary or sufficient conditions” (Levy 2008, 9). “While some
leverage can be gained by increasing the N of qualitative studies, if the total number of
cases remains small, the main basis for causal inference must derive from within-case
analysis” (Goertz and Mahoney 2012, 87). This research design moves back and forth
between theory and data, as dictated by the available evidence, combining within- and
cross-case analysis of necessary and sufficient conditions for the hypothesized dependent
variable outcome. It provides strong construct and internal validity (George and Bennett
2005, 254) and moderate external validity, which many in the literature recognize as the
most rigorous means of drawing inferences from case studies (2005, 18).
For complex social phenomena such as the GTR, it is uncommon for hypotheses
on typical cases to meet both necessary and sufficient conditions and far rarer for deviant
cases (Blatter and Haverland 2012, 92-3). This more stringent deviant, least likely case
selection design makes it more difficult for cases to pass hoop and smoking gun tests,
making claims stronger when passed. Hoop and smoking gun tests, when used jointly,
are the most reliable techniques for testing necessary and sufficient conditions (Van
Evera 1997, 32); the more certain and unique the claim, the stronger (1997, 76). While
passing a hoop test adds moderate support to a hypothesis, depending on how
restrictively it is designed, failing a hoop test falsifies and discredits the hypothesis
(Goertz and Mahoney 2012, 93). By contrast, passing a smoking gun test gives
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substantial support to a hypothesis, while failing it does not eliminate it. Increasingly
tightening hoop tests work to eliminate competing explanations, proving the evidence of
interest is a necessary condition of the outcome. The more restrictive the hoop, the more
validated the evidence.
This research design ensures strong construct validity through use of multiple data
sources, and the potential concern of a proxy gap is avoided by clearly defining and
operationalizing the relevant concepts into variables during the first phase of the research
design. The combination of a least likely and deviant case design increases internal
validity by tightening the claims on the hypotheses (George 1979, 57; Levy 2008, 14).
The theory development phase strengthens internal validity by openly weighing
competing explanations for effects on the GTR. Through this design process, “alternative
explanations are considered and found to be less consistent with data” (George 1979, 57).
Clearly delineating the bounds of theoretical generalization to fragile states sharing
similar socio-cultural contexts enhances external validity. Finally, comparative research
replication requires the researcher to provide detailed information on the sample
(boundary scope specification) from which cases were selected, variables used to select
cases, and case selection process and logic, as this dissertation does. This research design
is reliable; “By using the same information and the same methods one should arrive at the
same results” (Plümper et al. 2010, 43). This reliably constructed research design is
transferable and reproducible to other socio-culturally homogenous regions.
While MSSD case analysis cannot infer big empirical conclusions (Lieberson
1994, 311) or determine if a variable increases the likelihood of a specified outcome
within a population, it is valuable for theory-building (Eckstein 2000, 119) and theory
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disconfirming. Most similar systems design is preferred to the most different systems
design (MDSD) because it can determine causality, while most different analysis is only
useful for ruling out necessary causes (Fauer 1994, 314; George 1979, 210; Van Deth
2009, 93). Case studies also serve the heuristic purpose of identifying variables and
generating hypotheses (Eckstein 1975, 79-138). “Indeed, one of the most visible and
important contributions of case study methods has been to identify causal variables left
out of earlier analyses” (George and Bennett 2005, 254). It can also determine if a
theorized outcome is present in the cases under analysis and provides “falsifiable and
generalizable explanations of empirical phenomena” (Burroway 1998, 6), to theoretical
propositions (Bennett 2004, 43).
Most Similar Systems Design selects cases similar on all control variable
outcomes (George and Bennett 2005, 152) and many background factors—though these
are less important—differing only on the dependent variable outcome and test variable
hypothesized to cause the variation (Levy 2008, 10). Because this research design
compares cross-regional cultural, economic, political, and social phenomena at a nuanced
level of analysis, the close matching of control variables across cases is challenging
(Plümper et al. 2010, 14), and their perfect matching is impossible (Seawright and
Gerring (2008, 305). However, this does not expose a serious flaw in the research
design; instead, it is a confirmation that all research methods entail tradeoffs.
…deviant case analysis can, and should, play a positive role in empirical
research, rather than being merely the ‘tidying-up’ process through which
exceptions to the empirical rule are given some plausibility and thus
disposed of. – Kendall and Wolf (1949, 153)
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Deviant research design identifies and selects outlier cases that deviate as far as
possible from explanations of typical (control) cases (Seawright and Gerring 2008, 302),
differing on the dependent variable outcome and test variable’s independent effect.
Control and test cases are separated for analysis (2008, 304-5). This design is useful for
disconfirming (Smelser 1973, 56) or confirming (Creswell 1998, 119), refining (Kendall
and Wolf 1949, 153), or replacing (Levy 2008, 3) theory about country-level
observations that appear to have “outcomes not predicted or explained adequately by
existing theories” (George and Bennett 2005, 215). While the physical sciences value
analysis of “seeming exceptions to laws” (Molnar 1967, 1), the social sciences routinely
discard deviant observations without attempting to explain them (George and Bennett
2005, 215; Goertz and Mahoney 2012, 92).
The deviant case selection design is one of the most suitable methods for
identifying:
•
•
•
•

Boundary scope conditions (Bennett and Elman 2006, 467-8; Collier and
Mahoney 1996, 66-9).
Measurement error (Coppedge 1999, 470; George and Bennett 2005, 220;
King et al. 1994, 152-83).
Omitted variables (Collier et al. 2004, 47, 73, 78; Fearon and Laitin 2008,
8).
Underlying causes (Kazancigil 1994, 214).

For deviant cases, that is, cases that do not follow the causal pattern
predicted by the theory, within-case analysis gives qualitative researchers
an opportunity to discover the process that caused the case to diverge from
the hypothesized outcome. – Collier et al. (2004, 118)
Least Likely design serves to rectify the omission of the social network
composition variable in the trust and fragile states literature by analyzing its independent
effects on the GTR under the most unfavorable control variable conditions of fragile
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states, where its effects are more isolated and therefore more clearly measurable (Gerring
2007, 233; King et al. 1994, 209). When state security and contract institutions are
fragile, the culture is collectivist, and the inter-state market forces of trade, FDI, and FPI
are absent, but remittances and military and non-military aid are present, the independent
positive effects of SNC on the GTR are more clearly recognizable. Isolating its effects in
unfavorable conditions establishes the conditional boundaries in which variables are
likely to function as hypothesized (Beach and Pedersen 2016, 23). The “evidentiary
support for a theory from a least likely case…provides substantial theoretical leverage,
and induces a significant shift in our confidence in the theory” (Levy 2008, 12).
Nevertheless, because context matters greatly in mixed method case analysis, it is not
sound to assume an unlikely occurrence in one context is likely to occur in a very
different context. The claim of the popularized ‘“Sinatra inference’—if I can make it
there I can make it anywhere” (Levy 2002, 442), is misplaced for small-N case analysis
(Beach and Pedersen 2016, 49).
This dissertation claims the fragile state test cases of interest deviate from current
explanations for the GTR in typical fragile states. Typical case analysis is less useful at
this time in the trust and fragile states literature as it only serves to confirm, rather than
challenge existing theoretical assumptions (Seawright 2016, 502), which contributes less
to advancing the literature than deviant and least-likely analysis (Flyvbjerg 2006, 13). If
a researcher is interested in disconfirming a deterministic proposition, any deviant case
within the specified population of the inference will suffice (Dion 1998 quoted in
Seawright and Gerring 2008, 302), while ensuring test cases are both deviant and least
likely, makes their hypothesis tests much stronger.
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Procedure
This dissertation employs George’s (1979, 210) commonly used three-phase case
study research design updated with procedural modifications suggested by Beach and
Pedersen (2016), Plumper et al. (2010), and Seawright (2016). The first phase,
accomplished in Chapters I-III, entails construction of the research design, which
clarifies the research problem and question. It also identifies the class of events and
related theories of interest, specifies the dependent and independent variables, selects
appropriate cases, hypothesizes the causal relationships between the independent and
dependent variables for test cases, and formulates standardized questions asked of all
cases. The second phase, accomplished in Chapters III and IV, entails implementation of
the research design, beginning with the articulation of variable scoring criteria and
finishing with the presentation of case findings generated from systematic questions for
all cases. The third phase, accomplished in Chapters V and VI, entails synthesis of the
research design, demonstrating the superiority of sociological institutionalism and social
capital theory as a theoretical framework for explaining social network composition’s
effect on the GTR through comparing, analyzing, and interpreting the theoretical and
empirical implications of the Chapter IV findings.
Case Selection
The quantitative and much of the qualitative methodological literature have long
agreed that more observations produce more valid research results (see Eckstein 2000;
Flyvbjerg 2006; Herriott and Firestone 1983; Seawright and Gerring 2008). However,
every research has to balance the number of observations with the depth required to
answer the research question. This dissertation retains as many country cases as the case
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selection criteria, theoretical framework, and data availability allow and as much detail as
is required to answer the research questions.
Case selection is the most crucial component of research design for providing
reliability and “validity of causal inference” (Plümper et al. 2010, 42). Research design
may apply different case selection criteria, depending on if its purpose is to analyze
typical, deviant, most-similar, or most-different cases that favor extreme values on the
dependent (Y) or test (X1) variable, minimizing or maximizing the difference between
case environments (Z), or some combination thereof. The qualitative literature’s
“imprecise description of their case selection method” (2010, 14) has led to the “I know it
when I see it” (Stewart 1964, 378 U.S. 184) approach to case identification and
classification being arbitrarily applied across the empirical literature. This has resulted in
rival qualitative case selection techniques that affect boundary specification and
reliability differently—none of which have gained full support in the literature
(Seawright 2016, 500). Selecting the right method is of concern because if scope
conditions are applied too broadly or narrowly, the range of cases where the hypotheses
should theoretically hold will be inaccurate.
This dissertation’s research design adheres to the specific recommendations of
Plümper et al. (2010, 29) and Seawright (2016, 501), built on advances in the
methodological literature by Collier et al. (2004); Flyvbjerg (2006, 13); Gerring (2007,
87–8); King et al. (1994, 124–8); and Levy (2008: 8) and empirical studies by Ragin
(1992) and Rosch (1978). They claim theory-guided non-random case selection, and
extreme values on the test variable (X1) provide the most reliable results, while smaller
gains are made with extreme values on the dependent variable (Y) and minimizing the
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difference between case environments (Z). Therefore, to draw the most sound boundary
specification and maximize the reliability and quantity and quality of cases, selection
ensures SNC measures differ greatly between test and control cases.
This dissertation utilizes a high-low 2x2 case selection typology based on the new
GTR score and hypothesized SNC values. It partitions cases into discrete types sharing
common traits of interest (Stinchcombe 1968, 43-5). Cases populating this typology and
those selected for analysis are limited to those SSA states that are fragile, rather than nonfragile, collapsed, or failed. Selected cases represent SSA broadly, providing a laboratory
for comparing parallel background characteristics (Van Evera 1997, 84) of fragile SSA
states. The deviant test cases of Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, and Nigeria have positive
dependent (Y), and test (X1) variable values and typical control cases of Zambia and
Zimbabwe have negative dependent (Y) and test (X1) variable values. Uniformly
negative control variable outcomes in control and test cases provide a most-similar
research environment where there is little reason to think test cases would have wide
GTR, making them analytically interesting and meaningful.
Table 6
2x2 Case Selection Typology

↑Generalized Trust
Radius (Y = 1)
↓Generalized Trust
Radius (Y = 0)

↓Hypothesized Social
Network Composition
(X = 0)
(0,1)
Mali (0.5330)
Rwanda (0.4381)
Typical Control Cases (0,0)
Zambia (0.3280)
Zimbabwe (0.3064)
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↑Hypothesized Social
Network Composition
(X = 1)
Deviant Test Cases (1,1)
Burkina Faso (0.4408)
Ethiopia (0.3998)
Nigeria (0.3693)
(1,0)
Benin (N/A)
Cote d’Ivoire (N/A)

Table Continued
Note: Global low GTR score: Peru (0.1979).
Global high GTR score: Sweden (0.6272).

Variables & Data
The literature on the consequences of generalized trust has grown, while the
examination of its causes has lagged. This dissertation examines the structural causes of
generalized trust as Bjørnskov (2007), and Bjørnskov (2008) suggest. The trust and
fragile states literature provide strong support for security and contract institutions,
individualism, and inter-state market forces as control variables affecting the GTR. This
dissertation advances the literature by fine-tuning these claims and introducing a new
social test variable, Social Network Composition, composed of fractionalization,
proximity, and power differential, measuring how the size, strength, connectivity, and
interaction of groups affect society’s GTR. Analyzing the structural constraints that
collectively lead to self-reported trusting feelings between groups, more so than
trustworthy behavior between groups, is the most accurate measure of the GTR. This
research design tests hypotheses on the optimal balance of in-group, generalized, and
institutional trust levels and radii for creating environments conducive to the widening of
the GTR and associated positive externalities. These variables, along with how well
groups provide for their members’ interests, determine inter-group interaction and if
outcomes are positive or negative; the GTR only widens through mutually positive
interaction.
Generalized Trust Radius
The precise measurement of the GTR is essential (see Dinesen 2011; Glaeser et
al. 2000; Reeskens and Hooghe 2008), particularly for assessing functions of democracy

(see Nannestad 2008; Putnam 1993; Uslaner 2002). While some of the literature claim
experiments accomplish this most effectively, others favor surveys. The trust and
conflict experimental literature have more of a selection bias problem, as human subjects
willing to participate are likely to be skewed positively towards the value of the study
subject (see Pettigrew 1997). It is clear that social surveys are the most feasible
mechanism for collecting trust data at the group and society levels and the analysis of
survey data within case studies, as this dissertation does, is an accepted and common
practice. There is a consensus among trust surveyors that it is preferable to measure
attitudes and values, such as generalized trust, by multi-point scales rather than
dichotomously (see Alwin and Krosnick 1991; Krosnick and Fabrigar 1997; Schuman
and Presser 1981).
A widening GTR is the chief vehicle for the creation of social capital, “but its
origins remain uncertain and its consequences are yet to be clearly established” (Delhey
et al. 2011, 800), in part, due to the literature favoring the examination of trust level over
trust radius. The vaguely constructed old “standard” trust question measures generalized
trust level (Bauer et al. 2015, 59) rather than its radius. For the new GTR measurement,
“…out-group trust measures the level of trust in remote others, while the trust radius
measures how strongly remote others are in people’s minds when answering questions
about unspecified trust” (Delhey et al. 2011, 800). This reveals that “…when trust in
remote others is high, a wide circle of people is included in the notion of ‘most people’ ”
(2011, 800).
This dissertation uses the Delhey et al. (2011) out-group trust calculation of the
GTR from the new World Values Survey (WVS) 6-question trust battery, available in the
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WVS Wave 5 (2005-2009) and Wave 6 (2010-2014) surveys and is expected to be
expanded in future waves. Delhey et al. (2011) and Delhey and Welzel (2012) utilize the
Wave 5 (51 countries) data, eventually combining Wave 5 and 6 data (76 countries) in
the subsequent Delhey et al. (2014) and Welzel and Delhey (2015) articles. These four
articles encompass a pioneering effort to measure the GTR with greater precision. The
WVS has established itself as the most credible, enduring, and utilized global survey
instrument on social issues, including trust (Knack 2001, 19). There is a consensus
among the trust literature (see Bauer 2015, 21; Dekker 2011; Lundmark et al. 2016;
Sturgis and Smith 2010; Torpe and Lolle 2011; van Hoorn 2015) that this new trust
question battery and out-group trust measurement have inaugurated a new era in the trust
literature. Together, they accurately define, isolate, and measure the concept of “the
stranger,” surpassing all competing social survey research programs in this goal.
Table 7
Welzel’s Item Battery on Trust
I’d like to ask you how much you trust people from various groups. Could you tell me for each
whether you trust people from this group completely, somewhat, not very much, or not at all?
(Read out and code one answer each)
Your family
Your neighborhood
People you know personally
People you meet for the first time
People of another religion
People of another nationality

In-group trust

Out-group trust

Source: Delhey and Welzel (2012)
Reprinted with permission.

Miscalculating the Generalized Trust Radius
The new trust question is an improvement on the old “standard” trust question:
“Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can’t be
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too careful in dealing with people?” that served as the foundation for much of the trust
literature’s findings from 1981-2005. Much of the trust literature agrees, the old
“standard” trust question is invalid for cross-country analysis at the global scale (Delhey
et al. 2001, 787; Reeskens and Hooghe 2008, 530) because the concept of trust is
interpreted so differently between socio-cultural regions. Torpe and Lolle (2011) and
Helliwell and Putnam (2004) convincingly support this claim, shedding light on the
vagueness of the old “standard” trust question. It “is formulated with such a lack of
precision that it is unclear what ‘most people’ covers” (Torpe and Lolle 2011, 484), to the
point that its “capacity to measure trust across cultural divides is questionable (2011,
493). It “is perceived differently in different countries” (2011, 489), varying by region,
making cross-country comparison problematic. They call into question the validity of
research using the old “standard” trust question for cross-country analysis, particularly in
Asia and Africa (2011, 493) as it overestimates Asian GTR and underestimates Africa
GTR.
Table 8
Social Trust in Five Country Clusters (Percent Trusters)

West
Former East Bloc
Latin America
Asia
Africa
Total

Most
people can
be trusted
40.4
20.9
12.9
32.3
15.4
25.7

Trust people you meet for
the first time (somewhat
or completely)
41.2
16.3
17.8
18.7
27.8
25.8

Number
of
countries
15
10
8
10
9
52

Note: Only countries which have included both questions in the questionnaire are included in
this analysis. N is in all clusters above 10,000 respondents.
Source: Torpe and Lolle (2011, 486)
Reprinted with permission.
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A New and Improved Generalized Trust Radius Measure
While this question appears resolved for the old “standard” trust question, it is a
live debate for the new trust question. Delhey et al. (2011) agree with Bjørnskov (2008,
279) that the old question is subject to “…systematic variation in the radius of ‘most
people,’” (Delhey et al. 2011, 787) making it incomparable across countries. They also
agree with Torpe and Lolle (2011) that the new 6-question trust battery and its
measurement provide improved clarity and validity for cross-country comparison in
Africa and Asia. When comparing the measurement of “Confucian and developing
countries” (2011, 801)—specifically Burkina Faso and Ethiopia—the measurements
change dramatically when the old question is replaced by the new question (2011, 786).
For this dissertation, the GTR scores for Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Nigeria, and Zimbabwe
increase substantially when using the new trust question and measurement, while the
score for Zambia remains unchanged.
While some in the trust literature have proceeded with cross-country statistical
analysis using the new measurement, many realize further vetting is required. Delhey et
al. (2014) claim the new trust question battery and measurement correct the issues that
plague the old question through calculating the difference between derivative in-group
and transcendent out-group trust to measure how far beyond one’s group, trust extends.
Welzel and Delhey (2015) claim the Delhey et al. (2011) multigroup confirmatory factor
analysis makes the new trust measure valid for cross-country comparison on a global
scale, with Dinesen (2011), Torpe and Lolle (2011), Nannestad (2008), van Hoorn
(2014), Welzel (2011), and Welzel and Inglehart (2016) arriving at similar conclusions.
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Others in the trust literature caution this assumption (see Aleman and Woods 2016;
Banerjee 2016; Davidov et al. 2014; Donnelly and Pol-Eleches 2012; Mellon 2011).
While “the radius of trust problem remains resolved” (Delhey et al. 2014, 1260) and it
does appear “to measure the same latent constructs across groups and countries”
(Nannestad 2008, 418-9), the concern over the validity of its cross-country measurement
and comparison continues.
Refining the Generalized Trust Radius Measurement
This advancement of the literature has touched off a productive volley of critique,
defense, and improvement, resulting in a persuasive call to “discontinue using
unspecified trust, at face value, as a measure of general trust—at least in worldwide
comparisons” (Delhey et al. 2011, 801). It has also prompted a call to reexamine the
findings of studies that depend on the old “standard” trust question (see Adam 2008;
Inglehart and Baker 2000; Pichler and Wallace 2007). Van Hoorn (2014) presents
several valid methodological critiques of the Delhey et al. (2011) trust measure, which
has prompted modifications. In response, Delhey et al. (2014) concede they had a
statistical reporting error on correlation (r = .94), rather than the correct (r = .381), which
encouraged them to mistakenly claim out-group trust level (intensity of the feeling of
trust) proxies trust radius (extent of feelings of trust) (Delhey and Welzel 2014, 1261;
van Hoorn 2014, 1256-7).
Further, Welzel and Delhey (2015) make two updated claims. First, derivative
and transcendent out-group trust have different consequences, with the later correlated
with “a friendly orientation toward strangers” (2015, 893). Second, individual human
empowerment in the form of “emancipation from in-group control opens new
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opportunities to engage in beneficial exchange with out-group members” (2015, 876) and
is, therefore, the most critical omitted variable affecting the GTR.
Limitations on Measuring the Generalized Trust Radius
Promising research avenues have emerged in the trust literature as a result of the
new World Values Survey (WVS) 6-question trust battery and related Delhey et al.
(2011) GTR measure’s improved ability to isolate a society’s GTR from its generalized
trust level, in-group trust, and institutional trust. While the new trust question and its
technically sophisticated aggregate measure (Delhey et al. 2011, 798) are superior to the
old “standard” trust question (Lundmark et al. 2016, 39), because determinants of social
trust vary systematically across both countries and stages of economic and political
development (Bjørnskov 2008, 279), cross-country comparison is difficult.
Consequently, this dissertation agrees with those in the trust literature who encourage a
cautious approach to cross-country generalization of social phenomena, claiming it is
necessary to isolate the examination of trust to theoretically justified contexts. The cases
selected for this dissertation come from similar socio-cultural contexts and are at similar
stages of economic and political development, so social trust will not vary systematically
between them, as Bjørnskov (2008, 279) established is a problem for non-similar cases.
Another limitation of the new trust measure is that it is not useful to measure the
GTR longitudinally at this time. While measuring trust over time and at multiple sublevels has the potential to expose dynamic societal trends, longitudinal analysis requires
several decades of observations because normative cultural attitudes such as trust,
aggregated to the country- and group-levels, do not change measurably annually and even
change little over the course of a decade (Delhey and Newton 2005, 319). Since the new
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trust question has only existed for a decade over two survey cycles, longitudinal analysis
will not be possible until at least the release of the WVS Wave 7 (2015-2019) survey.
Social Network Composition
Fractionalization is the literature’s standard measure of country-level social
diversity. It provides the foundation for the Social Network Composition test variable,
yet it is inadequate alone to explain the social effects on the GTR, as it is limited to
measuring social homogeneity and heterogeneity in the areas of ethnicity, language,
religion, and culture. This requires the addition of physical, technological, and social
proximity and power differential measures.
The global measurement of fractionalization began in earnest with the Ethno
Linguistic Fractionalization (ELF) atlas project, which as of 2004, was more than 40
years out of date (Posner 2004, 850). It was not until 2001 that Roeder (2001) attempted
a serious reconceptualization of fractionalization, though as Fearon (2003) and Alesina et
al. (2003) rightly claim and then subsequently improve upon, it provides an incomplete
view of the concept. Following this flurry of productive fractionalization activity, Posner
(2004) aligned these competing voices in the discourse, while adding his own interesting,
though not substantially improved, PREG fractionalization measure. The most suitable
fractionalization concepts for this research include the Alesina et al. (2003) ethnic,
linguistic, and religious fractionalization measures. Fearon’s (2003) cultural diversity
measure is less suitable because the social network composition variable measures a
social phenomenon, rather than a cultural one. While Posner’s (2004) PREG index
claims to measure something conceptually different from the other indices, the literature
continues to favor the Alesina et al. (2003) measures, as does this dissertation.
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Social effects on the GTR may be examined via descriptive network measures,
which are commonly used in the case study method (Martinez et al. 2003, 5). Network
descriptors provide an analytical language and metrics employed at the node and network
levels that are useful for describing and explaining social network composition
(Emirbayer and Goodwin 1994, 1447). Fractionalization may be examined using
network cliques, which measure ultimate homogeneity, where all nodes are directly tied
to every other node in the group. As this is rare, structurally cohesive blocks—where
most, but not all nodes are directly tied to every other node in the group—are more
commonly observable. Related to this measure, the clustering coefficient assesses how
likely two nodes that are directly tied to the same node are also directly tied to each other.
Burt’s (1992) constraint measure is valuable for assessing tie strength and cohesion
within groups. Tie strength explains tie duration (homophily), intensity (propinquity),
and reciprocity (transitivity). In-group trust level (homophily), measures positive
intensity between group members, though it does not differentiate on what basis a group
identifies (ethnicity, language, religion, gender, race, age, occupation, education,
achievement, status, ideology, or values). As transitivity (perceived mutuality), defined
as connectivity between actors in a network (Wasserman and Faust 1994, 165)
approaches network closure (actual reciprocity), more expectations are met in social
interactions. Multiplexity (relational strength) is a measure of the variety of types of ties
a node has.
In addition to fractionalization, physical, technological, and social proximity and
power differential may be examined using descriptive network measures at the group and
societal levels. Physical proximity may be described and measured by network density,
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propinquity, and urban and rural ratios. Network density measures the ratio of how many
connections exist between nodes in a group or society compared to how many are
possible. In fragile states, where many groups are geographically constrained, their
propinquity (likelihood of proximity of tied nodes), should be high. Structural cohesion
and equivalence may serve as a measure of social proximity. Cohesion indicates network
interconnectedness, measuring how many nodes may be removed from a network before
it becomes disconnected. Technological proximity is measured by groups’ access to
communications (mobile and landline telephone, radio, television, and internet) and
transportation (road, rail, and air) networks. Some in the literature have hastily used
technological proximity measures alone to proxy social capital; Collier (1998) uses the
density of telephone networks, and Diamond (2000, 202) suggests radio networks may be
suitable. Power differential measures the fractionalization of power in society and
groups’ relative access to and ability to obtain desired resources, which is affected by
size, influence over government, military and the market, ownership of territory, and
ability to meet group members’ interests. The trust literature has yet to answer whether
many small groups of relatively equal size and power (multipolarity), two equally sized
and powerful groups (bipolarity), or a single dominant group (unipolarity) produces the
most conducive environment for an increasing GTR. This dissertation addresses this
question.
A More Complete Model of Social Network Composition
Two roads diverged in a wood and I - I took the one less traveled by, and
that has made all the difference.
—Robert Frost, The Road Not Taken
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Each sub-component of the SNC variable affects inter-group interaction, the only
path to wider or narrower GTR. Presented here are three models of possible SNC effects
on the GTR; however, each entails substantial nuance requiring greater explanation.
Table 9
Social Network Composition Effect on Generalized Trust Radius
Model 1
Model 2
Fractionalized
Fractionalized
(Ethnic, Linguistic, Religious) (Ethnic, Linguistic, Religious)
↓
↓
Multipolar
Unipolar or Bipolar
Power Differential
Power Differential
↓
↓
Proximate
Proximate
(Physical, Technological)
(Physical, Technological)
↓
↓
Initial Incentivization
Initial Coercion
Socially Proximate
Socially Proximate
↓
↓
Sustained Incentivization
Sustained Coercion
Socially Proximate
Socially Proximate
↓
↓
Positive Interaction
Negative Interaction
↓
↓
↑GTR
↓GTR

Model 3
Non-Fractionalized
(Ethnic, Linguistic, Religious)
↓
Unipolar or Bipolar
Power Differential
↓
Non-Proximate
(Physical, Technological)
↓
Non-Incentivized or Coerced
Socially Non-proximate
↓
Non-Incentivized or Coerced
Socially Non-Proximate
↓
No Interaction
↓
↓GTR

1. In model 1, mutually positive inter-group interaction occurs in fractionalized,
proximate, most often multipolar, societies where groups are more so
incentivized than coerced to interact, widening the GTR.
2. In model 2, mutually negative inter-group interaction occurs in fractionalized,
proximate, most often unipolar or bipolar, societies where groups are more so
coerced than incentivized to interact, narrowing the GTR.
3. In model 3, little interaction occurs in non-fractionalized, non-proximate, most
often unipolar or bipolar, societies, where groups are neither incentivized nor
coerced to interact, ensuring the GTR does not widen.
As globalization is increasing, most societies are becoming more fractionalized
and proximate. Therefore, negative and positive inter-group interaction is increasing.
The more interaction is incentivized and mutually beneficial, the more it is positive and
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widening the GTR; whereas, the more it is coerced and lopsided, the more negative it is,
narrowing the GTR. Societies’ ethnic, linguistic, and religious fractionalization changes
most slowly, followed by the power differential, while proximities change more rapidly,
though not uniformly.
Not all fractionalizations are equal in their ability to produce inter-group
interaction. The more ethnic, linguistic, and religious groups there are in a society, the
more likely one is to run into a stranger, increasing the chances of negative or positive
inter-group interaction. However, high ethnic heterogeneity has different societal effects
than does high linguistic or religious fractionalization. Ethnic and linguistic identity
often overlap, but groups feel less intensely about linguistic identity; they rarely have a
visceral hatred for speakers of other languages. Without the presence of a bridging trade
language, it is more difficult for linguistic groups to interact. Oppositely, different ethnic
and religious groups may be able to communicate through a common language, but
depending on how different they are and in what ways, they may feel more or less
distance from the other group. Groups identify more often by ethnicity, but more
intensely by religion. As the intensity of religious identity increases, the social distance
felt between groups makes positive inter-group interaction more challenging.
Fractionalization is no guarantee of inter-group interaction in the absence of
proximity and either incentivization or coercion. All types of proximity increase negative
and positive inter-group interaction, while types of power differential differ. Physical
proximity is the most explicit driver of negative and positive inter-group interaction.
When diverse groups are in physical proximity and sharing resources, it may either turn
conflictual or cooperative (Ostrom 2015, 183). Most communications and transportation
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technologies increase proximity and therefore increase the likelihood of inter-group
interaction; however, there is variation among types of media and transportation
infrastructure. A society’s power differential reflects the fractionalization of power in
society, group political relations, and the type of interaction that is likely, yet when strong
enough fractionalization and proximity drivers are present, even a society with a uniplar
or bipolar power differential may increase interaction. Groups may be either coerced or
incentivized to interact by the state, external forces, or other groups; most often, coerced
relationships become conflictual. Once initial interaction has occurred and depending if
it is negative or positive, further effort is required to sustain social proximity.
Societies’ power differential greatly affects whether inter-group interaction is
negative or positive.
Unipolar: Groups’ place in society is established and not easily changed, which
increases stability and may ease competitive tensions. The dominant group’s ability to
enforce the status quo tends to limit incentivized and even coerced inter-group
interaction. Because the dominant group does not need to interact with minority groups,
minorities that are usually unable to meet all of their interests must initiate engagement
with the dominant group on its terms.
Bipolar: Dominant groups are self-sufficient enough that they do not need nor
want to have interests met by other dominant groups. This produces a tense political
environment where dominant groups constantly vie for advantage over other dominant
groups, tending to produce insular societies within a society that interact negatively
unless a balance of power can be established.
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Multipolar: Most groups are unable to meet all of their interests, therefore, intergroup interaction increases. If groups have unmet interests that other groups can meet,
there is the opportunity for a symbiotic, rather than conflictual, relationship. Mutually
positive interaction depends on what resources groups have access to and what resources
other groups need.
State Security and Contract Institutions
Complex concepts such as the rule of law are composed of numerous differently
weighted and interdependent institutions (Voigt 2013, 16); therefore, measuring them in
aggregate sacrifices considerable precision and detail (2013, 3). As such, this research
examines security and contract institutions separately. The control variables (Security
and Contract Institutions) are measured using a combination of literature favored World
Bank quantitative global data complemented by Voigt’s (2013, 17) procedure for
assessing institutions. Although Voigt (2013, 22) raises the concern of omitted variable
bias with their use, the World Bank – Worldwide Governance Indicators for Political
Stability and Absence of Violence (2016) proxy security institutions and Rule of Law
(2016) and Control of Corruption (2016) proxy contract institutions sufficiently.
Voigt’s (2013) procedure is as follows:
•
•
•

Step 1: identify and specify the effective institution;
Step 2: predict de jure behavior expected from institutional compliance;
Step 3: measure de facto observed behavior.

It is useful to analyze conditions and patterns of institutionalization through
multiple units of analysis, including the group, field, and society, as each faces different
constraints. Size, embeddedness, strength, effectiveness, and duration are related but
separately measurable characteristics of all types of institutions. The size of an institution
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indicates the number of other institutions it likely intersects, while its embeddedness
indicates the societal depth to which an institution penetrates. The de jure-de facto gap
may measure institutional strength and effectiveness, and the longitudinal stability of an
institution may represent its duration. The de jure intention of formal rules and
regulations and the de facto social reality of compliance in fragile states are often worlds
apart (Voigt 2013, 5). The difference between the two must be measured (2013, 11) to
assess conducive environments for the widening of the GTR.
Individualism
The control variable (Individualism), which favors loose-knit social ties over
cohesive inward-looking local loyalties, is measured quantitatively, as suggested by van
Hoorn (2015, 275), using a combination of Hofstede’s (2001) Individualism cultural
dimension and the House et al. (2004) Global Leadership and Organizational Behavior
Effectiveness (GLOBE) measure for In-Group Collectivism. While the trust and fragile
states literature recognize these sources as having the best quality and reliability, they
lack global coverage, which drops several potential cases from this study. The trust
literature has also evaluated individualism qualitatively, primarily through ethnographic
studies of local cultures and comparative studies of primarily developed societies (see
Buss 2000; Kitayama et al. 1997; Lukes 1971; Realo et al. 2002; Vandello and Cohen
1999). What the literature lacks are adequate focused and comparative studies of
developing societies, particularly in SSA.
While some in the quantitative cross-cultural literature challenge collectivism’s
validity as a construct for differentiating cultures (see Brewer and Chen 2007, 147;
Oyserman et al. 2002; Schimmack et al. 2005), the majority agree individualism and
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collectivism are both meaningful and measurable cultural characteristics of societies.
The individualism-collectivism continuum has been used to this end to explain cultural
differences (see Hofstede 2001; Kagitcibasi 1997; Kim et al. 1994; Oyserman 2002;
Triandis 1995). More than a third of the cross-cultural literature claims it provides at
least a partial explanation for cross-cultural variation (Hui and Yee 1994, 410). What
remains under debate is which variants of individualism and collectivism provide
meaningful and measurable distinctions of cultural dynamics affecting the GTR.
Contending explanations include:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Vertical and horizontal individualism and collectivism (Triandis et al. 1993, 410).
Self-expression values (Welzel 2010, 157-8).
Universalism and exclusionism (Minkov 2011, 191).
Individualism, relational collectivism, and group collectivism (Brewer and Chen
2007, 147).
Familism and institutional collectivism (Gelfand et al. 2004).
Inclusive collectivism (Mbigi 1997).
Corporate collectivism (Jackson 2004, 158).
Combining cultural traits such as universalism, power, or achievement with

assessments of individualism and collectivism produce entirely different varieties
(Triandis et al. 1993, 410). Familism and institutional collectivism are distinct
measurable concepts (Realo et al. 1997, 459) that differ in scale and intensity. Some
mistakenly claim they are equal opposite types of collectivism (see Gelfand et al. 2004).
The former encourages and rewards collective actions within the family, while the later at
the societal level. Intense loyalty to family leaves more people outside one’s in-group
than when broadened to neighbors or co-workers and much more so than when
broadened to a whole culture or society. Exclusionist collectivists weigh personal
relationships when assessing appropriate behaviors towards others, whereas universalists
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rely on formal institutions to manage interactions (Minkov 2011, 239). Whole society
collectivism (present in homogeneous societies) may exhibit nationalist, totalitarian, or
even fascist tendencies. It is at this point where a society’s ethnic fractionalization
affects its individualism-collectivism.
Inter-State Market Forces
The control variable (Inter-State Market Forces) is composed of six related yet
separately measurable factors: trade, FDI, FPI, remittances, military aid, non-military aid.
These facets of economic globalization enable groups, to varying degrees, have interests
met without the risk or reward of interacting with other domestic groups. Literature
favored data include the World Bank’s 2015 Trade (Percent of GDP), Trade Balance
(Percent of GDP), Foreign Direct Investment (net inflows), Net Portfolio Equity Inflows,
Personal Remittances (received); the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) 2015 Non-Military Aid (net development assistance); and the
United States Agency for International Development (USAID) 2016 US Military Aid.
Trade as a percentage of GDP is the sum of exports and imports of goods and
services measured as a share of the gross domestic product. Current Account Balance as
a percentage of GDP is the sum of net exports of goods and services, net primary income,
and net secondary income. Also, the Net Barter Terms of Trade Index is calculated as the
percentage ratio of the export unit value indexes to the import unit value indexes,
measured relative to the base year 2000 (World Bank 2017). The foreign direct
investment (FDI) measurement is a valuable indicator of foreign influence in an
economy. The World Bank considers “ownership of 10 percent or more of the ordinary
shares of voting stock” (2017) to qualify as FDI. Portfolio equity records passive
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investment in a country, generally through the stock and bond market. It provides
countries and publically traded corporations “a direct way to access financial markets,
and thus it can provide liquidity and flexibility” (World Bank 2017). Personal
remittances are person-to-person financial transfers from one country to another or
compensation from an employer where the two reside in different countries. Official
Development Assistance (ODA) is non-military aid provided to developing countries
(incomes below $12,267 in 2010 USD) by developed OECD member governments
designed to promote economic development and welfare (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 2017). U.S. military aid, the most given by any country, is
provided to countries to enhance their military capability, defense provision, and
protecting their sovereignty.
Standardized Questions
These questions guide the data collection process in the subsequent findings
chapter.
Generalized Trust Radius
•

What are differences in in-group and generalized trust by sub-state region,
age, sex, urban-rural location, vocation, education, and wealth?

State Security Institutions
•
•
•

What is the colonial history?
What types of insecurity events have occurred and what were their
outcomes?
Does violence or poverty drive its fragility?

State Contract Institutions
•
•
•

How do colonial institutions affect modern contract institutions?
What is the quality of the state as a contract agent?
How has the state managed land tenure?
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Individualism-Collectivism
•
•

How wealthy and urban is the population?
What type of collectivism does the population exhibit?

Inter-State Market Forces
•
•
•

What is the market configuration?
How quickly and deeply has it adopted neo-liberal policies?
Does the West consider it a geo-politically strategic state?

Social Network Composition
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

What is the fractionalized composition?
Is there a unifying trade language?
What is the proximity composition?
How knowledgeable is the population of other groups in the country?
How mobile in the population?
How strong and pervasive are network ties between groups?
What type of power differential exists and has existed in the past?
Is there a history of violence?
Does it or has it had a “strongman” leader?
What are regional differences in fractionalization, proximity, and power
differential?

Limitations
Every research is bound by limitations of time, resources, effort, knowledge, and
access. The empirical reality, the current theoretical sophistication of the literature, and
available data limit the types of questions asked, hypotheses claimed, and methods
employed. It does not follow that just because the trust and fragile states literature have
mostly overlooked the effects on the GTR in fragile states, that there are not important
questions to be asked about them. This dissertation delimits its focus to effects on the
GTR in deviant fragile states. “Case(s) are studied in depth, and over time rather than at
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a single point” (Hammersley and Gomm 2000, 5) making the temporal and sequential
(Becker 2000, 225) analysis richer.
A valid critique of GTR analyses in fragile states is the difficulty in isolating
state, interstate, and social effects from each other. It is rare for a social outcome to have
a single measurable causal factor, and it is possible there are different sets of conditions
that may lead to the same outcome (Lieberson 1991, 308; Ragin 1987, xxviii). Thus,
GTR analyses contend with concerns of equifinality, collinearity, endogeneity, over
specification, and reverse causation. Past GTR studies were susceptible to endogeneity
due to the omitted Social Network Composition variable; this dissertation’s primary
contribution is rectifying that error. There are no omitted confounding variables present
affecting the dependent or independent variables. While it is difficult to avoid
collinearity and endogeneity of independent variables in the examination of trust, the
trust literature has adequately isolated these variables, ensuring each is measuring a
distinctly different social factor.
Three concerns remain. First, contract institutions may interact with inter-state
market forces through foreign capital management policies. Second, individualism (a
cultural factor) may interact with groups’ social network composition (a social factor),
affecting how willing one is to interact with strangers. Third, trust is a possible cause and
consequence of a wide range of social and political phenomena (Zmerli et al. 2007, 41-2),
which raises the concern that causation may run both directions between dependent and
independent variables. Reverse causality does not appear to be a valid concern for the
GTR because individualism is nearly an antecedent condition of societies and the
extension of generalized trust does not usually cause strong security and contract
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institutions in fragile states and has a mixed and weak effect on the various inter-state
market forces.
Over specification is a concern for statistical research models. Qualitative
methodologists once claimed that small-N analysis must adhere to the limitations of
degrees of freedom (see Campbell 1975; Lijphart 1971), but more recent literature
claims, “…it is not helpful to think about qualitative methodology in terms of a degrees
of freedom problem” (Goertz and Mahoney 2012, 10). Instead, the chief methods of
inference for small-N analysis are through theoretical propositions and within-case
analysis. This research addresses each of these methodological concerns and constructs a
model that is transferable to other most similar research contexts.
Conclusion
The primary goal of this chapter is to construct a valid, reliable, and replicable
analytical framework for explaining the GTR in fragile states. Three theoretical models
are presented to explain the GTR under different fractionalization, incentivization,
proximity, and power differentiated conditions. These models account for variations in
economic, political, cultural, and social pushing and pulling forces acting on in-group,
generalized, and institutional trust to produce societies’ GTR, trust differential, and trust
composition. Within this analytical framework, the two control and three test cases are
evaluated for their model fit through a series of standardized questions asked of each case
to produce easily measurable and comparable quantitative and qualitative findings.
This methodology chapter has provided support for the relevancy of the research
questions, the reasonableness of claims, transparency of its limitations, and rationale for
the chosen mixed method analytical framework and process for examining the
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determinants of the GTR in fragile states, implemented through subsequent chapters.
Chapter IV presents the trust-fragile states literature’s quantitative and qualitative
findings on the GTR and its determinants for the five test and control cases. Chapter V
tests the research hypotheses for each variable through within- and cross-case analysis of
necessary and sufficient conditions. Finally, Chapter VI provides conclusions and policy
suggestions flowing from the analysis, comparison, and synthesis.
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CHAPTER IV – FINDINGS
This dissertation focuses on trust; trust in environments where mutually positive
inter-group interaction does not come easily. This chapter reports quantitative and
qualitative findings separately and organizes them thematically by dependent, control,
and test variables for each case, providing a sound foundation for subsequent
comparative analysis and synthesis.
Quantitative Findings
Dependent Variable
Trust is the foundation of a healthy society. Nunn and Wantchekon (2011)
recognize a country’s colonial legacy is not the primary cause of underdevelopment,
although they claim it has lasting effects on intragroup (in-group) and institutional trust.
Interestingly, however, they do not address its effects on intergroup (generalized) trust.
The four hundred years long pre-colonial and colonial transatlantic and Indian Ocean
slave trades, which ended over a century ago, have left a legacy of mistrust between the
modern African descendants of those ethnic groups targeted by it and their governing
institutions (2011, 3221). The institutions formed subsequently in these insecure and
untrusting environments weakly constrain untrustworthy behavior (2011, 3249), making
it challenging to increase all types of trust. The authors claim a spatial correlation exists
between Atlantic and Indian Ocean coastal regions of Africa, where the slave trade was
more prevalent and increased modern mistrust. They test this claim in SSA successfully
against an Asian sample of countries with similar colonial legacies, which return an
opposite result.
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It is difficult to claim that a single institution (the African slave trade) that has not
formally existed for over 100 years still affects trust in contemporary African coastal
societies. Nunn and Wantchekon do so compellingly, although not without
methodological concerns. Their research combines “contemporary individual-level
survey data with historical data on slave shipments by ethnic group” (2011, 3221). They
produce theory-supported correlations between the slave trade and modern trustingness in
SSA, advancing the growing literature seeking to explain how cultural factors such as
trust, affect decision making (2011, 3249) in this context.
Their trust data comes from the Afrobarometer, a survey which “asks respondents
how much they trust their relatives, neighbors, and their locally elected government
council” (2011, 3228). These questions directly address intragroup (in-group) and
institutional trust, though they resort to indirect means to obtain the measurement of
intergroup (generalized) trust.
…we control directly for the impact of the slave trade on the other ethnic
groups living in the same location as the respondent. Our estimates show
that ethnic groups whose ancestors were heavily enslaved in the past are
less trusted today – Nunn and Wantchekon (2011, 3223)
They claim it is not problematic to merge Afrobarometer, Asiabarometer, and
World Values Survey data into the same regressions, claiming that any error produced in
the analysis is “not the result of differences in the underlying surveys” (2011, 3243).
However, assuming each survey is measuring the same concepts of intragroup (in-group)
and intergroup (generalized) trust is tenuous.
Finally, their assumption of immobile SSA coastal populations is unwarranted.
While SSA remains the most rural region globally, its urban percentage has increased
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from 27 percent in 1990 to 37 percent in 2014 and is projected to increase to 55 percent
in 2050 (United Nations 2014, 20). Moreover, its coastal cities have some of the highest
urbanization rates in the world, Lagos, Nigeria, Kinshasa, Congo (DRC), and Luanda,
Angola, each exhibiting over four percent annual growth between 1990 and 2014. Even
though there are recognized ethnic homelands throughout SSA, many do not live in the
same area (town, district, or province) that their slave-traded ethnic ancestors did a
century to half a millennia ago.
These findings suggest that analyses of in-group and institutional trust—and less
convincingly, generalized trust—should include slave trade legacy—and less
convincingly, coastal proximity—as background factors, if not as independent variables.
The remainder of this first section presents the quantitative case findings on the
dependent variable from the WVS new 6-question trust battery data, which is available
from the WVS Wave 5 (2005-2009) for the cases of Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, and Zambia
and from Wave 6 (2010-2014) for Nigeria and Zimbabwe. Case findings, presented
separately here, isolate the GTR from institutional and in-group trust as well as report
findings by class, regional, educational, and age effects on the GTR. The categories of
“Trust completely,” “Somewhat,” “Not very much,” and “No trust at all” are used to
report on the three levels of in-group trust (“Your family,” “Your neighborhood,” and
“People you know personally”) and the three levels of generalized trust (“People you
meet for the first time,” People of another religion,” and “People of another nationality”).
Table 10
New World Values Survey Trust Measure
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Country

Out-Group
Trust

In-Group
Trust

Trust
Differential

Peru (global low)

0.1979

0.5581

0.3602

Japan (outlier)

0.2980

0.6947

0.3967

Zimbabwe (SSA low)

0.3064

0.6825

0.3761

Zambia

0.3280

0.6098

0.2818

Ghana

0.3690

0.6296

0.2606

Nigeria

0.3693

0.7179

0.3486

Ethiopia

0.3998

0.7310

0.3312

Rwanda

0.4381

0.7611

0.3230

Burkina Faso

0.4408

0.6840

0.2432

South Africa

0.4649

0.7079

0.2430

Mali (SSA high)

0.5330

0.7842

0.2512

Sweden (global high)

0.6272

0.8292

0.2020

Mean (global)

0.3862

0.7288

0.3425

SD (global)

0.0989

0.0638

0.0938

Note: Data from World Values Survey Waves 5 and 6.
Trust Differential = In-group – Out-group Trust
Mean and SD reported for all country observations in both waves.
Source: Welzel and Delhey (2015)
Data extracted from Online Appendix OA-Table 4 on 07/14/17.
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Figure 1. Social Trust by Country.
Note: Data from World Values Survey Waves 5 and 6.
Source: Delhey et al. (2011)
Data extracted from Online Appendix OA-Table 4 on 07/14/17.

The GTR scores for the three test cases are considerably higher than the control
cases. If they were not, the research design would be “vulnerable to selection bias”
(Collier and Mahoney 1996, 89-90). Of the combined N=76 of country observations
available from Waves 5 and 6 of the WVS survey, the test cases populate the middle 50
percentile of GTR scores, when the trust-fragile states literature suggests fragile SSA
states should have much narrower GTR. The surveys’ observations follow a relatively
normal distribution with 68 percent of values falling within one SD from the mean, 95
percent within 2 SD, and 99.7 percent within 3 SD. Burkina Faso and Ethiopia’s GTR
scores are considerably higher than the trust-fragile states literature suggests and
Nigeria’s is moderately higher. Zimbabwe and Zambia’s GTR scores are as the trust112

fragile states literature suggests they should be, thus their control case status. Burkina
Faso (0.4408), scoring higher than 75 percent of the global sample, is more than one
standard deviation higher than Zimbabwe (0.3064), which scores higher than 25 percent
of the global sample. The other three cases are evenly spaced between these with
Ethiopia (0.3998) scoring higher than 55 percent of the sample; Nigeria (0.3693) scoring
higher than 46 percent of the sample, and Zambia (0.328) scoring higher than 34 percent
of the sample.
Development and fragility do not always predict the GTR. Recent literature
(Delhey and Welzel 2012, 61; Fukuyama 1995, 28; Yamagishi & Yamagishi 1994, 130)
claims East Asian societies are prone to narrow GTR, even though many have developed
economies. All test and control case score higher than Japan (0.298), which should not
be surprising since its society is highly homogenous, producing high in-group trust and
low generalized trust. There are also several moderately developed non-East Asian states
whose GTR scores fall below the test cases (Brazil (0.3273) and Slovenia (0.3281)) and a
few developed western states whose GTR scores fall below Burkina Faso (Italy (0.3885),
Uruguay (0.4214), and Netherlands (0.4221)).
Case #1: Burkina Faso. Burkina Faso’s in-group (0.684) and generalized
(0.4408) trust radii perpetuate trust environments with regional differences. Those
regions bordering Cote d’Ivoire and Mali, in particular, have lower in-group and
generalized trust. Specifically, the transient Cascades Region bordering Cote d’Ivoire
has a trust problem as it ranks lowest of all Burkinabé regions for trust in family,
neighborhoods, and people met for the first time. Its population even trusts their own
family completely (69 percent) the least of all regions compared to all other regions
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averaging 83.9 percent, a difference of 14.9 percent. Over a quarter of its population
(26.2 percent) have no trust in their neighborhoods compared to all other regions
averaging 5.4 percent, a difference of 20.8 percent. They do not trust at all people they
meet for the first time at 52.4 percent compared to all other regions averaging 26 percent.
The Mali-bordered Boucle du Mouhoun and Sahel regions also have a trust
problem, but it is primarily one of mistrust of those having different religions and
nationalities. Half of those in the Boucle du Mouhoun Region (50 percent) do not trust at
all people they meet for the first time. More than a third of the Sahel Region (36.9
percent) and a quarter of the Boucle du Mouhoun Region (29.7 percent) do not trust
people of another religion at all, this compared to the rest of the regions averaging 9.5
percent. They also have fewer people that trust people from another religion completely,
Sahel (3.9 percent) and Boucle du Mouhoun (3.8 percent), compared to the rest of the
regions averaging 14.3 percent. Finally, the Boucle du Mouhoun (36.1 percent) and
Sahel (35 percent) regions do not trust other nationalities at all more than all other
regions, which average 12.8 percent.
Table 11
Trust: People You Meet for the First Time (Burkina Faso)
Base=1534; Weighted results

Number of cases

Trust completely

Percent Total
47

3.1

Somewhat

375

24.4

Not very much

598

39

No trust at all

456

29.7

Missing; Not asked by the interviewer

13

0.8

No answer

12

0.8

Don´t know

33

2.2

1.534

100

(N)
Source: World Values Survey Wave 5: 2005-2009
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Data extracted from WVS Database on 12/28/17.

Table 12
Trust: People of Another Religion (Burkina Faso)
Base=1534; Weighted results

Number of cases

Percent Total

Trust completely

196

12.8

Somewhat

606

39.5

Not very much

437

28.5

No trust at all

209

13.6

Missing; Not asked by the interviewer

17

1.1

No answer

18

1.2

Don´t know

51

3.3

1.534

100

(N)
Source: World Values Survey Wave 5: 2005-2009
Data extracted from WVS Database on 12/28/17.

Table 13
Trust: People of Another Nationality (Burkina Faso)
Base=1534; Weighted results

Number of cases

Percent Total

Trust completely

138

9

Somewhat

575

37.5

Not very much

471

30.7

No trust at all

253

16.5

Missing; Not asked by the interviewer

24

1.6

No answer

20

1.3

Don´t know

53

3.5

1.534

100

(N)
Source: World Values Survey Wave 5: 2005-2009
Data extracted from WVS Database on 12/28/17.

Case #2: Ethiopia. Ethiopia’s in-group (0.731) and generalized (0.3998) trust
radii perpetuate trust environments with regional and age differences. While all

Ethiopians trust their families greatly (85-95 percent), young, urban, wealthy, and
educated Ethiopians have a trust problem. Trust among the young (under 29 in 2007) and
the old (over 49 years old in 2007) differ significantly. The young spent their formative
years suffering from famine under the rule of the communist regime. They have the most
trouble trusting those from their neighborhoods; people they know personally; and people
they meet for the first time.
Table 14
Ethiopian Trust Young v. Old
Young
Old
Difference

Know Personally
15.5
35.3
19.8

Neighborhood
32.7
52.9
20.2

Met for the First Time
18.8
31.4
12.6

Source: World Values Survey Wave 5: 2005-2009
Data extracted from WVS Database on 12/28/17.

One-third of Ethiopian urbanites, nearly one-fourth living in the capital, Addis
Ababa, do not trust people at all that they meet for the first time or that are of a different
religion, or nationality. Oppositely, only 12.4 percent of the people of Tigray State
bordering Eritrea do not trust people at all that they meet for the first time, with all other
states averaging only 11.9 percent and 15.6 percent respectively for not trusting people at
all of other religions and nationalities.
Members of the upper class (39.6 percent) and the university educated (39.8
percent) are the most mistrusting of people they meet for the first time, while the lower
middle class (16.3 percent) is the least mistrusting with all other educational attainment
levels average 20.8 percent. By contrast, the university educated (28 percent) are the
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most completely trusting of people of another religion, while those who failed to attain
their secondary college-preparatory diploma (2.3 percent) are the least.
Table 15
Trust: People You Meet for the First Time (Ethiopia)
Base=1500; Weighted results

Number of cases

Trust completely

Percent Total
41

2.7

Somewhat

349

23.3

Not very much

726

48.4

No trust at all

315

21

No answer

27

1.8

Don´t know

42

2.8

(N)

1.5

100

Source: World Values Survey Wave 5: 2005-2009
Data extracted from WVS Database on 12/28/17.

Table 16
Trust: People of Another Religion (Ethiopia)
Base=1500; Weighted results

Number of cases

Percent Total

Trust completely

164

10.9

Somewhat

379

25.3

Not very much

609

40.6

No trust at all

217

14.5

No answer

60

4

Don´t know

71

4.7

(N)

1.5

100

Source: World Values Survey Wave 5: 2005-2009
Data extracted from WVS Database on 12/28/17.

Table 17
Trust: People of Another Nationality (Ethiopia)
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Base=1500; Weighted results
Trust completely

Number of cases
73

Percent Total
4.9

Somewhat

294

19.6

Not very much

698

46.5

No trust at all

272

18.1

No answer

81

5.4

Don´t know

82

5.5

(N)

1.5

100

Source: World Values Survey Wave 5: 2005-2009
Data extracted from WVS Database on 12/28/17.

Case #3: Nigeria. Nigeria’s relatively high mobility, uneven development, ingroup (0.7179), and generalized (0.3693) trust radii produce trust environments with class
and regional differences. Wealthy Nigerians are nearly as suspicious of their own
families as they are of their wealthy neighbors and are divided on the extent of their trust
of those from other religions and nationalities. They (77.1 percent) trust their own
families completely 11.8 percentage points less than all other classes (88.9 percent). The
transient lower middle class (16.3 percent) trusts its neighborhoods completely 17.9
percentage points less than all other classes do, which average 34.2 percent, while 43.8
percent of the upper class does. The wealthy are also divided regarding their trust in
people of other religions, as they are nearly equally split and the most polarized of all
classes with 28.3 percent trusting them completely and 35 percent not at all. While all
Nigerian classes average 25.8 percent in their total mistrust of other nationalities, the
upper class (25.6 percent) trust them completely the most, while the lower class (5.4
percent) trust them the least with a 20.2 percent difference.
Many of the wealthiest Nigerians reside in Lagos, SSA’s largest and the world’s
sixth largest city when measuring the city proper rather than urban area or metropolitan

area (United Nations 2016). Of those residing in Lagos, only 67 percent trust their
families completely, 22 percentage points less than in all other areas of the country,
which average 89 percent. There are also several regional differences for in-group and
generalized trust. Only 8.2 percent of residents of the Middle Belt states in the North
Central Region trust their neighborhoods completely compared to all other regions
averaging 28.1 percent. The Igbo of the South East Region distrust people at all of
another religion the most (35.4 percent) compared to the rest of the regions at 18.7
percent, which is a difference of 16.7 percent.
Table 18
How Much You Trust: People You Meet for the First Time (Nigeria)
Base=1759; Weighted results

Number of cases

Percent Total

Trust completely

80

4.5

Trust somewhat

302

17.2

Do not trust very much

756

43

Do not trust at all

621

35.3

1.759

100

(N)
Source: World Values Survey Wave 6: 2010-2014
Data extracted from WVS Database on 12/28/17.

Table 19
How Much You Trust: People of Another Religion (Nigeria)
Base=1759; Weighted results

Number of cases

Percent Total

Trust completely

181

10.3

Trust somewhat

625

35.5

Do not trust very much

577

32.8

Do not trust at all

376

21.4

1.759

100

(N)
Source: World Values Survey Wave 6: 2010-2014
Data extracted from WVS Database on 12/28/17.
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Table 20
How Much You Trust: People of Another Nationality (Nigeria)
Base=1759; Weighted results
Trust completely

Number of cases

Percent Total
138

7.9

Trust somewhat

493

28

Do not trust very much

674

38.3

Do not trust at all

454

25.8

1.759

100

(N)
Source: World Values Survey Wave 6: 2010-2014
Data extracted from WVS Database on 12/28/17.

Case #4: Zambia. Zambia’s in-group (0.6098) and generalized (0.328) trust radii
produce trust environments with regional differences, primarily regarding in-group trust.
Zambia’s Central, Western, and Copperbelt provinces are most trusting, while its Eastern,
Lusaka, North Western, and Southern provinces have various trust problems. Zambia’s
Central Province trusts most completely their neighborhoods (35.4 percent), people they
know personally (36 percent), and those of another religion (27.3 percent). Those in
Western and Copperbelt provinces (1.1 percent) distrust their neighborhoods the least.
Zambia’s Eastern (33.8 percent) and Western (86.2 percent) provinces differ the
greatest (54.2 percentage point difference) in how much they completely trust their
family with the average of all provinces being 64.8 percent. In Lusaka, complete trust in
one’s neighborhoods is lowest (6.9 percent), while its level of no trust at all is highest (12
percent), excluding North Western Province (12.1 percent). Only 3.8 percent of those in
Southern Province trust completely people they know personally and 2.9 percent average
for those of other religions.
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Table 21
Trust: People You Meet for the First Time (Zambia)
Base=1500; Weighted results

Number of cases

Trust completely

Percent Total
23

1.5

Somewhat

214

14.3

Not very much

594

39.6

No trust at all

624

41.6

No answer

24

1.6

Don´t know

21

1.4

(N)

1.5

100

Source: World Values Survey Wave 5: 2005-2009
Data extracted from WVS Database on 12/28/17.

Table 22
Trust: People of Another Religion (Zambia)
Base=1500; Weighted results

Number of cases

Percent Total

Trust completely

124

8.3

Somewhat

438

29.2

Not very much

546

36.4

No trust at all

316

21.1

No answer

34

2.3

Don´t know

42

2.8

(N)

1.5

100

Source: World Values Survey Wave 5: 2005-2009
Data extracted from WVS Database on 12/28/17.

Table 23
Trust: People of Another Nationality (Zambia)
Base=1500; Weighted results

Number of cases

Trust completely

Percent Total
48

3.2

Somewhat

276

18.4

Not very much

649

43.3

121

Table Continued

No trust at all

453

30.2

2

0.1

No answer

33

2.2

Don´t know

39

2.6

(N)

1.5

100

Missing; Not asked by the interviewer

Source: World Values Survey Wave 5: 2005-2009
Data extracted from WVS Database on 12/28/17.

Case #5: Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe’s in-group (0.6825) and generalized (0.3064)
trust radii produce trust environments with class and regional differences. Zimbabwe’s
upper class places more trust in more groups than its lower classes. They (91.8 percent)
trust their families completely 12.4 percentage points more than all other lower classes
averaged at 79.4 percent and people they meet for the first time (11.6 percent), which is
eight percent higher than the lower classes averaged at 3.6 percent. Oddly, the upper
class is divided over complete (28.3 percent) and total lack of (35 percent) trust in
persons of another religion. While all classes average 25.8 percent in total lack of trust in
other nationalities, their complete trust in other nationalities is class-dependent, with the
upper class (25.6 percent) trusting most and the lower class (5.4 percent) trusting least, a
20.2 percentage point gap.
Regionally, minority areas of Midlands (59.9 percent), Masvingo (68.3 percent),
and Manicaland (71.9 percent) provinces trust their own families completely the least,
while Shona and Northern Ndebele majority areas average 91 percent. Masvingo
Province (1.9 percent) also trusts neighborhoods completely least compared to all other
provinces that average 17.6 percent. Those in Mashonaland East Province (35.4 percent)
do not trust at all people of another religion the most, compared to the rest of the
provinces’ average (18.7 percent), which is a difference of 16.7 percent.

Table 24
How Much You Trust: People You Meet for the First Time (Zimbabwe)
Base=1499; Weighted results

Number of cases

Percent Total

Trust completely

20

1.3

Trust somewhat

183

12.2

Do not trust very much

640

42.7

Do not trust at all

656

43.8

1.499

100

(N)
Source: World Values Survey Wave 6: 2010-2014
Data extracted from WVS Database on 12/28/17.

Table 25
How Much You Trust: People of Another Religion (Zimbabwe)
Base=1499; Weighted results

Number of cases

Percent Total

Trust completely

54

3.6

Trust somewhat

508

33.9

Do not trust very much

656

43.8

Do not trust at all

280

18.7

1.499

100

(N)
Source: World Values Survey Wave 6: 2010-2014
Data extracted from WVS Database on 12/28/17.

Table 26
How Much You Trust: People of Another Nationality (Zimbabwe)
Base=1499; Weighted results
Trust completely

Number of cases

Percent Total
31

2.1

Trust somewhat

325

21.7

Do not trust very much

681

45.4

Do not trust at all

462

30.8

1.499

100

(N)
Source: World Values Survey Wave 6: 2010-2014
Data extracted from WVS Database on 12/28/17.
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Independent Variables
State Security & Contract Institutions
There is a consensus in the state literature that security and contract institutions
determine the majority of state fragility, yet how much they affect the GTR remains
under debate in the trust literature. This dissertation addresses this debate by
constructing a hybrid sociological institutionalism and social capital theory theoretical
framework; unfortunately, their research agendas have remained largely disconnected
(Thelen 1999, 371, 386-7). The limited research at their intersection claims social capital
needs to be embedded in formal institutions to increase (see Berman 1997; Hall 1999;
Levi 1998; Stolle 2002; Tarrow 1996). If this is the case, it is imperative to identify
which formal institutions affect the GTR most.
Table 27
Security Institutions
Country

Political Stability and the Absence of
Violence/Terrorism (2016)
Estimate of
Percentile Rank (0-100)
Governance

Most Stable

100 (Greenland)

1.96 (Greenland)

Zambia

52.86

0.18

Rwanda

45.71

-0.05

S. Africa

42.38

-0.13

Ghana

40.00

-0.16

Zimbabwe

24.29

-0.61

Burkina Faso

15.24

-0.95

Mali

8.57

-1.55
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Ethiopia

7.62

-1.57

Nigeria

6.67

-1.85

Least Stable

0.00 (Syria)

-2.91 (Syria)

Note: Estimate of governance (ranges from approximately -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong) governance
performance).
Source: World Bank – Worldwide Governance Indicators: Political Stability and Absence of Violence
(2016) (N=215)
Data extracted from source on 09/25/17.

Table 28
Contract Institutions
Rule of Law (2016)
Country

Control of Corruption (2016)

Most Effective

100
(Sweden)

Estimate of
Governance
2.04
(Sweden)

100
(New Zealand)

Estimate of
Governance
2.30
(New Zealand)

S. Africa

58.17

0.07

60.10

0.05

Rwanda

57.69

0.07

74.52

0.69

Ghana

54.81

0.00

50.96

-0.17

Zambia

43.27

-0.30

42.31

-0.40

Ethiopia

37.02

-0.39

39.90

-0.44

Burkina Faso

34.13

-0.45

53.37

-0.13

Mali

22.60

-0.78

29.81

-0.67

Nigeria

13.94

-1.05

13.46

-1.04

Zimbabwe

8.17

-1.32

8.65

-1.28

Least Effective

0
(Somalia)

-2.37
(Somalia)

0
(Equatorial Guinea)

-1.81
(Equatorial Guinea)

Percentile Rank (0-100)

Percentile Rank (0-100)

Note: Estimate of governance (ranges from approximately -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong) governance performance).
Sources: World Bank – Worldwide Governance Indicators: Control of Corruption (2016) (N=215); World Bank – Worldwide
Governance Indicators: Rule of Law (2016) (N=215)
Data extracted from source on 09/25/17.

Rothstein and Stolle (2008) claim legal, law enforcement, and military “order”
institutions bear a greater societal expectation of impartiality than other institutions
(2008, 445) and are therefore most likely to affect the GTR and social capital.
Institutions may be arranged in an infinite number of configurations (Rothstein 1996,
572); the literature has left most of them unexplored (2008, 441), and it is unclear
whether trust in political institutions causes generalized trust or vice versa (2008, 443).
Together, analysis of order institutions and social mechanisms that trigger individual
behavior provide the fullest explanation of generalized trust (Hedström and Swedberg
1998, 12, 23).
Many in the trust literature assume generalized and institutional trust cannot be
separated entirely for analysis (see Crepaz 2008; Rothstein 2005; Rothstein and Stolle
2003, 199-200; You 2005). Within this presumed constraint, Freitag and Bühlmann
propose there is a “top-down approach to producing generalized trust through political
institutions” (2009, 1556). However, because their findings are based on the old
“standard” trust question, they merit reexamination using the new trust question. Further,
they claim institutional configurations with low corruption, and income inequality and
proportional representation may produce generalized trust (Freitag and Bühlmann 2009,
1554) rather than only institutional trust. They also claim that
…the rule of law, independence of the judiciary, health care spending,
institutional and executive power-sharing, and prominence of democraticpluralistic rules do not exhibit any statistically significant influence on the
development of trust – Freitag and Bühlmann (2009, 1554)
Rothstein and Stolle (2008) provide strong support for state security and contract
institutions affecting the GTR. However, Freitag and Bühlmann’s (2009) claim of
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institutions creating generalized trust requires further critique. The question of how
separable institutional and generalized trust is from the other remains unanswered. Most
of the trust literature claim them to be two separate phenomena, yet there is not a
consensus on where institutional designers end and institutions begin, nor where
institutions end and institutional administrators begin. Fragile states have weak
institutions, so even if institutions can elicit generalized trust, it is not possible in fragile
states. Therefore, strong security and contract institutions may serve (Smith 2003, 119)
as a limited and temporary alternate source of the positive externalities associated with
the widening of the GTR (Chan 2007, 734), although this is rarely realized in fragile
states. These quantitative findings present a compelling case for the effects of state
security and contract institutions on the GTR.
Individualism & Collectivism
The most consistent finding is that industrialized, wealthy, and urban
societies tend to become increasingly individualistic, whereas more
traditional, poorer, and more rural societies tend to remain collectivistic.
—Geert Hofstede, Cultures and Organizations
A society’s aggregate individualism-collectivism level is expressed through the
degree of independence (Hofstede 2001, 93), pride, loyalty, and cohesiveness (House et
al. 2004, 30) within and between its groups. This level affects social behavior and is
mostly antecedent to all other factors affecting the GTR. Rights, personal interests,
rationality, and fluidity of group boundaries, rather than duties and obligations to one’s
group(s), drive individualism, which is associated with a wider trust radius and
collectivism with a narrower one (van Hoorn 2015, 269). Hofstede’s (2001)
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Individualism and House’s (2004) In-Group Collectivism dimensions provide the
quantitative foundation for the qualitative findings and analysis in subsequent chapters.
Table 29
Individualism-Collectivism
Hofstede
Individualism
(higher = more
individualist)
(N=76)
91
(United States)

GLOBE In-Group
Collectivism
(practices) (lower =
more individualist)
(N=62)
3.18
(Czech Republic)

GLOBE In-Group
Collectivism (values)
(lower = more
individualist)
(N=62)
4.06
(Czech Republic)

S. Africa

65

4.80

5.45

Zambia

35

5.84

5.77

Nigeria

30

5.55

5.48

Ethiopia

20

-

-

Burkina Faso

15

-

-

Ghana

15

-

-

Zimbabwe

-

5.57

5.85

Mali

-

-

-

Rwanda

-

-

-

Least Individualist

6
(Guatemala)

6.36
(Philippines)

6.52
(El Salvador)

Country

Most Individualist

Note: N=52 countries common between Hofstede and GLOBE studies.
Sources: Hofstede (2001); House et al. (2004)
Data extracted from VSM 2013 08 25 Database and GLOBE Phase 2 Aggregated Societal Level Data: May 17, 2004, on
06/04/17.
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Individualism Dimension
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Global Low Burkina Faso Ethiopia (20) Nigeria (30)
Guatemala (6)
(15)

Zambia (35)

Global High
Global
United States Average (45)
(91)

Figure 2. Individualism Dimension.
Source: Hofstede (2001)
No Data available for Zimbabwe.
Data extracted from VSM 2013 08 25 Database on 06/04/17.

The Hofstede (2001) Individualism dimension is measured on a scale of zero
(low) to 100 (high). The range represented across the five country cases span a low score
of 15 (Burkina Faso) to a high score of 35 (Zambia). Each of the cases scores below the
global average of 45 and much closer to the global low score of six (Guatemala)
compared to the global high score of 91 (United States).
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In-Group Collectivism
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
Global Low
Czech Republic
(4.06/3.18)

Nigeria
(5.48/5.55)

Zambia
(5.77/5.84)

In-Group Collectivism (Values)

Zimbabwe
(5.85/5.57)

Global High
El Salvador
(6.52)
Philippines
(6.36)

Global Average
(5.66/5.13)

In-Group Collectivism (Practices)

Figure 3. In-Group Collectivism.
Source: House (2004)
No Data are available for Burkina Faso and Ethiopia.
Data extracted from GLOBE Phase 2 Aggregated Societal Level Data: May 17, 2004, on 06/04/17.

The House et al. (2004) In-Group Collectivism dimension is measured on a scale
of one (low) to seven (high), taking account of internalized values and actual behavior.
Each of the five cases scores highly for In-Group Collectivism in their practices. Only
Nigeria’s In-Group Collectivism (values) are below the global average. Only Zimbabwe
has a moderate difference between its expressed values and actual behavior; therefore,
Zimbabweans claim to be more collectivist (5.85) than they behave (5.57). Oppositely,
globally, countries claim to be less collectivist (5.13) than they behave (5.66).
Together, Hofstede’s (2001) individualism indicator and House’s (2004) practices
scale, measure individualism-collectivism along a continuum with a correlation measure
of −.765 (n = 25) (van Hoorn 2015, 275).
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A one standard deviation increase in individualism implies an increase in
the outgroup connotation of trust of almost 40% (.0357/.0896) and a one
standard deviation increase in collectivism implies a decrease in the
outgroup connotation of trust exceeding 50% (−.0486/.0944), ceteris
paribus – van Hoorn (2015, 273)
Some in the literature disagree (Allik and Realo 2004, 31), claiming individualism
and collectivism are not opposite ends of a continuum (see Triandis and Suh 2002) that
are stable over time (see Fontaine et al. 2008), and whose “meaning is not constant across
contexts within the culture” (Fiske 2002, 83-4). Van Hoorn (2014) further claims the rule
of law, democracy, income per capita, and income inequality affects how individualists
and collectivists understand the meaning of “trust in most people” as framed in the WVS
old “standard” trust question (2015, 274). There is an ongoing debate, not if
individualism and collectivism affect the GTR, but how much and in what ways. The
quantitative findings on individualist and collectivist cultural traits present a strong case
for individualism as a nearly antecedent, yet still variable, social condition that positively
affects a society’s GTR.
Inter-State Market Forces
Does generalized trust produce positive market outcomes or vice versa? Some in
the literature (see Beugelsdijk and Smulders 2004; Knack and Keefer 1997; La Porta et
al. 1997; Putnam 1993; and Zak and Knack 2001) “have argued that the causality goes
from generalized trust to GDP per capita (or GDP-per-capita growth rate), although the
causality can easily be argued to go both ways” (Chan 2007, 741). Chan (2007) and
Polillo (2012) synthesize the pertinent quantitative discourse related to globalization’s
multifaceted effects on the GTR through the separately measurable sub-factors of trade,
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foreign direct investment (FDI, foreign portfolio investment (FPI), remittances, military
aid, and non-military aid.
The literature is unresolved as to “whether global economic integration can lead
to national social disintegration, as proclaimed by Rodrik (1997)” (Chan 2007, 733).
...on the one hand, globalization is understood to be integrative and
civilizing, increasing people’s mutual dependence on others, and leading
to greater social trust; on the other hand, globalization is perceived as
destructive and threatening, making people vulnerable to forces beyond
their control, and thus affecting social trust negatively – Polillo (2012, 45)
referencing Guillén (2001); Kaya and Karakoc (2012); and Lizardo (2008)
What is certain is that increasing globalization exposes societies to additional
external factors such as trade, investment, remittances, and aid that potentially affect its
GTR. Non-fragile states are better equipped to take advantage of globalization’s effects
while fragile states are more susceptible to its adverse effects. For those states that
already have extensive capital, infrastructure, patents, and knowledge, it is exponentially
easier to produce more through the global market. Another struggle for fragile states is
that “global integration requires nations to make adjustments in some of their social
values and practices or be left behind economically” (Chan 2007, 751). However, if a
society is already “civil” and homogenous, Bhagwati (2004) and Sen (1999) argue “that
the transmission of foreign values from globalization benefits national values” (Chan
2007, 751). Unfortunately, most fragile states of SSA do not meet these criteria.
Economic inequality has an intervening relationship with, and non-linear effect
on, trade and generalized trust. Chan (2007) argues that a country’s openness to
globalization increases generalized trust and strengthens informal institutions, “the ‘civic
glue’ that holds together and governs the society” (2007, 751). He does not, however,
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make this claim without qualification, stating, “Economic inequality weakens this
positive effect” (2007, 751). The World Bank’s World Development Indicators national
economic inequality scores he references are estimated by unit-record consumption data
for all cases except Zimbabwe, which is estimated by grouped consumption data, range
from 23.1 to 59.3 with a mean of 37.58 and SD of 10.72 over various years. Zambia has
the highest economic inequality of the cases with a Gini score of 57.1 in 2010 and
Ethiopia the lowest at 29.8 in 2005; Ethiopia’s Gini score is 2.6 SD lower than Zambia’s.
Table 30
Inequality by Country (selected cases)
Country
Zambia
Zimbabwe
Nigeria
Burkina Faso
Ethiopia

Gini Coefficient
57.1
47
46.8
39.8
29.8

Year
2010
1995
2010
2009
2005

Note: Gini Coefficient is composite of nine separate inequality indicators.
Source: World Bank (various years).
Data extracted from World Bank Data Catalog on 11/19/17.

He hypothesizes that at some, yet to be identified, tipping point along this
continuum, increasing economic inequality, and openness to trade will negatively affect
generalized trust (Chan 2007, 751). The Zimbabwean and Zambian control cases support
this hypothesis, as they have high trade as percent of GDP, high inequality, and a low
GTR. Under these conditions, mutually beneficial inter-group interaction is dependent
on increased institutional trust through easily monitored and enforced institutions (2007,
734). Unfortunately, institutional trust is hard to come by in fragile states.
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Trade as Percent of GDP by Year
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Figure 4. Trade as Percent of GDP by Year.
Note: High and low all-time recorded annual scores per country.
Source: World Bank 2017.
Data extracted from World Bank Data Catalog on 11/19/17.

Table 31
Inter-State Market Forces: Trade
Trade (Percent of
GDP) (2016)
(N=217)
419
(Luxembourg)

Current Account Balance
(Percent of GDP) (2015)
(N=217)
25.45
(Macao SAR, China)

Net Barter Terms of Trade
Index 2015 (2000=100)
(N=217)
192.64
(United Arab Emirates)

Ghana

89

-7.48

174.50

Zambia

84

-3.63

165.10

Burkina Faso

63

-8.05

113.80

South Africa

60

-3.21

133.10

Zimbabwe

60

-9.46

113.50

Rwanda

48

-13.30

156.90

Mali

47

-4.83

148.80

Country
Global High
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Table Continued
Ethiopia

36

-6.89

134.50

Nigeria

21

-3.28

131.50

Global Low

22
(Sudan)

-42.26
(Liberia)

44.09
(Sierra Leone)

Note: Most recent data from each source.
Trade (Percent of GDP): Nigeria and Zambia are 2015.
Current Account Balance (Percent of GDP): Ethiopia is 2012, Mali and Burkina Faso are 2014, and South Africa is 2016
Sources: World Bank – Trade (Percent of GDP); Current Account Balance (Percent of GDP; Net Barter Terms of Trade Index
Data extracted from sources on 09/25/17.

Table 32
Inter-State Market Forces: Investment

Country

Highest Investment

Foreign direct
investment, net
inflows (Percent of
GDP) (2015)
(N=217)
71.7
(Ireland)

Portfolio Equity, net
inflows (BoP, current
US$) (2015) (N=217)
350,945,538,584
(Luxembourg)

Ghana

8.5

18,140,000

Zambia

7.5

182,760

Rwanda

4.0

1,395,122

Ethiopia

3.5

-

Zimbabwe

2.8

122,800,000

Burkina Faso

1.6

65,580,541

Mali

1.2

2,466,956

Nigeria

0.7

-486,640,211

South Africa

0.5

1,639,686,877

Lowest Investment

-29.9
(Marshall Islands)

-178,267,000,000
(United States)

Note: Most recent data from each source.
Sources: World Bank – Foreign direct investment, net inflows (Percent of GDP); World Bank –
Portfolio equity, net inflows (BoP, current US$)
Portfolio equity, net inflows (BoP, current US$): Ghana is 2010, Burkina Faso and Mali is 2014,
South Africa is 2016 data.
Data extracted from sources on 09/25/17.

Table 33
Inter-State Market Forces: Remittances
Remittances (Personal
remittances, received
(Percent of GDP) (2016)
(N=217)
30.6
(Liberia)

Remittances (Personal
remittances, received
(current US$) (2016)
(N=217)
62,745,000
(India)

Zimbabwe

12.7

2,046,580

Mali

5.7

802,655

Ghana

4.8

2,041,692

Nigeria

4.7

18,956,000

Burkina Faso

3.3

397,309

Rwanda

1.9

163,313

Ethiopia

0.9

641,939

South Africa

0.3

755,434

Zambia

0.2

44,321

Lowest Receiving

0.0

1,494
(Suriname)

Country

Highest Receiving

Note: Most recent data from each source.
Personal remittances, received (Percent of GDP) and Remittances (Personal remittances, received (current
US$): Zimbabwe is 2015.
Personal remittances, received (Percent of GDP): Angola, Congo, DRC, Turkmenistan, United States,
Suriname, Chile, and Saudi Arabia = 0.
Source: World Bank (2015)
Data extracted from sources on 09/25/17.

Table 34
Inter-State Market Forces: Aid
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Table Continued
Net ODA (non-military) received
per capita 10 Year Average
Disbursement (2005-2014)
(N=218)
2576.11
(Nauru)

US Aid (military) 10
Year Average
Disbursement (20062015) (N=222)
2,841,356,291
(Israel)

Rwanda

88.48

709,711

Zambia

81.47

408,376

Mali

70.08

2,559,140

Burkina Faso

64.42

932,342

Ghana

59.04

2,896,107

Zimbabwe

46.02

0

Ethiopia

35.87

4,106,991

Nigeria

22.17

6,433,980

South Africa

20.22

1,707,197

Least Received

0

0

Country

Most Received

Note: Most recent data from each source.
Net ODA (non-military) received per capita 10 Year Average Disbursement (2005-2014): multiple = 0.
US Aid (military) 10 Year Average Disbursement (2006-2015): multiple = 0.
Sources: OECD (2015); USAID (2015)
Data extracted from sources on 09/27/17.

Polillo (2012) comes to a similar, but more far-reaching conclusion than Chan
(2007) for the same question. He claims globalized competition and resulting economic
inequality have “deleterious effects on social trust” (2012, 60), “decreasing generalized
trust in the countries most exposed to it” (2012, 45). He also claims democracies are
almost certainly more effective incubators of social trust than authoritarian regimes,
though this is difficult to prove due to the endogenous relationship between democracy
and social trust (2012, 61); the trust literature is unsure how to identify and prove the
causal direction with clear empirical evidence. Confusingly, he qualifies his claims
stating, “the degree to which a country contributes to global scientific knowledge is

positively associated with the probability that its citizens will trust unknown others”
(Polillo 2012, 59). Assuming the accumulation of scientific knowledge is a reasonable
proxy for development, he is claiming the most productive countries in the global market,
regardless of their level of economic inequality, will increase in generalized trust.
These quantitative findings on inter-state market forces, centered on trade, present
a case for their bi-directional effects on the GTR, prompting subsequent analysis of the
qualitative findings on trade, FDI, FPI, remittances, military aid, and non-military aid.
Social Network Composition
Alesina et al. (2003) calculate ethnic, linguistic, and religious fractionalization,
leaving out the cultural fractionalization that Fearon (2003) includes. This study
increases the number of observations and consistency of measurement criteria over all
other previous research (Alesina et al. 2003, 182).
However, it is difficult to evaluate precisely the size of these effects
because of the strong correlation of ethnolinguistic fractionalization
variables with other potential explanatory variables, especially
geographical ones. In the end one has to use theory and priors to interpret
our partial correlations – Alesina et al. (2003, 183)
Table 35
Fractionalization (sub-Saharan African Sample)
Country

Most Fractionalized (global)
Nigeria
Zambia
South Africa
Burkina Faso
Ethiopia
Mali
Ghana
Zimbabwe

Ethnic
(N=180)
M:0.385
0.9302 (Uganda)
0.8505
0.7808
0.7517
0.7377
0.7235
0.6906
0.6733
0.3874
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Linguistic
(N=185)
M:0.435
0.9227 (Uganda)
0.8503
0.8734
0.8652
0.7228
0.8073
0.8388
0.6731
0.4472

Religious
(N=198)
M:0.439
0.8603 (S. Africa)
0.7421
0.7359
0.8603
0.5798
0.6249
0.1820
0.7987
0.7363

Table Continued
Rwanda
Least Fractionalized (global)

0.3238
0.0000 (Bermuda)

0.0000
0.0000 (Isle of Man)

0.5066
0.0028 (Somalia)

Notes: Higher values = more fractionalization.
Source: Alesina et al. (2003)
Data extracted from appendix table (184-9) on 10/11/17.

There are regional differences in fractionalization. While non-European Western
countries tend towards moderate-low ethnolinguistic fractionalization, and high religious
fractionalization, East Asian and European (mainly Scandinavian) countries tend towards
low fractionalization in all three areas. Sub-Saharan African countries tend towards high
fractionalization in all three areas except for Muslim-majority countries, which lack the
denominational diversity of Christian-majority countries. The 13 least religiously
fractionalized countries are all Muslim majority and located in the Middle East and
Northern Africa (MENA) and SSA. In SSA, high religious fractionalization indicates a
highly religious population or a high percentage of syncretism and the presence of
African Initiated Churches (AICs), most of which are independent and widely vary in
belief and practice. Low religious fractionalization in SSA may indicate a spatially small
country, one that is Muslim-majority, religion’s lack of importance in the society, or the
presence of a large, unified religion or denomination (e.g., Roman Catholic or Sunni
Muslim).
Nigeria is the most comprehensively fractionalized of the cases when considering
all of the indices from each source followed by Zambia, which is only low in Fearon’s
(2003) cultural fractionalization measure and does not make the ELF list of the ten most
fractionalized Africa countries. Ethiopia is only considered more fractionalized than
Zambia in Fearon’s (2003) measures; all others favor Zambia. Burkina Faso and
Zimbabwe make the list of the ten least fractionalized African countries for PREG and
ELF respectively. Zimbabwe is the least comprehensively fractionalized of the cases

when considering all of the indices from each source, except the Alesina et al. (2003)
religious fractionalization measure, while Burkina Faso comes in middle of the pack in
all measures except the Alesina et al. (2003) religious fractionalization measure, for
which it is the lowest of the cases. Burkina Faso and Zimbabwe each have a unipolar
configuration with a single large and powerful majority group, but they differ in their
minority group composition with the former having many small minorities and the later
having a single large minority group.
These quantitative fractionalization findings present a strong, yet incomplete, case
for social effects on the GTR. Societies with the greatest GTR potential are the most
fractionalized, yet this is only one of several meaningful effects along with proximity and
power differential, which the quantitative literature pays little attention. The test cases of
Ethiopia and Nigeria are highly fractionalized, while Burkina Faso is not and the control
case of Zambia is highly fractionalized, while Zimbabwe is not.

Qualitative Findings
Independent Variables
The quantitative findings presented in the preceding section suggest the balance
between in-group, generalized, and institutional trust affects the economic, political, and
socio-cultural composition of societies. These findings also suggest the measurement of
the GTR has been inaccurate for SSA, with the Delhey et al. (2011) new trust measure
providing promise for the advancement of the trust literature in this region. George’s
(1979, 210) second phase of case study examination (research design implementation)
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continues through this chapter’s presentation of qualitative case findings for each control
and test variable.
State Security Institutions

As a dog returns to its vomit, so fools repeat their folly.
—Prov. 26:11, NIV
Case #1: Burkina Faso. Burkina Faso, colonized by France, having gained its
independence in 1960 as Upper Volta, is not widely recognized as having a history of
state fragility, but it does. Even though it has one of the more peaceful post-colonial
histories in SSA, it has experienced other forms of fragility, including poverty, weak
political legitimacy leading to peacefully resolved coup d'états, uneven development, and
cross-border migration. In the 2010s it experienced increased conflict and violence
resulting from the spillover of Islamist extremism from Mali and political unrest in the
form of multiple successful and failed military coup d'états. Its culture of strongman
leadership, common across SSA, has held political leaders in power long after their
constitutional-democratic terms have expired.
The Burkinabé have fallen into a cycle of non-procedural, non-violent, power
transitions that have effectively short-circuited attempted power grabs. They have
experienced seven successful post-independence coup d'états (the highest of all SSA)
(Dwyer 2015, 98), due in part, to a chaotic and vigorous protest culture and undisciplined
military with one of the highest mutiny rates in SSA (Dwyer 2017, 220). Each regime
established by a successive coup d'état has quickly collapsed under the pressure of the
next one, indicating an active political culture in a weak institutional environment.
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Protest has served as a relatively peaceful political pressure valve for a society that has
few trustworthy security institutions.
Table 36
Burkinabé Insecurity
Type
Military coup d'état
Civilian power struggle
Military coup d'état
Military coup d'état
Military coup d'état
Military coup d'état
Military coup d'état
Military coup d'état plot
Military coup d'état
Military coup d'état
Military coup d'état
Military coup d'état

Year(s)
1966-1980
1974
1980-1982
1982-1983
1983
1983-1987
1987-2014
1989
2003
20142015
2016

Outcome
Long-term success
Parliament dissolved
Short-term success
Short-term success
Failed
Moderate-term success
Long-term success
Failed
Failed
Short-term success
Failed
Failed

Sources: McGowan 2003; Raleigh et al. 2010; Sarkees and Wayman 2010
Data extracted from sources on 11/18/17.

An increasingly active and emboldened Burkinabé civil society has helped to
pressure the military-led government to remain within its constitutional bounds but has
been unable or unwilling to generate sufficient electoral pressure until 2015 to elect a
stable non-military leader (President Kaboré). Before this, it repeatedly allowed a return
to the source of the government’s poor leadership—the military—to replace embattled
civilian leaders via coup d'état. The same solution to a recurring problem has produced
identical results: state fragility. Burkinabé security institutions do not positively affect
the GTR, as they are fragile and minimally functional.
Case #2: Ethiopia. Ethiopia, with the longest political history of any SSA
country, dating back 3,000 years, successfully resisted Italian colonization; it is one of
only two SSA states (Ethiopia and Liberia) never to be colonized. However, freedom
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from colonial influence has not spared it from insecurity. Ethiopian insecurity stems
from a combination of civil war, secession, spillover, and famine. It has experienced
fewer coup d'états than the average SSA state, in part because its military has been busy
managing more severe forms of conflict, such as secession and interstate war with Eritrea
(McGowan 2003, 357). However, for the few coup d'états that have occurred, the
military contributed to their manifestation (Wang 1998, 664). A Marxist military coup
d'état in 1974, for example, triggered a protracted civil war lasting 16 years. Following
this was a lengthy and costly stalemate resulting in the secession of Eritrea, freeing it
from an uncomfortable federation with Ethiopia, eventually leading to the EthiopianEritrean War 1998-2000, which killed an estimated 50,000-100,000 people (U.S.
Congressional Research Service 2000). This secession was born of two politically
separate cultures that valued “absolute victory and zero-sum calculations over
compromise and joint gains” (Lyons 2009, 168).
Table 37
Ethiopian Insecurity
Type
Civilian coup d'état
Military coup d'état
Military coup d'état/Civil war
Military coup d'état
Military coup d'état
Military coup d'état
Secession
War

Year(s)
1928
1960
1974-1991
1977
1977
1989
1993
1998-2000

Only McGowan (2003) includes the two 1977 events.
Sources: McGowan 2003; Raleigh et al. 2010; Sarkees and Wayman 2010
Data extracted from sources on 11/18/17.
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Outcome
Long-term success
Failed
Long-term success
Successful
Successful
Failed
Eritrea secedes
Eritrean-Ethiopian War

More recently, Ethiopia experienced the eighth worst global decline in freedom
between 2006-2016 due primarily to land rights conflicts, the state’s use of force against
its citizens, and proxy conflicts and spillover from Somalia (Puddington and Roylance
2017, 10), resulting in a highly militarized border (Lyons 2009, 167). One long-term
consequence of these conflicts has been food insecurity. The United Nations estimated
that 12 percent of Ethiopians were in need of food assistance in July of 2008 (Benequista
2008). For all of these reasons, Ethiopian security institutions do not positively affect the
GTR, as they are fragile and minimally functional, yet the state is not failed or collapsed.
Case #3: Nigeria. If the Nigerian state remains intact, it may provide a model of
constitutional governance for ethnically fractionalized societies (Suberu 2001, 205). A
2005 U.S. National Intelligence Council (NIC) report outlined a possible worst-case
scenario for Nigeria, estimating that within fifteen years, Nigeria may not survive as a
country (Population Council 2006, 192). While there have been some scares, it remains a
sovereign state, a regional military leader, and a major global petrol economy.
Britain colonized Nigeria by compelling an uncomfortable union between
northern Hausa Muslims, southern Yoruba and Igbo Christians, and hundreds of minority
ethnolinguistic groups residing in their spheres of influence. This fragmented country
gained its independence in 1960 peacefully (Sampson 1994, 88), yet this was not a
foreshadowing of things to come. Like many post-colonial African states, Nigeria has a
civil war story. The Christian Igbo coup d'état and secession attempt in 1966 to establish
the Republic of Biafra and the northern Muslim counter coup d'état later that year in
response triggered the Biafra War (1967-1970) (1994, 90). In the immediate fallout of
this failed secession attempt, an estimated 1.5 million Igbo fled the North of Nigeria and
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another 6,000-8,000 died (De St. Jorre 1972, 91). While the result of the Biafra War was
a widely disputed 500,000 to 6 million casualties (Wiseberg 1975, 54), 1 million from
starvation and disease (United States Congressional Record 1969, S1977). While its
military considers itself a regional power and substantiates this by providing the majority
of African Union troops, Nigeria is also one of the most unstable states domestically.
Even though it has a national police force, local communities often take responsibility for
their security through vigilantism (Paden 2008, 126). Some state governments have gone
a step further to enlist the services of vigilante groups and ethnic militias to maintain law
and order (Akinyele 2001, 628; Ukiwo 2002, 40). The federal government’s consistent
answer to domestic chaos has been a military response to return stability (Paden 2005,
219). In this way, the military sees itself as the savior of incompetent civilian leaders;
however, the military has been less capable than the civilian government of being a
catalyst for democratic transition and civil society (Ojo 2000, 2). Military Heads of State
Babangida (1985-1993) and Abacha (1993-1998) demonstrate that “military rulers
‘govern’ no better than elected civilians in Africa, and often much worse” (McGowan
2003, 340).
Table 38
Nigerian Insecurity
Type
Military coup d'état
Military coup d'état response
Civil War
Military coup d'état
Military coup d'état
Military coup d'état
Military coup d'état
Military coup d'état
Military coup d'état

Year(s)
1966
1966
1967-1970
1975
1976
1983-1985
1985-1993
1990
1993-1998
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Outcome
Short-term success
Long-term success
Failed Igbo Secession
Short-term success
Failed
Moderate-term success
Long-term success
Failed
Long-term success

Table Continued
Religious Violence
Boko Haram Insurgency

20002009-

Ongoing social conflict
Ongoing armed conflict

Sources: McGowan 2003; Raleigh et al. 2010; Sarkees and Wayman 2010
Data extracted from sources on 11/18/17.

Nigeria’s hybrid form of federalism is a product of its civil war and several
constitutional alterations via “military fiat rather than by constitutional amendment and
popular ratification” (Suberu 2001, 15). Some considered Nigeria a collapsed state in the
1990s (Rotberg 2004, 9). There have been six major state realignments between its
independence and the Fourth Nigerian Republic, established in 1999 (Suberu 2001, 15).
Since the sudden death of President Abacha in 1998, the federal government has become
more stable and democratic, yet there has been widespread Christian-Muslim social
violence, petrol conflict, and the Boko Haram insurgency concentrated in the
Northeastern Region. Since independence, ethnoreligious conflict has taken an estimated
three million lives (Fawole and Bello 2011, 217), and there were 17,402 politically
motivated deaths (only second to Congo DRC) recorded between 1990 and 2009,
resulting from ethnic rioting, religious extremism, and disruption of oil supplies
(Salehyan et al. 2012, 503). Nigerian security institutions do not positively affect the
GTR because they are fragile and minimally functional, yet the state is not failed or
collapsed.
Case #4: Zambia. At independence, “the scarcity of educated manpower was
extreme” (Lusaka 1968, 709). The British colonized Zambia as Northern Rhodesia, with
it gaining its independence peacefully on October 24, 1964. While it is known to have
one of the most peaceful histories of all post-colonial states, it is surrounded by states
whose violent fights for independence (e.g., Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Congo (DRC),

Angola, and Namibia) paired with Cold War proxy conflicts, have spilled over its
borders. Therefore, its insecurity has mainly been a function of its location in a bad
neighborhood of states. The Mozabeze Civil War brought border raids and village
bombing by Portuguese troops (McKay 1971, 18). Zambia was the staging ground for
conflicts of the Rhodesian Bush War and South African Border War. During the
Rhodesian Bush War, the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) set up
base camps in Zambia to conduct operations against the white minority-led Rhodesian
government. While the South African Border War consisted of conflict between the
South African Defence Force (SADF) and the People’s Liberation Army of Namibia
(PLAN), which spilled over into Zambia.
Table 39
Zambian Insecurity
Type
Spillover of Rhodesian Bush War
Military coup d'état
Spillover of South African Border War
Military coup d'état
Military coup d'état

Year(s)
1965-1979
1980
1966-1990
1990
1997

Outcome
Spillover
Failed
Spillover
Failed
Failed

Note: Only McGowan (2003) includes the 1980 and 1990 events.
Sources: McGowan 2003; Raleigh et al. 2010; Sarkees and Wayman 2010
Data extracted from sources on 11/18/17.

Zambia’s domestic politics has been relatively stable except for two unsuccessful
coup d'état attempts. The first one was civilian-led in 1980, led by the civil service
bureaucracy that was disillusioned by the establishment of a one-party state in 1972
(Larmer 2010, 391). The second one was military-led in 1997 that was quickly put down.
Even so, Zambian security institutions do not positively affect the GTR. They are fragile
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and minimally functional as is evidenced by their inability to prevent violent conflicts
from periodically spilling over their borders, yet the state is not failed or collapsed.
Case #5: Zimbabwe. Sub-Saharan Africa has not experienced a unified pattern of
decolonization. The relatively peaceful “consensual decolonization” present in many
British and French colonies was not present in Southern Rhodesia, now Zimbabwe,
where the “entrenched settler regimes had no intention of voluntarily liquidating their
control” (Weitzer 1984, 329). The decolonization-fatigued Britain was unable to
negotiate an independence settlement between the white minority-led Rhodesian
government and rival factions of the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army
(ZANLA) and the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU). This resulted in Southern
Rhodesia unilaterally declared its independence on November 11, 1965, causing Britain
to impose sanctions and withdraw its support for the government, producing a power
vacuum and triggering the Rhodesian Bush War, which lasted 14 years (1964-1979) and
cost 30,000 lives. The Rhodesian Bush War was not only a fight for independence; it
was also part Cold War proxy conflict. Zimbabwe has been one of the bad actors in a
troubled neighborhood of states, with its internal conflicts spilling over into surrounding
states.
On April 18, 1980, Zimbabwe became one of the last four states in SSA, along
with Eritrea, Namibia, and South Africa, to gain its independence and be majority ruled
(McGowan 2003, 347). Its history of insecurity is due to the struggle between white
Rhodesians resisting decolonization and blacks’ seeking independence, which is not
unique to Zimbabwe, while its modern insecurity is due to a combination of
authoritarianism and domestic maladministration. During its post-independence years, it
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went from having one of the most prosperous economies in SSA to one of the most
fragile in a few years, due to overextension of the military and capricious land tenure
policies.
Table 40
Zimbabwean Insecurity
Type
Rhodesian Bush War (civil war)
Entumbane I (civil war aftershock)
Entumbane II (civil war aftershock)
Military coup d'état plot
Mozambican Civil War
Gukurahundi
Second Congo War
Congo, DRC Kivu Conflict
Military coup d'état

Year(s)
1965-1979
1980
1981
1982
1982-1992
1984-1987
1998-2003
2004-2009
2007

Outcome
Post-colonial independence won
Government victory
Government victory
Failed
Stalemate
Government crackdown on opposition
Stalemate
Played both sides/government victory
Failed

Sources: McGowan 2003; Raleigh et al 2010; Sarkees and Wayman 2010
Only McGowan (2003) includes the 1982 military coup d'état plot
Data extracted from sources on 11/18/17.

The Zimbabwean military has a long history of involvement in domestic politics
(Williamson 2010, 410), yet Zimbabwe has experienced fewer coup d'états than the
average SSA state. This is in part due to the military’s preoccupation with the long civil
war, and after that, the civilian government keeping the military preoccupied in external
conflicts in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Mozambique, by allowing it to share
in the spoils of those conflicts (McGowan 2003, 357). This strategy allowed President
Mugabe to harness the military’s support to further his domestic agenda and lengthen his
tenure. The provision of military support to the Congolese government during the
Second Congo War (1998-2003), proved popular with the military elite, but drained
Zimbabwe’s finances, making it perhaps the most unpopular decisions of the regime
(MacLean 2002, 522). In 2000, President Mugabe issued the Zimbabwean version of the
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American Homestead Act of 1862, which seized white Zimbabwean farmers’ lands and
redistributed them primarily among non-farming black elites. These two events touched
off a major depression, hyperinflation, and food scarcity.
The coercive patterns of the colonial regime transferred readily to the independent
regime (Weitzer 1984, 530). The Shona ethnic-majority elite, who have access to plenty
of capital, maintain power and control by employing the same inequitable tactics of the
former colonial regime (Moore 2001, 912). To extend his tenure, President Mugabe has
employed guerrilla tactics of intimidation and indoctrination against his political
opposition, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), through the Zimbabwe
African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) (Blair 2002, supra note 35, 149). He
honed these skills as a leader in the Rhodesian Bush War (Williamson 2010, 394).
Opposition candidates and their supporters have even been tortured.
Fainos Zhou, who nominated the MDC candidate for Mberengwa West,
was kidnapped and tortured for four days…He was bludgeoned with iron
bars, and boiling, melting plastic was dripped all over his body…His wife
was gang-raped and sodomized with an iron bar – Blair (2002, 146)
A further two hundred MDC officials and supporters died, and 200,000 others
were displaced (see Amnesty International 2008; Human Rights Watch 2008; Impunity
Watch 2008; Solidarity Peace Trust 2008). Movement for Democratic Change
supporters, primarily ethnic Northern Ndebele minorities, did not believe justice was
possible as long as Mugabe was in power. “As long as Mugabe is there, they [the
perpetrators] will be sentenced today and tomorrow he will pronounce an amnesty and
they will be free again” (Bratton 2011, 376 quoting a focus group respondent). Even the
November 14, 2017, coup d’état that removed President Mugabe from power, is little
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comfort for opposition supporters as there are other Shona “heroes of the revolution”
waiting in the wings to take his place to perpetuate his institutions. For all of these
reasons, Zimbabwean security institutions do not positively affect the GTR. They are
fragile and minimally functional, yet the state is not failed or collapsed.

State Contract Institutions
If two brothers fight over their father's land, it is a stranger who will enjoy
there sweat and labour.
—African proverb
Case #1: Burkina Faso. While there are worse things than being colonized by the
French, as the Congolese experience with Belgium can attest, one negative legacy of
French colonialism in Burkina Faso is its contract institutions. Weak military institutions
have perpetuated a culture of strongman political leaders—common in SSA—who
attempt to extend their tenures unconstitutionally, as was the case with the 27 years of
semi-authoritarian rule by President Compaoré, ending in 2014. Even though an active
grassroots non-violent protest culture has thrived during his tenure, it has not been
sufficient to improve the state’s quality as a contract agent.
A minority voice in the land tenure literature claims government programs aimed
at modernizing and individualizing land tenure for the sake of consistency, may have the
opposite effect (de Zeeuw 1997, 583). Still, others claim to increase FDI in the
agricultural sector will make farmers lives less secure unless land tenure institutions
move from traditional to “better-defined and enforceable private forms of property
rights” (Bourdet and Persson 2001, 197). In 1983, the Burkinabé government
nationalized all customary lands, though it has been mostly unsuccessful in its goal of
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displacing powerful chiefs as the regulators of land tenure and transfer (Williams 1996,
217). In 1997, it again updated its land tenure policies to manage increasing urbanization
through the Reforme Agraire Fonciere. Due to its late entrance into the global market,
Burkina Faso remains one of Africa's least urbanized countries, yet with a high
urbanization growth rate, which has caused uncertainty, competition, and conflict
regarding the management of urban land titles and fraudulent land-titling schemes
(Harsch 2009, 265). For these reasons, Burkinabé contract institutions do not positively
affect the GTR but are instead fragile and minimally functional.
Case #2: Ethiopia. Because Ethiopia was never colonized, it ironically did not
have the opportunity to benefit from colonial institutional isomorphism that other, now
more prosperous, former colonies (e.g., India, Brazil, Nigeria) had. This is not to argue
that colonial isomorphism occurred uniformly or positively in most cases. When
Ethiopia reformed its land tenure policies in 1991, following the Ethiopian Civil War and
the fall of the Marxist derg, it abolished all preexisting customary and Marxist forms of
land tenure, rapidly privatized farm collectives (Crewett and Korf 2008, 203), and
granted rights to occupants “who were able to demonstrate productive use of land”
(Williams 1996, 218). This dramatic shift did not last long and quickly reverted to
previous derg land policies, because the government prohibited land sales, producing a
more feudal than capitalist arrangement. In doing this, the government’s distribution of
land deeds became politicized by the more dominant Tigray ethnic group following
elections (Young 1996, 540), where officials would use promises of land as an electoral
strategy. Subsequent, Western-influenced, policy changes instituting land certification
have “resulted in a significant reduction of tenure insecurity and increase in land-related
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investment” (Deininger et al. 2011, 330). However, western-modeled land tenure
systems often prove unsustainable in other SSA contexts (e.g., Madagascar) because the
cost of maintaining the titling infrastructure outweighs that of the benefits to landholders
(Jacoby and Minten 2007, 23). For these reasons, Ethiopian contract institutions do not
positively affect the GTR but are instead fragile and minimally functional.
Case #3: Nigeria. Nigeria’s diverse ethnolinguistic, religious, and cultural
character has presented the state with many interesting contracting challenges. It
emerged from colonialism with a “bizarre version of federalism” (Diamond 1988, 155)
“designed in such a way as to virtually guarantee its failure” (Lijphart 1977, 163). The
governing philosophy that created Nigeria’s latest Constitution in 1999 recognizes that
people are naturally corruptible and that “ambition must be made to counteract ambition”
(Madison 1788). However, it has only managed to produce minimally functional contract
institutions at the federal, state, and local government area (LGA) levels, making the state
an inadequate agent for mediating contract disputes.
Nigerian contract institutions are shaped by centralizing tendencies of the federal
government, conflict-inducing indigene-settler laws, and the regional adoption of Shari
‘a. Any one of these is a challenge in itself, but all three converge to shape the political
environment of Nigeria’s Middle Belt states. The federal government—as many do—
uses control of the purse strings to leverage behavior of its states. Nigerian states are
hyper-dependent on the federal government to sustain even basic services, giving the
central government outsized influence. These centralizing tendencies have turned
Nigeria into a “unitary state in federal disguise” with states “following the money”
(Williams 1980, 100). States have even been sub-divided multiple times in relation to
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changing federal budget allocation policies (see Mackintosh 1962; Osaghae 1992, 18990), increasing from 10 percent in 1991 to 20 percent in 1997, which therein increased
the number of LGAs from 593 to 774 (Suberu 2001, 108).
Nigeria’s Land Use Act of 1978 nationalized land ownership and management
while granting states control over land decisions of their urban areas and LGAs over rural
areas, which appears to align well with the goals of federalism. However, this has
produced a disorganized patchwork of competing homeland claims (Williams 1996, 217).
A single dominant ethnoreligious group usually drives rural LGA-level indigene-settler
policy; therefore, each LGA’s policies are unique to and deeply ingrained in each area
(United States Department of State 2010). To exacerbate this situation, during the 1991
LGA reorganization and expansion, Hausa federal legislators pulled off a Texas-style
redistricting strategy that favored the Babangida administration’s elite supporters (Suberu
2001, 9). Following this, the 1999 Nigerian Constitution has allowed indigene groups to
discriminate further against non-indigenes living in “their” lands, over education,
employment, and property ownership through the issuance of certificates of indigeneship.
These policies are centripetal in that they disincentivize migration outside of one’s
ethnoreligious home area, which limits social, cultural, economic, political, and religious
inter-group interaction and all of the benefits that come with it.
While less frequent, religious conflicts have increased between 1950 and 1996
globally, and are more intense than nonreligious conflicts (Fox 2004, 55). Nigeria is the
epicenter of religious conflict in Africa (Salehyan et al. 2012, 504). Because Nigerian’s
are highly religious, ethnic territorial and land tenure claims quickly become infused with
religious significance. In Plateau State surrounding the city of Jos, at the dividing line
154

between the mostly Muslim north and mostly Christian south, the indigenous, primarily
Christian Afizere, Anaguta and Berom minority ethnic groups, have pushed back against
the incursion of northern Muslim Hausa settlers (Ostien 2009, 2). The Berom threated to
build a large church to rival the central mosque down the street and claimed the mosque’s
land is theirs (Suberu 2001, 25). In another case, the Ife and Modakeke ethnic minority
groups have fought over land tenure rights with over 3,000 killed in 1998.
There has been a resurgent demand in northern Nigerian states for Shari ‘a in
reaction to several decades of capriciously enforced military rule. Many Nigerian
Muslims have long been dissatisfied with the secular common law judicial system;
besides being mired in corruption and delayed justice, it is not rooted in their norms and
beliefs (Hodkinson 1984, 739). As the 1999 Nigerian Constitution does not prohibit dual
legal systems, it is left to the states to decide what combination of common, customary,
and Shari ‘a legal systems work in their context. Most of the Muslim-majority northern
states have opted for full or partial Shari ’a: the fuller version typically banning alcohol
and prostitution for the whole population (Paden 2006, 147), while the partial version of
it limits these statutes to only Muslims. Rabo, the secretary of the Independent Shariah
Implementation support Committee in Kano, Nigeria says, Shari ‘a is “a total way of life”
(Rabo 2003); non-Muslims “should conduct their ceremonies in their private
environments and they shouldn’t disturb peace in the society” (Rabo 2003). This
majoritarian attitude has made some non-Muslim minorities feel trapped, surrounded by
and sometimes subject to, an unfamiliar legal system.
When any one of these three contract challenges is present (centralizing
tendencies of the federal government, conflict-inducing indigene-settler laws, and the
155

adoption of Shari ‘a) it is difficult for contract institutions to have a widening effect on
the GTR, but when two or all three are intertwined as they are in Nigeria, it is much more
difficult. Therefore, Nigerian contract institutions do not positively affect the GTR but
are instead fragile and minimally functional.
Case #4: Zambia. In 1970, the Zambian government began appropriating
expatriates’ unutilized land and by 1975 abolished customary freehold land tenure and
nationalized it (Williams 1996, 217), replacing it with 100-year leases (Tordoff 1977,
65). Twenty years later, Zambia’s Land Act of 1995 was the most publicly deliberated
piece of legislation (Kaunda 1995, 87). Its logic was that introducing flexibility and
choice into the old customary land tenure system through “mechanisms for transferring
customary land to individually titled state land” (Sitko 2010, 39) would reduce title
uncertainty and free up land to be used as collateral for credit (Kaunda 1995, 92).
However, what has emerged instead is a clandestine land market that remains controlled
by chiefdoms (Roth 1994, 61, 193), which denies woman access and keeps Southern
Zambian Nkandanzovus’ lands continuously cultivated, reducing its fertility (Sitko 2010,
36) and causing land shortages and food insecurity. The HIV/AIDS epidemic has
exacerbated this situation by often leaving HIV-positive women divorced and without
land title (2010, 36). These “measures to accelerate privatization of land have
encountered strong protest from defenders of peasants’ land rights” (Boone 2007, 581)
and went under review in 2006. The amended 2016 Constitution began to address
sustainable land management practices and transparency in land transactions
(Constitution of Zambia 2016, Part XIX). For these reasons, Zambian contract
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institutions do not positively affect the GTR but are instead fragile and minimally
functional.
Case #5: Zimbabwe
Our party must continue to strike fear in the heart of the white man, our
real enemy!
—Robert Mugabe
There are four types of property rights in Zimbabwe: freehold (private), state land,
communal, and leasehold (resettlement system) (Gwenhamo et al. 2012, 597) as a result
of highly visible and contested (Boone 2007, 558) land tenure policy reforms, including
the Land Acquisition Act of 1992 and Land Acquisition Amendment Act of 2000.
Following independence, the Zimbabwean government resisted taking white
farmers’ lands because it realized its productive value in their hands. Since 1980, it only
led a modest populist resettlement program for a half million citizens who were displaced
by the civil war by forcibly purchasing millions of acres of land from white farmers
(Williams 1996, 215). Only in 2000, out of fear of losing the 2000 parliamentary
elections (Moore 2001, 916), did President Mugabe, in a fit of kleptocracy, take white
farms and distribute them to his political base, primarily his inner circle and relatives
(Power 2003, 4) more so than landless peasants (Howard-Hassmann 2010, 900). The
little land the poor did receive was bound by a thirty-day cancelation clause that rendered
it unsuitable collateral for financing, so owners were unable to make productive use of it
(Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre 2008, 38). This land distribution disorder has
resulted in “overlapping and even multiple entitlements to the same plots and widespread
disputed claims” (Bracking and Cliffe 2009, 111). Formerly productive farmland became
barren, and by October 2003, half of Zimbabweans were food-insecure, many dependent
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on remittances (Howard-Hassmann 2010, 901); by 2005, unemployment was at 80
percent; and by 2007, GDP growth rate was negative at -6.1 percent (World Factbook
2008). During this period, average life expectancy dropped from 56.4 years (1990-1995)
to 37.3 years (2005-2010) (World Bank 2017).
Many Zimbabweans are resigned to the fact that “there will be no magical date on
which ‘The Old Man’ will die and good governance will be restored” (Bracking and
Cliffe 2009, 104). Mugabe-created contract institutions and their effects will endure long
after his November 14, 2017, removal from office because his regime has created
informal institutions and networks that shadow formal government institutions to ensure
their longevity (MacLean 2002, 520). For these reasons, Zimbabwean contract
institutions do not positively affect the GTR but are instead fragile and minimally
functional.

Individualism & Collectivism
A thumb, although it is strong, cannot kill aphids on its own.
—African proverb
Case #1: Burkina Faso. Few in the trust literature dispute Hofstede’s claim that
the more poor, rural, and traditional a society is, the more collectivist it will remain
(2010, 127). Burkina Faso is one of the poorest countries globally, ranking 121 out of
196 for its 2016 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) of $32
billion (international dollars) and it remains poor when considering its 2016 GDP PPP of
$1,595 per capita (constant 2011 international dollars) (World Bank 2017). It is also one
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of the least urbanized countries globally (31.5 percent), ranked 167 out of 196 (World
Factbook 2017).
Burkinabé society is highly collectivist. Its people value Familism and tend
towards a broad institutional, vertical, exclusionist collectivism, in part, because their
identity revolves around the dominant Mossi ethnic group, which composes a slight
majority (52.2 percent) of the population. The Mossi exhibit a rather broad institutional
collectivism, whereas the many smaller ethnic groups tend to be narrower. This
difference may help explain Presidents’ Lamizana (1966-1980) and Compaoré’s (19872014) ease in extending their tenures. Notwithstanding its religious and cultural
homogeneity and ethnolinguistic heterogeneity, its groups preference the values of honor,
loyalty (Akkus et al. 2017), survival, solidarity, compassion, and conservatism (Jackson
2004, 31). Interestingly, even though East Asian corporate collectivism (2004, 158)—
which may be characterized by what Bellah (1967) would call a Confucianist-Buddhist
civic religion—is also based on homogeneity, they result in entirely different societies.
For these reasons, Burkinabé culture is highly collectivist and is therefore not in a
position to widen the GTR.
Case #2: Ethiopia. Ethiopia meets Hofstede’s (2010, 90) criteria for a highly
collectivist society. It is considered a moderate wealth country, ranking 67 out of 196
globally when measured by its 2016 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) Purchasing Power
Parity (PPP) of $178 billion (international dollars). However, when considering its 2016
GDP PPP of $1,608 per capita (constant 2011 international dollars) (World Bank 2017),
its wealthy drops substantially. Ethiopia is one of the least urbanized countries globally
(20.4 percent), ranked 184 out of 196 (World Factbook 2017). It is also one of the least
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industrialized countries globally with an industrialization intensity index score of 0.16
(United Nations Industrial Development Organization 2014). Its society is collectivist as
is evidenced by its groups’ preference for Familism and social organization around small
villages composed of a dozen or so families (Ben-Ezer 1992, 138). Despite being
exposed to Western values in Israel, emigrating Ethiopian Jews remain more collectivist
than the Israeli-born population (Kurman 2003, 498). Ethiopian society adheres to a
moderately institutional (see Mbigi 1997), vertical, and exclusionist collectivism. Its
three largest ethnic groups (Oromo, Amhara, and Tigray), do not have a history of
politicizing along ethnic lines (Mengisteab 2001, 22), yet they still have substantial
conflict. The Oromo constitute nearly half of the population and are spread throughout
the country, yet being the largest ethnic group has not secured its dominance. While
smaller, the Amhara are more hierarchically individualist and the Oromo more egalitarian
collectivist (Levine 2000, 148). The former tend to look down on the later, and the
smaller Tigray have found a way to gain political advantage over both.
Ethiopia has a collectivist identity crisis with “too many heroes and too few
innovators” (Gudina 1994, 929). Ethiopian nationalists insist they have a unified identity
that reaches back thousands of years to the ancient Axum (Sorenson 1992, 247) and they
rest on this ethnonational legacy and pride in never having been colonized (Ekeh 1990,
679), rather than working to produce developmental innovations. There was a short time
when western progressivism reigned in the 1950s to 1970s, but it did not last long, nor
did it have a lasting effect. Pre-civil war Ethiopian collectivism was driven by competing
horizontal and vertical “themes of equality, self-reliance, the indivisibility of the nation,
state control of the economy, and the elimination of landlordism” (Donham, 1999, 16).
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At that time, “there were many voluntary, loosely organized, semi-autonomous
organizations”…“such as Edir (self-help associations in time of death), Ikub (rotating
saving and credit associations), and Mahber (associations based on kinship or
religion)”…“but they were too apolitical and not strong enough to form a cohesive civil
society” (Kebede 2010, 307) as a democratic protection from the communist derg. The
civil war resulted in the rule of the communist derg dictatorship in the 1980s (Sorenson
1992, 231), strengthening collectivism by providing groups with a common cause, fate,
and identity, severely restricted resources, strengthened cultural homogeneity, and
isolating society from external influences (Triandis 1989, 511). Even after the eventual
fall of the communist derg in 1987, there remained an absence of attachment to western
positivism and the rule of law (Brietzke 1995, 37). Social divisions and identity
formation continued to be structured along ethnic and class lines, a consequence of the
derg’s scientific socialism policies. An eclectic cultural and political history has shaped
Ethiopia into a unique and collectivist modern society. For these reasons, Ethiopian
culture is highly collectivist and is therefore not in a position to widen the GTR.
Case #3: Nigeria. The means by which Nigerian society organizes itself have
changed rapidly since its colonization in 1901, having gone from highly tribal3 to more
aggregated ethnic groups, and more atomized in urban areas. Nigerian individualism,
where present, is best characterized as a relational individualism (see Adams and
Dzokoto 2003) such that individuals consider their network connections to others when
choosing whether to trust them or not. “The Igbo are individualistic and egalitarian,

3

While the term “tribal” is considered derogatory in the literature today, it accurately describes this context in 1901.
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every man considered himself as good as everyone else” (Boahen and Webster 1970,
166). In aggregate though, Nigeria is a highly collectivist society; there is variation
within its extreme diversity, ranging from highly segmented (less rigid) to highly
structured, the latter being slower to change (Akiwowo 1964, 155). However, this is not
always the case; for example, both Pakot and Igbo ethnic groups are segmentary, yet only
the former has resisted Western influences (Schneider 1962, 144). Nigeria’s moderately
institutional (see Mbigi 1997), vertical, and exclusionist collectivism has produced a
hyper-divided society along ethnolinguistic and religious lines. In highly collectivist and
heterogeneous democratizing societies such as Nigeria, politicians are incentivized to
appeal to communal loyalties.
…a vicious circle ensures the perpetuation of communal conflict in a
participant political system: aspirant politicians make communal appeals
and communal demands which exacerbate communal tensions; these
tensions, in turn, encourage the recruitment of leaders who will make
communal appeals and demands – Melson and Wolpe (1970, 1122)
Some in the trust literature may question Nigeria’s inclusion as a case based on
Hofstede’s (2010, 90) collectivist criteria however even though it is a wealthy,
moderately industrialized, and rapidly urbanizing country, most Nigerians are poor. It is
the wealthiest country in SSA, ranked 21 out of 196 globally when measured by its 2016
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) of $1,091 billion
(international dollars). However, when considering its 2016 GDP PPP of $5,439 per
capita (constant 2011 international dollars) (World Bank 2017), it is less wealthy than
seven other SSA countries. Nigeria remains more rural than urban, but that is quickly
changing, ranked 126 out of 196 at 49.4 percent (World Factbook 2017). It is a
moderately industrialized country with an industrialization intensity index of 0.35
162

(United Nations Industrial Development Organization 2014) that is unable to refine its
petroleum. While its rural areas remain more rigidly structured along age, sex, clan, or
birth, its urban populations increasingly identify along vocational, educational, and
income lines. Nigerian culture is collectivist, yet its urban populations are becoming
more individualist. Culture changes slowly, therefore, it will be a long time before
individualism overtakes collectivism, if ever. For these reasons, Nigerian culture is
collectivist and is therefore not in a position to widen the GTR.
Case #4: Zambia. Zambia is a moderately poor, rural majority, and nonindustrialized country, meeting all of Hofstede’s (2010, 90) collectivism criteria. It ranks
94 out of 196 globally when measured by its 2016 Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) of $65 billion (international dollars) and remains
moderately poor when considering its 2016 GDP PPP of $3,636 per capita (constant 2011
international dollars) (World Bank 2017). It has a rural majority, ranked 138 out of 196
at 41.8 percent (World Factbook 2017) and is one of the least industrialized countries
globally with an industrialization intensity index of 0.25 (United Nations Industrial
Development Organization 2014).
As the Zambian state has executed formal democratic and capitalist institutional
modifications, social divisions have uncomfortably formed along class lines, yet its
people continue to have a low level of class-consciousness (Dresang 1974, 1608). They
instead, through a moderately institutional (see Mbigi 1997), vertical, and exclusionist
collectivism, continue to value rigid social hierarchies, adherence to Familism, and a
preference for the values of solidarity, compassion, respect, and dignity (Edwards et al.
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2004, 18). Zambian social identity remains centered on ethnicity, making it highly
collectivist and is therefore not in a position to widen the GTR.
Case #5: Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe was formerly wealthy, but is now destitute and
remains highly rural. It ranks 120 out of 196 globally when measured by its 2016 Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) of $32 billion (international
dollars) and becomes even poorer when considering its 2016 GDP PPP of $1,860 per
capita (constant 2011 international dollars) (World Bank 2017). It is also one of the least
urbanized countries globally, ranked 162 out of 196 at 32.2 percent (World Factbook
2017).
Further, it is somewhat surprising that Zimbabwean society is highly collectivist
because it is not a uniformly, nor highly, fractionalized society. Zimbabwean
collectivism rejects Welzel’s (2010) self-expression values and instead values ascribed
family roles, status (see Bourdillon 1987), and Familism, and tends towards a broad
institutional, vertical, and exclusionist collectivism, in part, because the Shona ethnic
group is so large (70 percent of the population) and dominant. This may also help
explain President Mugabe’s (1980-2017) ability to have sustained such a long tenure. Its
mixture of cultural and ethnolinguistic homogeneity and religious heterogeneity still
produce rather rigid social hierarchies. However, its exclusionist collectivism (see Mbigi
1997) differs from East Asian corporate collectivism (Jackson 2004, 158), even though
both are found in homogeneous societies. Zimbabwean culture is highly collectivist and
is therefore not in a position to widen the GTR.
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Inter-State Market Forces
Much wealth brings many enemies.
—African proverb
Case #1: Burkina Faso. Burkina Faso has long been a sleepy backwater precolonially, colonially, and now as an independent state. Not much changed politically
and economically in the years following Upper Volta’s independence from France in
1960, as Burkinabé leaders retained much of the semi-authoritarian tendencies of the
French colonizers. The state has purposefully been a late adopter of modern institutions
and engagement in the global economy. Its largest and most influential ethnic group, the
Mossi, work to rebuff the adoption of modern institutions that would erode its own
cultural and political control. President Sankara’s (1983-1987) refusal to submit to the
imperialist domination of the global market (Wilkins 1989, 385) typifies this long-held
attitude.
The Burkinabé revolution will provide a method of combating hunger,
thirst and ignorance, but most of all, it will fight against the forces of neocolonialism and imperialist domination – Sankara (1984, 143)
He and likeminded leaders believed that accepting foreign aid and investment
“would spell an end to the Popular Revolution” (Wilkins 1989, 388). Regardless of its
anti-globalization rhetoric, since independence, Burkina Faso has attracted neither trade,
investment, remittances, or aid. At one time, remittances flowed through the Burkinabé
diaspora, primarily from Côte d‘Ivoire (9.41 percent of GDP in 1986), but has dried up
since that country fell into civil war in the early 2000s. Remittances dropped to a low of
0.918 percent of GDP in 2004 and leveled out at 3.348 percent of GDP in 2016 (World
Bank 2017). Burkina Faso’s developmental challenges are attributable, in part, to the fact
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that it is a landlocked country with an arid climate in a historically non-geo-politically
strategic and relatively peaceful region.
Burkina Faso has begun to make strides to politically decentralize and engage its
meager economy in global trade since a military coup d’état led by Blaise Compaoré,
overthrew and killed President Sankara on October 15, 1987. Since then, it has been a
World Bank model reformer in its development of neo-liberal policies, which has
improved its economy absolutely, yet it remains relatively one of SSA’s most
undeveloped countries (Harsch 1998, 625). In 1991, it adopted its first IMF and World
Bank structural adjustment program, which pushed for political decentralization and
lower social spending (Harsch 2009, 269). It made a drastic move from Marxist isolation
to deregulation and privatization of formerly state-owned entities to attract foreign
investment. Between 1988 and 1993, this resulted in an increase from three to 13 million
dollars annually of FDI (World Bank 2017), which is substantial for the Burkinabé
economy, yet nearly unmeasurable globally.
Before the 1980s, Burkina Faso was quite peaceful, but due to this rapid
development, there has been an increase in social conflict. More than 200 public
demonstrations, marches, sit-ins, strikes, and riots railing against police violence,
corruption, and displacement from urban modernization (Harsch 2009, 265) took place in
30 urban municipalities from 1995 to 2007. The most prevalent of these was 50 local
labor disputes in 15 different cities (2009, 278). Because it had so long been off the radar
of global traders, investors, and donors, Burkinabé society is behind the development
curve, even for SSA standards. Therefore, the potential GTR widening effect that
consistent trade, FDI, and FPI could have on Burkinabé society is absent.
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Case #2: Ethiopia. Non-military aid and remittances subsidize nearly 50 percent
of Ethiopia’s federal budget (World Bank 2017), while there is a paucity of trade and
investment. Ethiopia has little petroleum; therefore, it exports coffee in trade for oil,
producing a massive trade deficit. Bilateral economic relations between Ethiopia and
China increased considerably in the 2000s, where the latter began providing aid and
trade, in exchange the Ethiopian government has given “unabashed diplomatic support
for deeper Chinese involvement in Africa” (Adem 2012, 155).
Ethiopia is the second most populous country in SSA and has a growing diaspora,
but is consistently in the bottom 10 percent of countries regarding economic development
(United Nations Development Programme 2018). Investment is more sustainable for
income generation, job creation, and development than remittances, so creating and
fostering an environment conducive to investment, particularly outside of the capital,
Addis Ababa (Chacko and Gebre 2013, 504), is critical. However, the government does
not make it easy for investors to obtain land and financing and there is substantial
information asymmetry, weak contract enforcement, and capriciously changing policies
(2013, 495), making investing laborious and risky.
Therefore, the Ethiopian diaspora is consigned to sending remittances rather than
investment capital to support family and in-groups, but the results have been mixed.
Between 1994 and 1997, Ethiopian households relied heavily on remittances in the wake
of the civil war (see Bigsten et al. 2005), yet they only amounted to 0.107 to 0.355
percent of GDP. Since 2000, the Oromo diaspora has funded political activities through
remittances, donated primarily to opposition parties (Fransen and Kuschminder 2009,
21). Remittances received were minimal until 2004, when they increased to 1.32 percent
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of GDP and have since then varied between 0.806 and 3.23 percent of GDP, figures that
are still small compared to other SSA states (Klugman 2009: 161). Knowing
remittances’ full effect in SSA is difficult since informal remittances average between 35
and 75 percent of formal remittances in the region (Freund and Spatafora 2005, 22).
Ethiopia has long been on the receiving end of military and non-military aid as a
heavily contested Cold War proxy site. During the Cold War, the communist derg and its
opposition funneled aid strategically to build domestic political support, resulting in aid
dependence (Kissi 2005, 128). Post Cold War, as Ethiopia’s political value waned, it
received consistently below $1 billion in non-military official development assistance
(ODA) annually. Not until 2001, due to an International Monetary Fund (IMF) debt
reduction program, did it began to increase, whereby 2009 it rose to $3.8 billion,
subsidizing 44.7 percent of Ethiopia’s GDP, and has remained at that level since (World
Bank 2017). It received $3.2 billion in 2015, the largest in SSA and fourth most globally
following Syria, Afghanistan, and Pakistan (World Bank 2017).
Famine has also made Ethiopia dependent on international food aid. Many in the
development literature have assumed that agricultural food aid disincentivizes domestic
food production in receiving countries (see Gelan 2007; Schultz 1960), but they have
been unable to pinpoint at what threshold and in what contexts this occurs. Food aid
accounted for nine percent of Ethiopia’s cereal budget from 1994 to 2006, rising to as
much as 16 percent in 2003 (Tadesse and Shively 2009, 942). When limited to only
those foods that are domestically produced, as food aid rises above 10 percent of
domestic production, prices for those same domestic products decrease, which is the
point at which domestic production begins to be disincentivized (2009, 942).
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Ethiopia has fallen into an aid trap and cannot get out. Its best minds have left the
country for better opportunities, and while its diaspora provides remittances, its attempts
at investment are rebuffed by maladaptive government policies. An environment of weak
investment, outsized Chinese market influence, and extensive non-military aid has
produced a rather non-competitive market where non-military aid has become a crutch.
For these reasons, the potential GTR widening effect that trade, FDI, and FPI could have
on Ethiopian society is absent.
Case #3: Nigeria. Nigeria is a petrol-federation deeply integrated into the global
economy; therefore, its success is central to global stability (Paden 2005, 3). “Crude oil
production accounts for 90-95 percent of Nigerian export revenues, over 90 percent of
foreign exchange earnings, and 80 percent of government revenues” (Paden 2008, 12).
The overdependence on centralized oil revenues and the global petroleum market has
produced a volatile trade swing from a surplus of $63.7 billion in 2012 to a deficit of $6.2 billion in 2016 (Rimmer 1985, 444).
The negative relationship between economic development and civil conflict is the
most robust finding to emerge from the conflict literature (Hegre and Sambanis 2006,
533), yet it does not appear to hold in Nigeria. Weak state security institutions scare
away plenty of potential foreign investment (Fawole and Bello 2011, 217), yet many
more are willing to brave the insecure environment for economic gain, in the oil-rich
Niger Delta region (Ostien 2009, 3), making Nigeria the largest recipient of FDI in SSA.
Nigeria has a sizable diaspora because it has the seventh largest population
globally. In 2000, its diaspora was over four million (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 2012), and in 2016 it had risen to wide-ranging estimates of
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five to 15 million. The Nigerian government actively encourages investment of its
diaspora (Adepoju 2008, 40) as a way of filling gaps left by uneven economic
development. However, this occurs more often through remittances than FDI or FPI.
Remaining well below one percent of GDP until 1993, Nigerian remittances increased to
five percent of GDP and then dropped to 2.6 percent of GDP ($2.3 billion) in 2004,
fluctuating from thereon between 1.6 and 13 percent of GDP, to an all-time high amount
of $21.1 billion, yet only a moderate 4.4 percent of its GDP in 2015 (World Bank 2017).
A pervasive culture of dependence on the federal government’s oil revenues has
developed where Nigerian states have little incentive to generate internal revenue or
create an investing and contracting environment that is safe and conducive to
entrepreneurial activity. Its people have developed a “cake-sharing psychosis”
(Babangida 1992, ii) where they expect to consume without producing. To fill the gaps
during volatile trade and investment cycles, Nigeria has also received a substantial
amount of military and non-military aid, which has made it vulnerable to aid shocks.
Steadily below $1 billion until 2005, net ODA spiked to $11.4 billion in 2006, only to
return to fluctuate between $1 and $3 billion from there forward (World Bank 2017). In
2005, it experienced a 963 percent increase in aid, the third largest aid shock of any
country in the 2000s (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 2013,
63). It has also been destabilizing to have too few major donor sources, with only two in
Nigeria (2013, 63). Neo-liberal structural adjustment policies attached to this aid aim to
diversify exports, stabilize trade balance, and reduce the excessive public sector, yet
High rates of recidivism, low rates of completion, and an insignificant
catalytic effect on other capital flows are presented as evidence that IMF
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programs and the related conditionality do not work in the way intended;
or more accurately, often do not work – Bird (2001, 1862)
With many potential traders and investors vying for access to its unrefined
petroleum, Nigeria has many viable options for engaging with inter-state market forces,
yet its trade, investment, remittance, and aid policies have produced uneven economic
development rather than consistent growth. Its outsized remittances and non-military aid
overshadow the positive benefits of high trade and investment in its petroleum sector.
For these reasons, the potential GTR widening effect that trade, FDI, and FPI could have
on Nigerian society is absent.
Case #4: Zambia. For half a century, copper mining and sales composed the
majority of the Zambian economy, making it wealthy by SSA standards (Tordoff 1977,
60). In the 1960s alone, the copper industry made up 60-70 percent of its GDP and 90-95
percent of government revenue (Larmer 2005, 32). While the overreliance on this single
non-renewable resource as an export has influenced uneven cycles of development and
increased foreign debt, it does not appear to have produced a lasting “resource curse.”
However, the recent fluctuation of the copper market from a spike up to $3.5/lb. in
2006—nearly tripling in value—dropping down to $1.3/lb. temporarily in 2009 as a result
of the global recession, and rebounding back up to $4.5/lb. in 2011, has tested this.
Zambia has been subject to structural adjustment programs through tied aid, their
primary purpose to service donor repayments (2005, 44). Some programs have removed
food subsidies on staple crops, while others have weakened trade unions’ ability to
protect wages and jobs (Simutanyi 1996, 837) and the government has shown little
concern with providing a social safety net or correcting resulting poverty. Zambia struck
171

a trade deal of Chinese oil for Zambian copper. Even though large amounts of FDI and
FPI have not flowed into Zambia by opening its markets in the 1990s, the Chinese have
been active investors. Zambia ranks third in SSA and nineteenth globally for Chinese
foreign investment (United National Conference on Trade and Development 2008). As
early as 1971, China had begun investing in Zambia through the Tan-Zam railway,
financed by a 401 million dollar interest-free loan (McKay 1971, 25). Some claim this
new era of Chinese investment is a more humane and inclusive one than the past Western
era of tied aid (Carmody and Hampwaye 2010, 86). Indeed, many SSA economies,
including Zambia’s, developed rapidly from 2004 to 2008 under Chinese trade and
investment influence. However, market openness since the mid-1990s has decreased
average tariff rates globally and in SSA to around 10 percent to attract trade (World Bank
2016), which has placed Zambia (4 percent) in a weak bargaining position, leaving it
vulnerable to becoming entrenched in a mercantilist relationship with China (Kurlantzick
2007, 140).
With few options for trade partners and a minimal amount of remittances (0.2
percent of GDP) (World Bank 2017), the Zambian economy hangs somewhat
precariously between the West and China. Most significantly, China’s overwhelming
influence in Zambia has produced a less competitive market, and its non-diversified,
copper-rich economy does not always attract well-intentioned investors and donors. For
all these reasons, the potential GTR widening effect that trade, FDI, and FPI could have
on Zambian society is absent.
Case #5: Zimbabwe. The effect of inter-state market forces on Zimbabwe hinge
on Chinese influence and the Land Acquisition Amendment Act of 2000, where President
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Mugabe chose autonomy and isolationism over prosperity and global engagement.
Regardless of potential justifications for doing so, President Mugabe’s seizure of white
Zimbabwean farmers’ lands in the name of returning them to the original inhabitants,
turned out to be a foreign policy and agricultural disaster, prompting global
condemnation and domestic chaos. It caused a decade of distress and isolationism where
Zimbabwe’s relatively strong $2,577 GDP per capita, PPP (in constant 2011 international
$) in 2001, dropped to $1,209 in 2008 and eventually leveled out at $1,860 in 2016.
Annual GDP growth rates for the years 2002 to 2008 were all negative, reaching double
digits in 2003 and 2008, prompting the rejection of its currency in favor of the U.S. dollar
and South African rand. To counter the effects of hyperinflation, lost trade and
investment, and food insecurity, remittances from its diaspora rose to 14.2 percent of
GDP in 2010 (Howard-Hassmann 2010, 901) and 15.9 percent of GDP in 2011 (World
Bank 2017). However, remittances also carry the risk of exacerbating inflation.
Zimbabwe has few trade partners and a large trade deficit of $2.37 billion in 2016,
up from $534 million in 1995 (United Nations Comtrade 2016). It has a long-suffering
trade and investment relationship with China that has endured through good and bad
times. In 2016, Zimbabwe purchased 13.4 percent of its imports from China in trade for
Zimbabwean tobacco. While not large by international standards, in 2013, Zimbabwe
received $600 million in FDI from China, the third highest amount in SSA (World Bank
2013). However, this investment relationship was threatened by President Mugabe’s
unexpected 2016 enforcement of the dormant 2008 indigenization law requiring foreign
and white-owned companies to surrender or sell a majority control to black
Zimbabwean’s or the government (Xinsong 2016).
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Zimbabwe’s history with tied aid and structural adjustment is mixed. The
Economic and Structural Adjustment Program (ESAP) implemented in the early 1990s
failed to meet many of its stated goals. Requisite removal of social safety nets hit the
working poor hardest, which provided President Mugabe with an enraged and ready
voting block to keep him in power. Because of its censured status among the global
community, sans China, in 2010, Zimbabwe received a rather small amount of ODA nonmilitary aid ($758 million) (World Bank 2010) to help pull it out of its economic tailspin.
Zimbabwe, once a flourishing economy, has, since the Land Acquisition Amendment Act
of 2000, slid deep into economic isolation; therefore, the potential GTR widening effect
that trade, FDI, and FPI could have on Zimbabwean society is absent.
Social Network Composition
The friends of our friends are our friends.
—African proverb
Case #1: Burkina Faso
Fractionalization
Burkina Faso is ethnolinguistically heterogeneous, but only moderately
religiously so, and is culturally homogeneous. Burkinabé have a strong oral tradition
rather than a written one; thus their low adult literacy rate of 36 percent (United Nations
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 2015) is not surprising. There are 81
languages (66 indigenous) spoken (Simons and Fennig 2017) in a country the size of
New Zealand or Ecuador. This extreme linguistic diversity has the potential to cloister
groups, yet the French language instituted during colonialism serves as a trade language
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that has been able to bridge some of this diversity, most easily in urban areas. Also, even
though there are many languages, most derive from the same language family.
The dominant, Mooré-speaking (Gur language family) Mossi ethnic group
composes over half of the Burkinabé population and is the geographic, cultural,
economic, and political heart of Burkinabé society. The Mossi have a strong sense of
identity and confidence because they have resided in the Sahel region for over half a
millennium, yet this pride has been tempered with humility by the French colonial
experience. Mossi communities are surrounded by a conglomeration of smaller, more
rural, localized native (Bobo and Senufo), transplanted (Gurunsi and Lobi), and
regionally spread (Fulani, Gurma, Mandé, and Tuareg) ethnic groups that are rarely able
to garner sufficient political cooperation to oppose the Mossi. Most of these groups have
resided in the region for many centuries, resulting in an isomorphic melding of their
cultural practices.
Burkinabé are religiously mixed, with a Sunni Muslim majority and a Catholic
Christian minority. Both are highly syncretistic, with traditional spiritualism remaining a
strong identity driver, which dampens the expansionistic tendencies of these global
religions. This syncretism is apparent in the Mossi’s deep need for “privacy about
personal affairs and plans because disclosure makes one vulnerable to fatal attacks by
sorcerers and witches” (Fiske 2002, 83). Religious adherence does not mirror
ethnolinguistic or political allegiances; there has not been a serious attempt to institute
Shari ‘a, even in majority Muslim areas.
Table 41
Burkinabé Ethnic Groups
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Table Continued
Name
Mossi
Fulani
Bobo
Gurma
Mandé
Senufo
Gurunsi
Lobi
Tuareg
Other

Percent Pop.
50.2
9.4
5.9
5.8
5.3
4.9
4.8
4.7
2.5
6.5

Origin
Native
Regionally Spread
Native
Regionally Spread
Regionally Spread
Native
Transplant
Transplant
Regionally Spread
Mixed

Sources: Simons and Fennig 2017; WorldAtlas.com 2017
Data extracted from sources on 09/21/17.

Figure 5. Upper Volta Ethnic Groups.
Source: University of Texas Libraries 1968
Reprinted with Permission.

Religion
Sunni Muslim Majority/Christian Minority
Sunni Muslim
Sunni Muslim
Sunni Muslim
Sunni Muslim
Non-Religious
Traditional Spiritualism Majority/Sunni Muslim Minority
Traditional Spiritualism
Sunni Muslim
Mixed

Physical Proximity
Physical proximity measures how closely strangers live, work, shop, and play to
one another, indicating the potential for inter-group interaction if an effective
incentivization or coercive driving force is present. Burkina Faso is not an expansive
country, and its people are moderately mobile, which increases the likelihood of intergroup interaction; yet, having a highly rural and poor population (Wouterse and Van Den
Berg 2011, 357) with many small geographically bounded dense network ethnolinguistic
groups, increases its propinquity, reducing inter-group interaction.
Migration comes in two forms: continental and intercontinental. Most Burkinabé
migration is continental and primarily internal, rural-to-urban and urban-to-urban (Harsch
2009, 287), which increases physical proximity and inter-group interaction. The Mossi,
concentrated in the middle third of the country surrounding the capital, Ouagadougou, are
more self-sufficient than other ethnic groups, which does not provide it an incentive for
inter-group interaction. However, smaller rural groups must have some interests met
outside the group, which drives them toward regional urban centers such as BoboDioulasso and the capital.
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Figure 6. Burkina Faso Population Density.
Source: LandScan 2000
Reprinted with Permission.

Technological Proximity
Technological proximity measures how technology makes it easier or harder for
strangers to access, learn about, and communicate with each other; findings are
categorized into communications and transportation technologies for reporting. Members
of Burkinabé communities communicate face-to-face most often and when not in
physical proximity, via mobile phone. They receive news and information via radio
rather than television or internet, as there are only two television stations and only 14
percent of its population has internet access (World Factbook 2017). However, access to
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cellular networks and radio coverage is not equal, but instead is concentrated in urban
areas and along major road networks, with greater access among the Mossi and Bobo
ethnic groups.
Regarding transportation technology, Air Burkina, the only commercial carrier,
has but three planes operated out of Burkina Faso’s lone paved airport in the capital city
of Ouagadougou. Thus its domestic air transport system does little to increase
technological proximity. The only passenger rail line cuts through the country east to
west, connecting the Mossi with several of the western ethnic groups and Cote d’Ivoire,
but little else. Even though its road network is mostly unpaved, wealthy and poor
Burkinabé’s travel via bus, rather than air, rail, or private vehicle, which increases
technological proximity since public transportation increases the likelihood that strangers
will interact.
Burkina Faso largely skipped the landline telephone revolution and went straight
to mobile as evidenced by its landline system’s rank of 141 out of 196 and mobile of 74
out of 196 (World Factbook 2017). Mobile phone usage has increased rapidly throughout
SSA (Elegbeleye 2005, 197), especially in Burkina Faso, where districts only a few years
prior had little to no mobile phone access. As of 2007, Burkina Faso exceeded 50 percent
Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) coverage (International
Telecommunications Union 2016). Much of the literature on technology and culture
assumes mobile phones are “best understood as an expression of the increasing
'individualisation of society” (Hahn and Kibora 2008, 90). However, in the West African
context, random strangers do not regularly communicate via mobile phone except for
business purposes. Instead, mobile networks are highly insular in the SSA context (Slater
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and Kwami 2005, 3). Increasing domestic migration has spread many ethnic groups
between villages and cities; the mobile phone provides a tie that sustains their networks.
Instead of atomizing collectivist Burkinabé society, mobile phones serve as a tie
mechanism for maintaining and strengthening in-group trust within non-physically
proximate groups (Hahn and Kibora 2008, 90).
Social Proximity
The active Burkinabé protest culture regularly places different ethnic, linguistic,
cultural, class, and religious groups in physical proximity and their shared purpose of
protest often places them in sustained social proximity where they develop lasting
network ties across groups. Because the Mossi have such outsized influence over all
areas of Burkinabé society, they often serve as the hub for network connections between
the other smaller ethnic groups. This is what occurred through the progressive
development and spread of 50 local labor protests in 15 different cities in 2008 (Harsch
2009, 278). Once groups begin to have their interest of vocational solidarity met by other
groups, they tend to be open to having other interests met by them, which further
strengthens their network ties.
Religious expansionism that is present in many other highly religious SSA
countries is not as present in Burkina Faso, perhaps due to the absence of large numbers
of Pentecostal Christians and Muslims advocating Shari ‘a. Being a highly syncretistic
society also makes Burkinabé Christian and Muslim divisions less intense. This, in itself,
does not necessarily incentivize religious groups to interact more frequently or intensely,
strengthening their network ties, but when they do interact, there is less conflict and
demonization of the “Other.”
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Burkinabé political parties tend to form based on physical region more than along
class, ethnic, or religious lines, which keeps party interests more localized and allows
increasing physical and technological proximity, when present, to strengthen network ties
between groups. There is not a clear relationship between the Mossi majority and the
strength of the Congrès pour la Démocratie et le Progrès (CDP) party (Stroh 2010, 16).
Instead, one’s geographic home area explains party affiliation better than one’s ethnic
affiliation (Basedau and Stroh 2009, 7). However, ethnicity does serve as a driving force
within parties (Stroh 2010, 1). When this occurs, party social structure tends to
fractionalize, weakening party network ties and strengthening intra-ethnic ties within the
party. The more a strongman model of governance is present, the more likely a party is
concentrated in that leader’s home region, which allows him to “control the network and
protect his self-interest” (2010, 24).
Power Differential
Burkina Faso’s former unipolar power differential was evidenced by minority
groups’ inability and even strong collective desire, to mount a challenge to Mossi
cultural, economic, political, and social dominance. The Mossi have greater access to
market and state resources, although this has not resulted in extreme inequality and
deprivation of minority groups; instead, all ethnic groups are relatively poor, including
the Mossi, because Burkina Faso does not have many resources over which groups may
compete.
While one might assume 72.6 percent of a country’s exports coming from gold
(United Nations Comtrade 2015) would sow discord and uneven development, it has not
done so. Burkina Faso does not have a history of ethnic, political, or religious violence.
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The Mossi’s long, relatively peaceful, if not prosperous, post-colonial hold on power has
come, in part, through the political dominance of the Congress for Democracy and
Progress (CDP) party, which has been able to pull a sufficient number minority groups
into its coalition. Its long-time leader, President Compaoré (1987-2014), turned Burkina
Faso into a de facto single-party state from 1996-2014. Only after his push to remove his
term limits, claiming, “What I’m doing is legal” (British Broadcasting Company 2014),
was sufficient protest sparked, setting off the Burkinabé uprising of 2014 that resulted in
his removal and a reordering of the CDP-stacked Parliament and a push for a multipolar
power differential.
The composite effect social network composition has on the Burkinabé GTR,
through ethnolinguistic fractionalization, moderate-high physical, moderate
technological, and high social proximity, and a multipolar power differential has the
potential to widen the GTR.
Case #2: Ethiopia
Fractionalization
There is no single cultural, economic, political, or religious heart of Ethiopian
society, but instead many; the government has seen fit to institutionalize this reality
through ethnic-based federalism. Ethiopians are ethnolinguistically heterogeneous and
moderately religiously and culturally so. Only 49.1 percent (United Nations Educational,
Scientific and Cultural Organization 2015) are literate as they have a long oral tradition
that has inhibited literacy. There are 90 languages (85 indigenous) spoken in Ethiopia
(Simons and Fennig 2017), yet urbanized populations and the education system utilize
English, which bridges some of the linguistic diversity. Ethiopia’s many languages are
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clustered into four language families (Semitic (13), Cushitic (24) Omotic (28), and NiloSaharan (19) (Hudson 1999, 94). Within each of these families, there are subtle
differences, yet when comparing across them, there are many. Most ethnolinguistic
groups are native to the region, with only the largest, the Oromo, being regionally spread
throughout the Horn of Africa.
Ethiopians are a highly religious, non-syncretistic people with 77.2 percent
claiming to attend weekly religious services (World Values Survey 2007) and only 3.3
percent (World Factbook 2016) practicing traditional religions. There is a slight
Ethiopian Orthodox Christian majority (50-55 percent) (Adogla 2010) and a significant
Sunni Muslim minority. While the Oromo and many of the smaller ethnolinguistic
groups are religiously mixed, Christian and Muslim, the Amhara and Tigray are primarily
Ethiopian Orthodox. Both faiths have formed uniquely over many centuries from the
more recognizable Western and Middle Eastern variants of their respective faiths, with
Ethiopian Orthodox considered an African Independent Church (AIC). These groups
seem different, though less so when compared to other world religions such as Hinduism
or Buddhism. Both are Abrahamic faiths that have been shaped by the other over many
centuries.
Religion is not the only identity driver for Ethiopians; instead, ethnicity and
historical nationalistic pride are also important. Many Ethiopians, regardless of ethnicity
or religion, are proud to be Ethiopian because of its long-held autonomous existence,
notwithstanding being a Cold War proxy site and having extensive aid influence. This
nationalistic drive has held a diverse assortment of Ethiopians together under the extreme
duress of the Ethiopian Civil War, the Ethiopian-Eritrean War, and the rule of the
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communist derg. Even though the Tigray have outsized political influence, each ethnic
and religious group feels it has a role to play in the state and perpetuation of nationalistic
pride; the institution of ethnic-based federalism attempts to accommodate this desire.
Table 42
Ethiopian Ethnic Groups
Name
Oromo
Amhara
Tigray
Somali
Sidama
Gurage
Welayta
Hadiya
Afar
Gamo

Percent Pop.
34.5
26.9
6.1
6.0
4.0
2.5
2.3
1.7
1.7
1.5

Origin
Regionally Spread
Native
Native
Regionally Spread
Native
Native
Native
Native
Regionally Spread
Native

Religion
Mixed (non-Orthodox Christian/Muslim)
Orthodox
Orthodox
Muslim
Protestant
Mixed (Muslim/Orthodox)
Protestant Majority/Orthodox Minority
Protestant Majority/Orthodox and Muslim Minority
Muslim
Protestant Majority/Orthodox Minority

Note: Ethnic groups over 1 million.
Sources: Ethiopian Central Statistical Authority 2007; Simons and Fennig 2017; WorldAtlas.com 2017
Data extracted from sources on 09/21/17.
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Figure 7. Ethiopian Religion by Region.
Source: GeoCurrents 2013
Reprinted with Permission.

Physical Proximity
Ethiopia is a densely populated, rural, and rugged country, which serves to
increase and decrease its propinquity and likelihood that its many small ethnic and
linguistic groups will interact. Increasing Ethiopian physical proximity is driven by
migration for economic opportunity and internal displacement due to conflict. Ethiopians
are a mobile population, due to the Ethiopian Civil War, as well as “overpopulation,
famine, poverty, land scarcity, governmental agricultural policies, and a lack of
agricultural resources” (Fransen and Kuschminder 2009, 13), which have forced its many
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ethnic, linguistic, and religious groups to interact to meet many of their unmet interests.
In 2009, there were 300,000 internally displaced persons due to violence and famine
(IDPs) (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 2010, 57). An estimated 50 to
70 percent of Ethiopians have migrated either temporarily or permanently (Mberu 2006,
522-3), primarily from rural to urban areas, because cities provide jobs, attracting
members of all ethnic and religious groups. However, rural-to-urban migration decreased
significantly during the rule of the derg (Berhanu and White 2000, 92). While the
modern context is not ideal for increasing generalized trust, it does produce inter-group
interaction, the first step to that end.

Figure 8. Ethiopian Population Density.
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Source: LandScan 2000
Reprinted with Permission.

Technological Proximity
The Ethiopian government owns and regulates most of the 36 radio and six
television stations that serve as Ethiopians’ primary sources for news and information
about other Ethiopians. Because most Ethiopians live in small villages, they
communicate most often face-to-face with others in physical and social proximity and
when not in physical proximity, those in urban areas, along major transportation
corridors, and the wealthy, communicate via mobile phone. Only 51 percent of
Ethiopians have mobile subscriptions (World Bank 2016), and the internet is not highly
utilized as only 15.4 percent of its population have access to it (World Factbook 2017).
What access there is to cellular networks and radio coverage is higher in the center of the
country, where most live, with better access among the larger Amhara, Oromo, and
Tigray ethnic groups. Often left out of communications technological proximity are the
Afar and Somali ethnic groups in the more sparsely populated eastern region.
Ethiopia’s transportation infrastructure is fragmented. The quality of road
networks are spotty, and there exists little passenger rail service. However, recently,
desiring to get its coffee exports to the global market more effectively—though not
having a seaport of its own—it has set out on a massive rail infrastructure project, the
Chinese-financed and -built Addis Ababa-Djibouti Railway—to gain access to Djibouti’s
seaport. Realizing its overly ambitious goal, it has scaled back its rail development in
other areas. Therefore, Ethiopians do not ride the rails because there are very few of
them unless one lives in Addis Ababa where SSA’s first light-rail system is located.
187

Ethiopian roads are unsafe. Ethiopia has the fifth highest number of road fatalities per
motor vehicle globally (World Health Organization 2015), yet it has one of the fewest
vehicles per capita (Ethiopian Ministry of Transport 2017). Therefore, not many
Ethiopians own and drive private vehicles, yet when they do, people die at high rates.
The few wealthy utilize the state-owned Ethiopian Airlines, the only commercial carrier,
which has seventy-five planes operating out of Ethiopia’s 17 paved airports. The air
transport system is helpful for increasing technological proximity among the wealthy, yet
most Ethiopians are poor and therefore travel via public bus, which increases
technological proximity.
Social Proximity
Class identity is not a strong deterrent to establishing network ties between
modern Ethiopians. While there is more wealth in Addis Ababa, most Ethiopians are
rural and equally poor, having the third lowest GINI (33.2) (World Bank 2010) in SSA.
While the defeated communist Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionary Party (EPRP)
recognized the right of self-determination, it viewed class as the primary concern of
Ethiopian society (Aaron 2005, 57). However, the victorious Tigreyan People's
Liberation Front (TPLF) believed the primary cleavage is along ethnic lines (Markakis
1994, 254) as is evidenced by its selection of an ethnic-based model of federalism. While
Amharan culture is most pervasive and the Tigray dominate politics, there also exists a
strong pan-Ethiopian nationalism.
War, overpopulation, and famine have forced ethnic and religious groups into
closer physical proximity, which increases their potential for social proximity through
sustained network ties. However, long before the communist derg ruled, Orthodox
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Christians and Sunni Muslims were in relatively close, albeit, somewhat static, physical
and social proximity. Ethiopian Orthodox and Muslim communities are unique among
their global counterparts. Neither are highly expansionistic in the way that many
Pentecostal Christians and Muslim advocates of Shari ‘a tend to be; there has been no
serious attempt to establish Shari ‘a except in the Afar Region, which is administered by
the federal government through the Proclamation no. 188 of the Ethiopian Constitution
(Ethiopian Constitution 1999, 1185). Being the dominant religious groups, they tend to
honor the religious institutions in the status quo, rather than challenge them. Religion has
not been the conflict intensifier that it is in many other highly religious SSA countries.
Instead, inter-group conflict is driven by ethno-nationalistic competition, as is evidenced
by the Eritrean secession and the establishment of an ethno-federation, which has
provided a buffer between groups. This model of federalism, through its goal to mitigate
potential conflict, has served to decrease network ties between ethnic groups; it is but one
barrier in a society with many drivers of social proximity.
Power Differential
Ethiopians have traded freedom in favor of development. The Ethiopian
multipolar ethnic power differential is driven by the power politics of the dominant
Tigray minority group. The two largest—though not dominant—groups, the Oromo and
Amhara, each composes about one-third of the population and are surrounded by a
conglomeration of much smaller ethnic groups, including the Tigray. Both groups have
strong nationalistic identities, as they have inhabited the region for over two thousand
years, yet their refusal to share power, rooted in their collectivist fear of compromise
leading to dilution of their distinctiveness (Handler 1988, 49), has left open this
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opportunity for the Tigray. “The ideological, ethnic and political differences of these
groups have made it a monumental task to develop a long-lasting political framework”
(Engedayehu 1993, 29). The answer to this dilemma in 1991 was establishing a
federation of ten ethnic-based states “designed to enhance popular participation in
governmental and political affairs at the grassroots level” (Keller 2002, 27), the mostfully ethnic-based federalism of any country (see Turton 2006). This may appear
democratic because it provides ethnic groups de jure autonomy and control over their
regions and has even empowered them to secede if so desired (Selassie 2003, 64), but has
not afforded all groups a meaningful voice in national politics. Also, enhancement of
“group rights do not at all entail the respect of individual rights” (Vestal 1999, 165). The
Tigray have been able to dominate the political and military elite through the leadership
of Meles Zenawi for the last quarter century by gaming this system of ethnic federalism
and playing the Amhara, Oromo, and Southern Nations off each other.
Since the Amhara, Oromo, and Southern Nations have not been able to cooperate
to mount an opposition to the Tigray, they have joined them instead to form an
uncomfortable alliance through the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front
(EPRDF). The remaining 19 regional parties, 12 national parties, and ten parliamentary
party coalitions representing smaller ethnic groups have not been able to mount a
challenge to this alliance to the extent that in 2015, the EPRDF won all 547 seats in
parliament, making Ethiopia a de facto one-party state. This precarious centralized
political arrangement disguised as a federation (Keller 2002, 46) has not reduced violent
conflict. Instead, it has reduced institutional trust (Brietzke 1995, 35) and has provided
groups space to “reassert their cultural identity and revitalize their culture, which was
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suppressed for generations” (Mengisteab 2001, 20). It has produced ethnic-based
conflict, in the form of protest, riots, and violence, to the point that the government shut
down internet access following the August 6, 2016, #OromoProtests that took place
across more than 200 cities.
The composite effect social network composition has on the Ethiopian GTR,
through ethnolinguistic fractionalization, high physical, moderate technological, and high
social proximity, and a multipolar power differential has the potential to widen the GTR.

Case #3: Nigeria
Fractionalization
Answering the Nigerian social network composition question requires a religious
lens. Nigeria’s old “ethnic problem,” expressed through the Biafra War, has morphed
into primarily a “religious problem” (Paden 2005, 203). This has occurred, in part,
because Nigerians are likely the most religious population globally, having the highest
service attendance (World Values Survey 2014) and from the state strategically bisecting
ethnic homelands with new political divisions to weaken ethnic dominance to promote
state-based identities (Suberu 2001, 5). This policy is based on the theory that the most
“successful multi-ethnic federal systems are those in which there is at least a certain level
of divergence between the constituent units and their ethnic divisions” (Elazar 1993,
194). In theory, state-based identities should increase, empowering ethnic minorities and
placing them on a level playing field to pursue their political agendas (Rothchild 1991,
39); however, in reality, Nigerian religious identities have grown stronger.
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Nigeria is one of the most ethnolinguistically, religiously, and culturally
fractionalized countries globally. Its tremendous linguistic diversity comes primarily
from the Niger-Congo language family, while a minority come from the Afro-Asiatic
language family (e.g., Hausa). Its overall literacy rate is a low 60 percent (United
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 2016) in keeping with many
oral societies of West Africa. Many of its hundreds of small ethnolinguistic groups,
composing 32 percent of the population, are native to the region while many larger ones,
Hausa-Fulani (29 percent), Yoruba (21 percent), and Igbo (18 percent) together
composing 68 percent of the population, are regionally spread throughout West Africa.
Even though there are 527 spoken languages (510 indigenous) (Simons and Fennig
2017), urbanized populations and the education system utilize English, bridging some of
the extreme linguistic diversity.
Since the first recorded settlements in the 9th Century A.D. (Falola and Heaton
2008, 23), the region has been highly fractionalized. Had not the British joined the
northern and southern regions together into a single colony, they would likely be two or
more separate Yoruba-Igbo Christian-majority, and Hausa-Fulani Muslim-majority states
today. The Hausa Muslim culture is more hierarchical while the mixed Christian and
Muslim Yoruba culture is more representational (Paden 2005, 204), and the Christian
Igbo culture is more equity-oriented and participatory (Njaka 1974, 139). This has led to
widespread misunderstanding about group representation, communication, and
coordination.
Table 43
Nigerian Ethnic Groups
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Table Continued
Name
Hausa-Fulani
Yoruba
Igbo
Ijaw
Kanuri
Ibibio
Tiv

Percent Pop.
29
21
18
10
4
3.5
2.5

Origin
Regionally Spread
Regionally Spread
Native
Regionally Spread
Regionally Spread
Native
Native

Religion
Sunni Muslim
Christian Majority/Sunni Muslim Minority
Christian
Christian
Muslim
Christian
Mixed

Sources: Simons and Fennig 2017; WorldAtlas.com 2017
Data extracted from sources on 09/21/17.

Figure 9. Nigerian Linguistic Groups.
Source: University of Texas Libraries 1979
Reprinted with Permission.

The isolated institutionalization histories of the north and south are the driving
force of modern religious identity formation in Nigeria (see Tajfel and Turner 1979, 35).

British colonial administrators’ sensitivity to the importance of religion in northern
Nigeria (Hansen and Twaddle 2002, 136) and resulting “Indirect Rule” of the region
allowed Islam to strengthen (Ojo 2007, 177), as northern Muslims and southern
Christians were kept apart. The Nigerian population is a near-religious parity with 46.45
percent Christian and 45.53 percent Muslim (Johnson and Grim 2013). There are
Christian majorities in the South South and South East regions, Muslim majorities in the
North West and North East regions, and mixed populations in the North Central and
South West regions. The current Nigerian model of governance, “may not be as well
suited to balancing Muslim and Christian religious communities as expected” (Paden
2005, 208), particularly those in the Middle Belt states.
Table 44
Nigeria – Religion by Region
Region
South East
South South
North Central
South West
North West
North East

Percent Christian
Christian Majority
96.71
93.86
Mixed Populations
59.44
62.74
Muslim Majority
8.94
20.79

Percent Muslim
0.30
3.36
38.7
36.49
90.02
78.39

Source: Johnson and Grim (2013)
Data extracted from source on 03/06/17.

Physical Proximity
Nigeria is a relatively expansive and moderately rugged country, which decreases
physical proximity. However, because it has the seventh largest population globally (186
million) (World Bank 2016) and only the 32nd largest landmass, it is one of the most
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densely populated SSA countries, increasing physical proximity. Having a relatively
large urban population (49.4 percent) decreases its propinquity in urban areas, yet its
hundreds of small geographically bound, dense network ethnolinguistic groups, increases
it in rural areas.
Nigeria has an urban-rural and north-south divide. While it has a sizable
diaspora, because it has a large population, most migration is internal, from rural to urban
and south to north and is typically incentivized by economic opportunity rather than
coerced by violence. In the late 1920s and again in the late 1960s there were significant
population migrations from the south to the north, increasing its share of the population
from a parity to 57.03 percent in 1931 and 64.42 percent in 1973, respectively (Udo
1998, 356). Between 1963 and 1973, the annual intercensal growth rate in the mostly
rural and less mobile north was as high as 6.8 percent and in the more urban and mobile
south as low as -0.62 (Adepoju 1981, 33; Campbell 1976, 247; Suberu 2001, 151). Since
the 1970s, it has had one of the highest urbanization rates in the world (Paden 2008, 10).
The population growth rate remains high in 2017, with an estimated 4.3 percent between
2015 and 2020 (World Factbook 2017). Therefore, while many members of small ethnic
groups interact in urban areas, there is a nesting effect for those remaining in ethnic
homelands, leaving them triply insulated from urban populations and other small ethnic
groups with whom they are not physically, technologically, or socially proximate.
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Figure 10. Nigerian Population Density.
Source: LandScan 2000
Reprinted with Permission.

Technological Proximity
Nigerians are highly mobile with moderate communications and transportation
options; however, in rural areas, whom one interacts with depends mostly on religious
affiliation. Nigerians communicate face-to-face and via mobile phone when not in
physical proximity and receive news and information via sixty radio and 106 television
stations. The internet is not highly utilized as only 25.7 percent of its population has
access (World Factbook 2017). Access to mobile networks and radio and television
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coverage is widespread. However, left out of communications technological proximity
are some rural Muslim-majority states in the North West and North East regions. An
active media drives religious expansionism as an estimated 40 percent of state and private
television and radio station revenues come from religious broadcasting (Ihejirika 2004;
Ojo 1999, 8). It is also often the culprit of disseminating misinformation nationally about
localized conflict events, which triggers subsequent violent events in more distant
locations (Weidmann 2011, 13).
Nigeria’s transportation infrastructure is unevenly developed. It has an extensive
road network, but most are in poor condition. Its rail network connects many of its most
populous cities, but is primarily for cargo and does not connect to the capital, Abuja; as
well, Lagos is the largest city in the world without a metro rail system. Domestic air
travel is relatively inexpensive in Nigeria through one of its 16 commercial carriers
operating 73 aircraft out of 40 paved airports (World Factbook 2017); at least three of
these carriers fly domestic routes. Therefore, poor Nigerians travel via bus and the
wealthy via air, which is useful for increasing technological proximity between groups.
Social Proximity
Physical proximity increases the likelihood of increasing social proximity and
stronger network ties between groups. Nigerian Christians and Muslims, neither very
syncretistic4, have remained mostly separate due to tribal and British colonial alignments
until acute post-independence institutional failures unintentionally seeded civil society
growth by providing opportunities for expansionistic Christian and Muslim groups to fill

4

Only 1.7 percent of Nigerians adhere to traditional religions (World Factbook 2016).
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basic needs, security, and service gaps for their adherents. This has resulted in the
development of two active and separate religious-based civil societies that choose not to
link their networks for greater effectiveness in filling gaps left by the state
(Juergensmeyer 2005, 152). Further, this has grown into a competitive enterprise and
sustained violent turf war between disparate ethnoreligious civil society groups (Agbese
1996, 139), where they may choose to extend services to other groups with the purpose of
increasing political power (Juergensmeyer 2005, 153) or securing conversions (2005,
157).
Religious violence is less frequent but more intense. Non-religiously-motivated
social conflict related to elections, economic markets, and the environment is more
widespread in Nigeria but rarely threatens one’s ontological and epistemological
foundation as religious conflict does. One example of religious conflict is the fallout
from the 2002 Miss World pageant that was supposed to be held in Kaduna, Nigeria.
Provocative marketing angered Muslims to the point of rioting, shutting down the event,
and the death of over 200 people, exposing Nigeria’s fractured public sphere (Obadare
2004, 192). There has also been widespread conflict on university campuses over
religious symbolism (Paden 2008, 62), proselytizing, and claims on sacred space. One
rare counterexample to this trend comes from the city of Kaduna where the inter-religious
collaboration of Imam Muhammad Ashafa and Pastor James Wuye has been successful in
connecting Christian and Muslim civil societies for conflict resolution dialogue.
Nigerian religious civil societies are in closest physical, technological, and social
proximity in Middle Belt states and the Southwest Region; however, their interaction
regularly results in religious or ethnoreligious conflict in the former via indigene-settler
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disputes (Hansen and Twaddle 2002, 130). In the Christian-dominated Niger Delta, civil
society effort is focused on environmental sustainability, and in southern urban centers, a
focus on micro-credit programs. “Conflicts are unique events and must be understood
within their own contexts” (Druckman 2005, 9). The Middle Belt states provide a unique
environment where religious parity, land conflict, and Shari’ a law intersect to produce a
religiously polarized civil society. Poorly constructed and unevenly adjudicated
indigene-settler policies that reminiscent of rent controls in gentrifying urban centers,
restrict citizens’ free movement and stagnate the market. Added to this, conflict triads
involving Christians, Muslims, and government officials, further complicate relations
(Roniger 1994, 76). State officials often view civil society as competitors of power,
influence, and legitimacy (McGowan 2003, 340).
The social tie that binds these groups together is often conflict over sacred space
(Gambo and Omirin 2012, 522). Both are expansionist religions that are prone to buying
into demonizing myths of the “Other.” Christian proselytism, particularly the more
assertive Pentecostal version (Ihejirika 2009, 12, 20), differs greatly from Islamic Shari ‘a
and Da’ wah. Their intentions are similar, but their means to that end are not (Krings
2008, 64). Aggressive Renewalist Christian preaching and the unthoughtful construction
of churches in Muslim-majority areas has escalated conflict, as has the implementation of
Shari ‘a (Islamic Law)—which does not separate religion from the political and economic
(Hoexter et al. 2002, 115). Both of these cause religion to spill out from the private
sphere into the semi-public and public spheres (Ojo 2007, 176). Muslims consider
Nigeria overly influenced by western education, symbols, and legal codes (Gbadamosi
1978, 536). Because Nigerians have experienced numerous regime changes, “some say,
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military and civilian political rule have failed Nigeria, why not try a Islamic theocracy”
(1978, 528). The federal government has thereby taken a flexible approach to its
constitutional separation of religion and state, allowing Muslim religious symbolism to
adorn public buildings (e.g., bus stops and post offices) (Osaghae 1994, 129). The
implementation of Shari’ a criminal code in mixed religious populations throughout most
northern and some Middle Belt states has caused conflict (Obadare 2004, 178). Even if
non-Muslims are not adjudicated under Shari ‘a, it alters the cultural, economic, political,
and social environment for all citizens. Further, Hisba (local voluntary vigilante
enforcers of Shari ’a), attempt to close bars and hotels, even in non-Muslim areas (Paden
2005, 164). Social conflict increases when non-Muslim minorities are willing to fight
back.
Social conflict is most intense in the religiously-mixed Middle Belt and northern
cities of Kano, Kaduna, Jos, and Bauchi, where settlement patterns fall along religious
lines (Gambo and Omirin 2012, 133) and highly dense Christian and Muslim
communities share few network ties. Kaduna and Jos have gone so far as to zone
Christian and Muslim neighborhoods in an attempt to control inter-group interaction.
“By 2002, residents were describing particular areas of Kaduna town as ‘100 percent
Christian’ or ‘100 percent Muslim” (Human Rights Watch 2003, 5). The rule of law is
weak throughout Nigeria, but because these groups are mobile, competing over limited
resources, highly religious, and physically, but not socially proximate, routine land
tenure, indigene-settler, and property disputes become spiritualized resulting in
indivisible sacred space conflict. Therefore, conflict often serves as the first network tie
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between these communities and subsequent information asymmetry and
miscommunication lead to further conflict and strengthening of negative network ties.
Power Differential
The bipolar Nigerian power differential occurs along religious and geographic
divisions. However, this does not mean ethic, class, and resource-based conflict does not
occur. Religious majorities in each of Nigeria’s 36 states have autonomy to shape
political institutions to their advantage and to the detriment of local religious minorities;
this is most pronounced in Middle Belt states. One-third of Nigeria’s 36 states have a
religious parity (primarily Middle Belt), while 13 are Christian-majority (all southern),
and 12 are Muslim-majority (all northern). Moreover, the more states and LGAs there
are, the weaker each one is alone, encouraging the formation of alliances between likeminded political units along religious lines, resulting in “the bipolar cleavages of North
versus South and Muslim versus Christian” (Diamond 2001, xv). Religious parity among
substantial ethnolinguistic diversity (see Igwara 2001) makes Nigeria an excellent test
case for analyzing power struggles common to federations (Paden 2005, 4) (e.g., colonial
independence, civil war, resource conflict, religious extremism, and social conflict),
where there are often no clear winners or losers, leaving all sides hopeful they will
prevail.
The Nigerian Constitution forbids the adoption (1999, Ch. I, Part II, Section 10),
support, or discrimination (1999, Ch. IV, Section 38) based on religion by the federal or
state governments and protects the freedom of religion for all (Nmehielle 2004, 730),
however, this has not happened consistently in practice. Modern religious conflict in
Nigeria can be traced to the national debate on Shari ‘a at the Constituent Assembly in
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1977-78 (Osaghae 1994, 123). Also, since the General Babangida administration
upgraded Nigeria’s membership in the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) in
1986, “Nigeria appears to have degenerated from a religiously peaceable to a religiously
polarized federation” (Suberu 2001, 17). The Nigerian Christian-majority south has
dominated the economy, while the Muslim-majority north has been successful in
achieving political dominance (Kukah 1993, 259). From 1979 to 1999—minus the 84day Ernest Shonekan Interim National Government—no Christian had led Nigeria
(Obadare 2006, 669 citing Agbaje et al. 2005). Modern Nigerian politics under the
Fourth Republic is quite active with several dozen political parties, 14 of them active,
with two highly relevant: the left-leaning All Progressives Congress (APC) and the rightleaning People’s Democratic Party (PDP). The PDP dominated the first decade of the
Fourth Republic, so much so that within the party, it struck an informal power-sharing
agreement for alternating the nomination of its presidential candidates between a
Christian and a Muslim (Suberu 2001, 16). The APC was cobbled together by several
smaller Hausa-Fulani and Yoruba parties to challenge this PDP dominance and was
successful in doing so with President Buhari’s 2015 win.
Nigeria is not all conflict and violence. The appearance of widespread conflict
due to the chaotic arrangement of informal and formal Nigerian institutions is often
mistaken for actual violence (see Fearon and Laitin 1996). Social conflict tends to be
concentrated in areas of religious parity, while religion is often not the root cause of
conflict. Because religion is quickly becoming the primary means of Nigerian identity,
economic and political disputes become imbued with religious significance. When
Nigerian Christians and Muslims are physically proximate, equally powerful, and
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governed by an inconsistent rule of law, the intensity of conflict increases (see Ojo 2007).
In this uncertain and highly competitive political environment, religious groups feel a
sense of urgency to stake out their claim and ensure the “Other” does not have greater
access to state resources, land, markets, and public spaces than they do, thus rendering
some of these disputes indivisible and subject to intensified conflict. However,
religiously intensified conflict over land and public space (sacred space conflict), erupts
in short, intense, localized bursts (Salehyan et al. 2012, 507) and does not often spread. It
has altered settlement patterns and land use in the Middle Belt, particularly in Kaduna
and Plateau states (2012, 509) where each group is large and powerful enough to think it
can eventually prevail against the “Other.” What aggravates this type of conflict further
is when law enforcement sides with either Christian or Muslim communities, which
produces complex triadic conflict, enemy alliances, and damaging political behavior (see
Saperstein 2004). Oppositely, clear religious majorities are present in Christian-majority
southeastern states and Muslim-majority northwestern states. In Nigeria’s most populous
city, Lagos (9 million), which is three times larger than the next two largest cities, Kano
(3 million) and Ibadan (3 million), there is a diverse mixture of ethnicities, languages,
classes, and religions.
The composite effect social network composition has on the Nigerian GTR,
through ethnolinguistic and religious fractionalization, high physical, high technological
and moderate social proximity, and a bipolar power differential has the potential to widen
the GTR.
Case #4: Zambia
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Fractionalization
Zambia’s population is ethnolinguistically and religiously heterogeneous, but
culturally homogenous. It is more ethnically diverse than linguistically, as most of its
languages proceed from the common Bantu language family. There are almost double
the number of ethnic groups (73) as there are languages (46, with 37 being indigenous)
(Simons and Fennig 2017). Zambians have a low literacy rate at 63.4 percent (United
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 2015), and their official
language is English, which bridges some of the linguistic diversity between groups. Just
four ethnic groups (Bemba, Tonga, Nyanja-Chewa, and Loiz) compose 48 percent of the
population (Simons and Fennig 2017), the first two being the larger and native to the
area, while the latter two, smaller and regionally spread throughout southern Africa.
Zambia’s official religion is Christianity, with 97.6 percent claiming that faith
(Pew Research Center 2010). However, Zambian Christianity is not a cohesive body as
demonstrated by its high religious fractionalization, substantial syncretism, and many
small and widespread evangelical and African Independent Church (AIC) sects. The
remainder of Zambian Christians are the more formally institutionalized Catholic Church
and mainline Protestant denominations. The Catholic Church has dioceses represented in
each province and is more involved in public life as a voice of social justice, while
evangelical denominations and AICs focus more on church growth and proselytism.
Table 45
Zambian Ethnic Groups
Name
Bemba
Tonga

Percent Pop.
21
14

Origin
Native
Native

Religion
Christian
Christian
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Table Continued
Nyanja-Chewa
Lozi

7
6

Regionally Spread
Regionally Spread

Sources: Simons and Fennig 2017; WorldAtlas.com 2017
Data extracted from sources on 09/21/17.

Figure 11. Zambian Linguistic Groups.
Source: Zambian Translators International 2017
Reprinted with Permission.

Christian
Christian

Figure 12. Zambian Ethnolinguistic Groups.
Source: Muturzikin.com 2007a
Reprinted with Permission.

Physical Proximity
The Zambian population is sparse and spread out, which decreases its physical
proximity, yet it is not a particularly rugged terrain, increasing its potential for physical
proximity in the presence of effective incentives or coercion. It has a moderately
urbanized (44 percent) population, which grew at a rate of 4.2 percent between 2000 and
2010 (Zambian Central Statistical Office 2013, 25). Because it is a highly mobile
society, there is the potential for domestic isomorphism between ethnic regions, which is
evident by its homogeneous culture.
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Zambian rural to urban migration patterns are driven by economic development
and opportunity (2013, 1) more than conflict and violence. The many smaller
geographically concentrated ethnic groups do not migrate from their home regions to
other ethnic home regions, but instead to urban areas in their region and eventually on to
where the most jobs are located in the Copperbelt and Lusaka provinces. Between 2000
and 2010 rural eastern and western provinces have lost population to the more urban
Copperbelt and the Copperbelt has subsequently lost population to neighboring Lusaka,
the capital region, rising as high as 10.4 percent of the Copperbelt’s population in 2010
(2013, 10). This migration pattern does not place ethnic groups in proximity to each
other except in the few large urban centers. Therefore, home area ethnic populations are
not in physical proximity.
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Figure 13. Zambian Population Density.
Source: LandScan 2000
Reprinted with Permission.

Technological Proximity
The Zambian state built an extensive—by SSA standards—landline
telecommunications infrastructure, but it is mostly idle as only one percent of the
population utilize it while 75 percent have mobile subscriptions (World Bank 2016). The
rapid diffusion of mobile technologies has made its landline infrastructure unsustainable
to develop further; such is the state of many of its industries and infrastructure. While
Zambians primarily receive domestic news and information via sixty-eight radio stations,
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their access to other southern African societies through electronic communications is
quite limited. The internet is not highly utilized as only 25.5 percent (World Factbook
2017) of its population has access to it, severely decreasing its ability to benefit from the
experiences of other societies facing similar challenges (Larmer 2005, 43).
What exists of Zambia’s transportation infrastructure is relatively sound thanks to
Chinese investment and trade of Zambian copper for development of its transportation
sector (see Brautigam 2009). This deal has primarily worked because China is the
world’s largest consumer of copper (Carmody and Hampwaye 2010, 87) and Zambia
requires the increased reliability of its transportation network to bring its copper and
other exports to market. As a result, the Zambian national government has awarded
many Chinese companies contracts for road, railway, and airport infrastructure building
and maintenance (2010, 88). Traders, investors, and donors have mustered sufficient
buy-in from Zambians to launch infrastructural projects, but once off the ground,
maintaining them has proven difficult. As a result, much of its road network has gone
through cycles of growth and deterioration, to the point that by 1980, it was valued at
US$2.3 billion, shrinking to US$1.5 billion by 2000 (World Bank 2010).
Zambia does not have the most extensive rail network in SSA, but because it has
relatively forgiving terrain, access to external financing, the incentive to get its copper to
market, and a relatively peaceful post-colonial development period, its rail system is in
better condition than many of its neighbors. Because Zambians do not own many private
vehicles and domestic air travel is almost non-existent and prohibitively expensive with
only one carrier, they ride the rails and public buses. The more urban and centralized
Lusaka and Copperbelt provinces have the best access to all of these communications
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technologies and transportation infrastructure and are therefore the most technologically
proximate. Mostly left out of technological proximity are the more sparsely populated
Western, North-Western, and Northern provinces.
Social Proximity
An HIV/AIDS prevalence of 12.4 percent (UNAIDS 2014), rising as high as 16.2
percent in 1998 (World Bank 2017), directly affecting over one million people and much
more indirectly, has made even the most straightforward decisions complicated. The
Zambian cultural, economic, political, and social structure has been altered by
individuals’ purposefully planning daily activities so to avoid contact with particular
people or groups for health or taboo reasons, choosing whom to consider for marriage,
and means for how to care for infected group members (Frank 2009, 34). This has
resulted in an added layer of network separation between ethnic groups.
Zambia’s economic growth has been primarily limited to urban areas, increasing
economic inequality to the sixth highest Gini (57.1) globally (World Bank 2015), which
has produced an extensive urban-rural divide and network separation. The government
has perpetuated this growing divide since independence by subsidizing maize meal
consumption “to benefit urban constituencies, particularly the unionized workers in
Lusaka and the Copperbelt” (Simutanyi 1996, 833). Linguistic diversity does not serve
as a barrier to social proximity since English is the official and primary trade language.
The highly syncretistic nature of Zambian Protestantism and Catholicism (12 percent
prevalence of traditional spiritualism) (World Factbook 2016) and the lack of competing
global religions reduces the expansionistic nature of Christianity in this context, which
both decreases inter-group interaction and conflict.
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Power Differential
While Zambia is not an ethnic-based federation, its administrative divisions are
predicated mainly on Zambia’s four major politically cohesive ethnolinguistic groups
(Bemba, Nyanja, Lozi, and Tonga) (Dresang 1974, 1606). The Zambian economy is
concentrated in Bemba and Tonga areas (Copperbelt and Lusaka provinces), leaving all
other areas dependent on them. Its post-colonial multipolar power differential has been
kept in balance by strongman President Kaunda and the socialist United National
Independence Party (UNIP) from 1964 to 1991. His strategic management of competing
ethnic groups through the distribution of copper wealth, allowed him to establish a
unipolar de jure and de facto single-party state. However, under sustained pressure, he
eventually allowed multiple competitive parties, which promptly unseated him. This has
spurred an active democratic society with competitive elections, though not free from
corruption.
The Zambian civilian government has strategically managed the military through
recruitment. As well, recruitment of Northern Rhodesian and eventually Zambian law
enforcement officers expanded from five ethnic groups to twelve (Haantobolo 2008, 92)
representing all regions, with most posted outside their home region. Consequently, no
single ethnic group could dominate the military or law enforcement institutions
(Lindemann 2010, 10). Later, during the Second Republic, the fruits of this strategy
shown in that each major ethnolinguistic group has cycled through top military leadership
positions (2010, 13).
The composite effect social network composition has on the Zambian GTR,
through ethnolinguistic and religious fractionalization and cultural homogeneity,
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moderate physical, moderate technological, and low social proximity, and vacillation
between a multipolar and unipolar power differential does not have the potential to widen
the GTR.
Case #5: Zimbabwe
Fractionalization
Zimbabwe is moderately ethnolinguistically homogeneous, highly cultural
homogenous, and religiously heterogeneous. Zimbabweans are highly literate (87
percent) (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 2016), and
their languages usually align with their ethnic groups. There are 21 languages (16 being
indigenous) spoken in Zimbabwe (Simons and Fennig 2017), with all of them receiving
official state language status, which tends to reinforce divisions between groups.
However, English, commonly spoken in urban areas, relieves some of this tension. The
most dominant ethnolinguistic group, the Shona, compose 70 percent of the population,
while the largest minority, the Northern Ndebele, make up 16 percent. There are also a
dozen much smaller ethnic groups, half native and the other half regionally spread.
Zimbabweans are highly Christian (85 percent) with a Protestant (Anglican and
Methodist) majority and Roman Catholic minority.
Table 46
Zimbabwean Ethnic Groups
Name
Shona
Northern Ndebele
Tswa
Kunda
Nsenga
Manyika
Ndau

Percent Pop.
70
16
1
1
1
1
1

Origin
Regionally Spread
Regionally Spread
Native
Native
Native
Native
Regionally Spread
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Religion
Protestant Christian
Protestant Christian
Protestant Christian
Protestant Christian
Protestant Christian
Protestant Christian
Protestant Christian

Table Continued
Venda
Kalanga
Tswana
Lozi
Nambya
Tsoa
Tonga

1
1
1
1
1
1
1

Regionally Spread
Regionally Spread
Native
Native
Native
Native
Regionally Spread

Sources: Simons and Fennig 2017; WorldAtlas.com 2017
Data extracted from sources on 09/21/17.

Figure 14. Zimbabwean Ethnolinguistic Groups.
Source: Muturzikin.com 2007b
Reprinted with Permission.

Protestant Christian
Protestant Christian
Protestant Christian
Protestant Christian
Protestant Christian
Protestant Christian
Protestant Christian

Physical Proximity
Zimbabwe is a relatively compact country with a forgiving terrain, which
increases the likelihood of physical proximity. Zimbabweans are a highly mobile
population, though this does not result in close physical proximity between ethnic groups.
Being a highly rural population (67.8 percent) (World Factbook 2017), concentrates its
urban populations in the cities of Harare and Bulawayo. Much of Zimbabwe’s lack of
physical proximity is explained by the history of the Shona and Northern Ndebele
ethnolinguistic groups, which are two strong nations contained in one state. The Shona
occupy the northeastern and central Mashonaland provinces surrounding the capital
Harare, deeply rooted in the area for over a millennium, while the Northern Ndebele have
resided primarily in the Matabeleland provinces in the southwest of the country
surrounding Bulawayo for nearly 200 years. During the Rhodesian Bush War, violence
was the most common driver of internal migration and in the years following, economic
deprivation and political turmoil. Nearly a quarter of Zimbabweans of all ethnic groups,
but more so Northern Ndebele, fled to South Africa and Botswana in the mid-2000s due
to food insecurity and hyperinflation (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre 2008, 21)
resulting from President Mugabe’s land policies. Many others remain internally
displaced because of Mugabe’s gentrification plan, Operation Murambatsvina, which
uprooted over half a million of Zimbabwe’s most impoverished citizens (United Nations
Human Settlements Programme 2005).
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Figure 15. Zimbabwean Population Density.
Source: LandScan 2000
Reprinted with Permission.
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Figure 16. Zimbabwean Food Insecurity – June 2008.
Source: Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and World Food Program (WFP) 2008
Reprinted with Permission.

Technological Proximity
The Shona-led government controls the few radio and television stations through
which Zimbabweans receive their news and information. The internet is not highly
utilized, as only 23.1 percent of its population have access (World Factbook 2017).
Cellular subscription rates are 83 percent (World Bank 2016) therefore when group
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members are not physically proximate, they can remain technologically proximate,
though this does not increase technologically proximity between groups. The Shona and
Northern Ndebele have greater access to these communications technologies than do
smaller ethnic groups.
Zimbabwe’s rail and road networks are adequate. There are nearly 200 airports
(17 paved) indicating its developing past and yet few travel by air via the only carrier, the
government-owned, Air Zimbabwe, which has been in and out of business during the
2010s due to financial difficulties. Zimbabwe’s terrain and physical size do not
necessitate air transport, and thus its air transport network does little to increase
technological proximity. Oppositely, its 3,427 km rail network and extensive road
system connect much of the country. Therefore, Zimbabweans travel via “chicken bus,”
rail, and because they have the third most vehicles per capita in SSA, the wealthy travel
by private vehicle.
Social Proximity
The Shona and Northern Ndebele have an almost religious adherence to their
ethnic identities and homelands. Their shared British colonial experience did not unify
them nor produce many strong network ties even though they fought against a common
enemy in the white settler regime. When the threat of their common enemy was
removed, hostile feelings between them returned and increased—every group needs an
enemy to define itself (see Volkan 1988). In the absence of social proximity,
isomorphism has not caused their informal institutions to converge, but they have instead
developed separately and differently.
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The HIV/AIDS epidemic has ravaged and restructured Zimbabwe’s already
complex society. Multiple layers of social complexity ensure that those infected from
one ethnic group are doubly or triply isolated from those in other groups. It has resulted
in a substantial drop in average life expectancy for Zimbabweans, from 61.92 years in
1986 to a low of 40.68 years in 2002 and rebounding back up to 59.61 in 2015 (World
Bank 2015). Its national HIV/AIDS prevalence rate rose to a high of 28 percent in 1997
and has since come down to 13.5 percent in 2016 (UNAIDS 2016), which is still over 1
million infected and many more millions affected.
Not even this common, potentially network-tying, experience has produced
isomorphism between Shona and Northern Ndebele institutions. The infection rates vary
significantly between these groups; Northern Ndebele areas (Matabeleland South at 21
percent) are almost double that of Shona and other ethnic minorities (Manicaland at 10.5
percent) (Zimbabwe Health and Child Care Ministry 2016). The reality of potential
physical proximity, yet deep social separation between these groups is evident in the two
districts with the highest (27.6 percent in the Bubi District of Matabeleland North
Province) and lowest (6.6 percent in Gokwe North District of Midlands Province)
infection rates (UNAIDS 2014, 11), being separated by only two districts and a span of
170 miles. HIV/AIDS spread so rapidly throughout the Northern Ndebele because they
are highly mobile within their home region. The more mobile populations are more
vulnerable to HIV/AIDS than settled populations (International Organization for
Migration 2002, 1).
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Power Differential
Modern Zimbabwean administrative divisions are predicated mostly on precolonial Shona and Northern Ndebele territories, which the British eventually codified.
Its post-colonial unipolar power differential has been cemented for 37 years by Shona
strongman, President Mugabe and his Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front
Party (ZANU-PF). His status as the hero of the independence movement was established
through the Rhodesian Bush War victory over the white minority rule of Ian Smith’s
Rhodesian Front (RF). The eventual merger of Nkomo’s competing Zimbabwe People’s
Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) with his own Zimbabwe African National Liberation
Army (ZANLA) to form ZANU-PF during the Third Chimurenga, afforded him
legitimacy among the Shona and proper fear among the Northern Ndebele. Additionally,
his symbiotic relationship with the military elite has secured its long-term allegiance until
on November 14, 2017, when President Mugabe was removed from power through the
Zimbabwean military’s progressive coup d'état, writ, “national democratic project”
(Chiwenga 2017).
As the president’s authoritarian grip on the state has been gradually
slipping in the face of growing opposition, the military has grown more
and more involved in politics – LeBas and Mangongera (2014, 68)
Former Vice President Mnangagwa replaced Mugabe, but the Zimbabwean
military wanted to make “it abundantly clear that this is not a military takeover” (Moyo
2017). However, some outside observers claim, “If it looks like a coup, walks like a coup
and quacks like a coup, then it's a coup” (Onyango-Obbo 2017).

219

Figure 17. Zimbabwe Election Results – First Round (Parliamentary Seats) – 2008.
Source: Zimbabwe Electoral Commission 2008
Reprinted with Permission.
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Figure 18. Zimbabwe Parliamentary Seats – 2017.
Source: Zimbabwe Election Support Network (ZESN) 2017
Reprinted with Permission.

The composite effect social network composition has on the Zimbabwean GTR,
through ethnolinguistic and cultural homogeneity and religious fractionalization, low
physical, moderate technological, and low social proximity, and a unipolar power
differential, does not have the potential to widen the GTR.

Conclusion
These findings provide insight into where the GTR discourse has been, its current
state, and ideas for the direction it may go, revealing there is broad support for the
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comprehensive examination of a social cause of the GTR. While the literature is justified
in focusing first on state security and contract institutions and their well-documented
effects on the GTR and giving secondary attention to the cultural effects of
individualism-collectivism and market effects of globalization, a social focus extending
beyond fractionalization is overdue. Fractionalization suffers from collinearity; the
literature is unsure how ethnic, linguistic, and religious fractionalization affect each other
and which has the greatest effect on the GTR. Democracy presents another collinearity
concern; the literature is unsure if it causes generalized trust or vice versa. Nonetheless,
fractionalization has provided the literature a valuable base upon which to build a social
explanation for the GTR. When including findings on proximity and power differential
in addition to fractionalization, the size and quality of the literature on the social effects
on the GTR grows substantially.
The time has also come for the trust literature to focus on the GTR rather than
generalized trust level and to focus on its social causes, rather than its consequences.
Generalized trust is a discrete phenomenon from in-group trust, yet it is less conceptually
separable from institutional trust. This complexity arises because “people” legislate,
execute, enforce, and interpret institutions. This overlap makes each substitutable for the
other on a limited basis for achieving similar positive externalities. A high level of
inequality is not as much of a problem in non-fragile states because a high level of
institutional trust can substitute for low generalized trust. However, when examining
theories of trust in fragile states, it is essential to know in what context one may substitute
one for the other.
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These findings reveal that each case’s security and contract institutions are weak,
yet minimally functional, rendering the state fragile, but not collapsed or failed. Each of
their cultures is highly collectivist and economic relations tend towards export
dependence and concentration and aid rather than balanced and diversified trade. While
control cases exhibit common fractionalization, proximity, and power differential
patterns, deviant test cases exhibit different patterns.
The trust literature suggests a wide GTR is a necessary, though not sufficient
condition of a non-fragile state. Narrow GTR are possible in non-fragile states, and wide
GTR are possible in fragile states. It also finds social diversity and state fragility are not
sufficient conditions to produce an untrusting population; instead, a SSA society’s slave
trade legacy may explain its in-group and institutional trust compositions. While not all
fragile states are highly fractionalized, many are; though this does not mean they are
conflict-ridden, untrusting, and untrustworthy societies.
Chapter V follows by interpreting, comparing, analyzing, and synthesizing
within- and cross-case findings through a most similar least likely multiple comparative
deviant case analysis of the findings for each of the five selected cases, testing social
network composition’s effects on the GTR.
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CHAPTER V – COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS & SYNTHESIS
Why, sometimes I’ve believed as many as six impossible things before
breakfast.
—Lewis Carroll, Through the Looking Glass
The third and final phase of George’s (1979, 210) case study design (synthesis of
findings) is implemented here through a most similar least likely multiple comparative
deviant case analysis. The most similar, least likely, and deviant parts are accomplished
through the case selection process, where control variables affect the dependent variable
as negatively as possible, making necessary and sufficient claims very difficult to
achieve. The two control and three test cases are most similar on control variable inputs
and background factors, while they differ on the test independent variable input and
resulting dependent variable outcomes. The two control cases are typical cases, while the
three test cases are deviant outliers in that their dependent variable outcomes are
unexpected and are least likely in that their control variable inputs negatively affect the
dependent variable. The analysis is comparative in that case inputs and outcomes are
compared, and research hypotheses are tested across all cases for each control and test
variable (cross-case analysis) and variable interrelations are compared and synthesized
per case (within-case analysis).
The hypotheses for the control cases (Zambia and Zimbabwe) claim all
independent control and test variables have a GTR narrowing effect. The hypotheses for
the test cases (Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, and Nigeria) claim all independent control
variables have a GTR narrowing effect, while the independent test variable has a GTR
widening effect. Most hypothesis claims are either confirmed or affirmed. Control
variable findings suggest, as hypothesized that all test and control cases are highly
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collectivist societies governed by fragile, yet functional state security and contract
institutions and unstable inter-state market forces, having a narrowing effect on the GTR.
Test variable findings suggest, as hypothesized that the test cases have highly
fractionalized and proximate societies with large power differentials, producing a
widening effect on the GTR despite the GTR narrowing effect of the control variables.
There is predictability within complex systems of interaction. Sociological
institutionalism and social capital theory provide the theoretical framework through
which analysis of findings is conducted, where competing explanations for case outcomes
are compared and tested using hoop and smoking gun tests through within-case and
cross-case analysis of necessary and sufficient conditions in unfavorable fragile SSA
state environments. This framework explains how institutions and social networks
constrain behavior and how regional differences in fractionalization, proximity, and
power differentials shape different trust environments. Voigt’s (2013) three-step process
for examining the de jure-de facto gap of formal and informal institutional conditions
(size, embeddedness, strength, effectiveness, and duration), patterns (coercive, normative,
and memetic isomorphism and institutionalization or deinstitutionalization), and
structures (rules, norms, and scripts) is used for institutional analysis at group and
societal levels. Collective action is made possible by embedding institutions in social
networks; therefore, measuring and describing social network structures matter.
Descriptive social network measures explain how strong and pervasive network ties are
between groups by describing connectivity between groups within a society. One
category of network measurement is social cohesion, which measures “the number,
length, and strength of paths that connect actors in networks” (Galaskiewicz and
225

Wasserman 1994, 7). Greater social cohesion leads to shared views and behavior (Burt
1987, 1289). Cohesion measures: cliques, density, and structurally cohesive blocks
describe the strength of in-group trust. Tie measures: homophily, propinquity,
transitivity, and multiplexity describe the environments within and between groups that
make bridging ties more or less likely. These measures are essential to examine because
it is through weakly tied structurally equivalent nodes that networks connect through
inter-group interaction and where the GTR may widen.

Cross-Case Analysis
This section first examines how the control variables affect the GTR across all
cases; and finally the primary focus, the testing of SNC’s effects on GTR across all cases.

Control Variables
Each case’s security and contract institutions are weak, yet minimally functional,
rendering the state fragile, but not collapsed or failed, and their cultures are highly
collectivist, both producing a GTR narrowing effect. There is variation present in how
trade, investment, remittances, and aid affect the GTR that must be explained. While all
test and control cases have low investment, their trade, remittances, and aid measures
vary. Zambia has relatively high trade and low remittances, and Zimbabwe has moderate
trade, which could have a GTR widening effect, but they have not. This indicates that
these control cases have a good fit but prompts the question of how much trade,
remittances, and aid affect the GTR, at least in these cases. Of the test cases, Burkina
Faso has moderate trade, Ethiopia has only moderate remittances, and Nigeria has only
moderate non-military aid, which suggests minor weaknesses in test case selection.
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These potential GTR widening effects are examined thoroughly to ensure they do not
have a substantial GTR widening effect.
State Security Institutions
How do institutions affect the generalized trust radius in fragile states?
H2: Increasing state security and contract institutions widens the generalized trust radius
in fragile states.
State security institutions is the first control criterion for widening or narrowing
the GTR. State security institutions are minimally functional in all test and control cases,
ensuring it is not what is causing wide GTR in the test cases. This passes a smoking-gun
test and rejects the null hypothesis, confirming that security institutions have a negative
effect on the GTR as hypothesized for all cases. This also passes a hoop test, disproving
the state security institutions alternative hypothesis, which affirms the SNC hypothesis.
Both control cases also have minimally functional security institutions and a narrow GTR
as hypothesized, suggesting a good control case fit.
When highly functional, state security institutions (e.g., military and law
enforcement) provide society with an institutional trust-rich environment, where fear of
internal and external threats of violence from states, non-state actors, other groups, or
one’s group are minimized. Institutional trust removes barriers to inter-group interaction
and offers opportunities to widen the GTR. Low-security environments, oppositely,
encourage groups to close ranks to protect group interests or when very low, force or
incentivize groups to take their security interests into their own hands through vigilantism
and seeking interests outside the group through violence. A secure interest-seeking
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environment is one of the most important factors required for groups to feel safe having
their interests met by other groups.
Social conflict is increasing across SSA and in each of the five cases in particular.
There were 141 social conflict events recorded in SSA in 1990, increasing to 422 in 2010
(Salehyan 2012, 506). The increasing trend of protest and conflict is a byproduct of the
early stages of democratization (Scarritt et al. 2001, 801) resulting from increasing intergroup interaction in fragile environments characterized by low legitimacy and weak
capacity (see Herbst 2000; Obioha 2008; Van de Walle 2001). Some military and law
enforcement standard protocols have transferred from the West to these cases through
coercive, normative, and mimetic isomorphism; however, this has been insufficient to
produce secure environments. Law enforcement institutions in each case suffer from the
competing goods of selecting officers from local communities, which increases
legitimacy but also increases the likelihood of corruption and favoritism. Even in Zambia
(52.86), the most peaceful of the cases according to the World Bank’s 2016 Political
Stability and Absence of Violence and Terrorism measure, security institutions are fragile
and not widening the GTR. The small and poorly trained and educated Zambian Defence
Force has had few coup d'état attempts and has had difficulty managing conflict spillover
from Zimbabwe, Mozambique, and Congo, DRC. One would then expect it to have a
much wider GTR with such a politically stable environment, but it does not.
Even though the Burkinabé (15.24) have developed a relatively peaceful protest
culture that has served as a needed pressure valve, recent Islamic spillover has occurred
from Mali, and unstable leadership transitions have kept entrenched military leaders in
power, perpetuating security institutions that sow mistrust between society and the
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military. A desertion problem weakens the relatively small and undersupplied military;
therefore, it is not surprising that many Burkinabé consider it illegitimate and ineffective.
While it has carried out many coup d'états and supplied political leaders, Burkinabe
norms, behaviors, and scripts do not take their cues from the military. Even more fragile
security institutions persist in Ethiopia (7.62) and Nigeria (6.67) where specific regions
are perpetually violent environments indicating highly negative inter-group interaction
and narrower GTR in those areas. Civil war, secession, and food insecurity have
dominated Ethiopia since the 1970s and freedom has declined since 2006 due to land
rights conflicts, state use of force against citizens, proxy conflicts, and spillover from
Somalia. The strong Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) is saturated with Tigray
leaders, which makes the isomorphic transfer of high-quality western protocols unevenly
implemented, whereas the centrally controlled Ethiopian Federal Police (EFP) fails to
provide standard operating procedures across very different regional contexts. Local
populations view them as outsiders, and many engage in vigilantism to take care of their
own security needs. The Nigerian Armed Forces are deeply embedded in society,
affecting many other state institutions and has a far reach, providing the most troops for
the African Union (AU). It is so strong that it has developed a habit of stepping in to
relieve the citizenry of ineffective civilian leaders. Even so, Nigerian domestic security
institutions are minimally functional and struggle to manage intense ethnic, religious, and
petroleum conflict. While improving since the nationalist-induced Biafra War (19671970) that killed upwards of six million people, the large, but ill-equipped Nigerian
Police (NP) that handles law enforcement at the federal level fails to provide consistent
enforcement across diverse contexts. This encourages many communities to pursue their
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security needs through vigilantism. Because there are rarely mutually understood scripts
shared between Christian and Muslim groups, information asymmetry increases while
each seeks to meet its interests. Further, when the military has periodically overtaken the
civilian government to restore stability, it has weakened institutional trust.
Finally, one might also expect Zimbabwe (24.29) to reside near Ethiopia and
Nigeria, but because it has a unipolar power differential, the government has been able to
keep a tight rein on its population’s behavior. Its security institutions were born out of
the disjointed and violent Rhodesian Bush War for independence against an entrenched
settler regime that was also permeated with Cold War proxy conflicts, making it a source
of spillover for neighboring countries. Built on this security foundation, authoritarian
maladministration of the military produced a major depression, and Mugabe has
employed guerrilla tactics to intimidate political opponents. The powerful Zimbabwean
military has not attempted many coup d'états but has instead served as a tool of Mugabe
to build political support among his base and instigate fear among ethnic minority groups,
narrowing the GTR. Corruption and Shona favoritism are concerns in the Zimbabwe
Republic Police (ZRP). In-group trust suffers among Zimbabwean ethnic minorities
who, because of severe upheaval, have difficulty even trusting their family members and
neighbors.
State Contract Institutions
How do institutions affect the generalized trust radius in fragile states?
H2: Increasing state security and contract institutions widens the generalized trust radius
in fragile states.
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State contract institutions is the second control criterion for widening or
narrowing the GTR. State contract institutions are minimally functional in all test and
control cases, ensuring they are not causing wide GTR in the test cases. This passes a
smoking-gun test and rejects the null hypothesis, confirming that contract institutions
have a negative effect on the GTR as hypothesized for all cases. This also passes a hoop
test, disproving the state contract institutions alternative hypothesis, which affirms the
SNC hypothesis. Both control cases also have minimally functional contract institutions
and a narrow GTR as hypothesized, suggesting a good control case fit.
Formal contract institutions are initially shaped through the legislative process,
find fuller meaning through the judiciary, and are legitimized by the citizenry. When
highly functional, state contract institutions provide society with an institutional trust-rich
environment with less information asymmetry and more fairly adjudicated contracts.
Greater institutional trust often leads to increased opportunities to widen the GTR. This
context also lacks common barriers to positive inter-group interaction. By contrast, poor
contracting environments encourage adverse selection leading to moral hazard and
increased transaction costs and conflict over competing claims. Groups may choose to
take what they claim is theirs by force rather than rely on slow, unfair, and corrupt justice
institutions. With these barriers removed, groups feel greater confidence having their
interests met by other groups.
Contracting in SSA is centered on the rule of law, controlling corruption, and
land tenure policy. Similar to their security institutions, as per the World Bank’s Rule of
Law and Control of Corruption measures for 2016, all cases score below the global mean.
Also similar to security institutions, Zambia has the most functional rule of law (43.27)
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and second most effective control of corruption (42.31) of the cases reflected in its
relatively progressive, though varying regionally in its success. The Ethiopian rule of
law (37.02) and control of corruption (39.90) are not much worse. While the Burkinabé
rule of law (34.13) is on par with Ethiopia, its control of corruption (53.37) is the most
effective of the cases because of the implementation of recent structural adjustment anticorruption policies. As with security institutions, Nigeria’s rule of law (13.94) and
control of corruption (13.46) are some of the worst globally. Finally, while Zimbabwe
may not be a highly violent environment, its terrible rule of law (8.17) and control of
corruption (8.65) create an unpredictable contracting environment for agents, which
decreases institutional trust and narrows the GTR.
When it comes to land, the cases manage the principle-agent problem poorly as
they lack the specialization required to maintain a Western-style land tenure system. The
coercive isomorphic transfer of colonial contract institutions has affected the
development of land tenure regimes in four of the five cases, sans Ethiopia. Pervasive
authoritarian strongman executive leadership has stunted legislative and judicial branches
where contracts are written and adjudicated. A massive wave of land tenure policy
modernization occurred in the 1990s and 2000s prompted by a donor-led second wave of
structural adjustment. More than 20 countries accounting for more than 80 percent of
arable land in SSA (Boone 2007, 566) including Burkina Faso in 1997, Zambia in 1995
and 2006, and Zimbabwe in 1992 and 2000, sought to modernize, individualize, and
capitalize their longstanding customary land tenure regimes based on birthplace and tribal
affiliation with the purpose of increasing land registration and titling to make it more
productive and profitable. These productivity-driven policy adjustments put many
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subsistence farmers at risk of losing their land titles. These governments have had
difficulty wresting control of land rights from tribal leaders because the former often
have less legitimacy than the latter. However, if market forces prevail, the privatization
of land holdings is likely to increase as land values are driven higher by population
growth and growing land scarcity (Boserup 1965, 77).
The fragile Burkinabé state has not been able to wrest full control of its land
tenure regime from tribal leaders, making it a weakened and ineffective contract agent.
Tribal leaders still have great legitimacy, which has made it difficult for the government
to embed modern land tenure policies. Merely codifying formal land institutions has not
provided the government legitimacy when behavior and scripts remain anchored to
legitimized informal Burkinabé norms.
During the Cold War, Ethiopian contract institutions were subject to competing
Western and communist coercive isomorphic forces. Its rapid cycling of
institutionalization and deinstitutionalization between communism and privatization
produced disjointed and weakly institutionalized land tenure policy and land insecurity.
The weakness of their encoding and enforcement alike have allowed land titles to be
misused by Tigray politicians as political favors within their political networks to ensure
electoral victories. Through this means, the Tigray, an ethnic minority, has been able to
game and shape the political system and institutions to its benefit. The state has realized
that it is expensive to maintain a Western-style land titling infrastructure and has been
mostly unwilling to prioritize it.
As with all federations, Nigerian contract institutions struggle to find the balance
of power between the central state and political sub-units. It has erred on the side of
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exerting enormous influence over states through a land tenure regime. When effective,
contract institutions penalize or incentivize behavior, but the incentivization structure for
Nigerian state agents to serve principles impartially is broken. It begins with the
imperfect Constitution, which allows indigene discrimination against settlers regarding
education, employment, and property ownership, which disincentivizes migration outside
one’s ethnic home area. As well, because Nigerian’s are highly religious, indigene-settler
disputes easily become infused with religious significance.
The Zambian government was relatively well-intentioned in its attempt at making
the land market more stable and productive through a far-reaching Western model,
Zambia’s Land Act of 1995, which was updated in 2006 and embedded in the
Constitution in 2016. However, this has produced the unintended consequence of a
clandestine land market controlled by chiefdoms, which regularly deny women access to
land title and abuse most fertile lands, producing land shortages and food insecurity.
Many have lost confidence in the Zambian “rules of the game” due to continually unmet
expectations. Land tenure disparity adds to growing economic inequality and affects
means of capital exchange and effective scripts for meeting interests.
The Zimbabwean government has tried hard to avoid having its land tenure
policies affected by western coercive, normative, and mimetic isomorphism. To combat
this magnetic pull, President Mugabe needed an equal and opposite force, which required
him to forego serving as a neutral agent in land adjudications. He enacted sweeping
seizures of white farmers’ productive farmlands to give to non-farming blacks, many of
whom were his sycophants. The Land Acquisition Amendment Act of 2000 created a
vast and embedded contract institution that affects institutions as far ranging as the
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finance industry and commodity pricing and constructed new social norms and scripts.
An unintended consequence of this rapid deinstitutionalization was a black market that
emerged for not only luxury imports but also basic needs. These new landowners could
not use the land as collateral for financing due to statutes limiting its use. Most were not
skilled farmers, which caused food insecurity and eventually hyperinflation and major
economic depression. The haphazard way in which this occurred produced many
overlapping land entitlements and ensuing conflicts over claims.
Individualism
Cross the river in a crowd and the crocodile won’t eat you.
—African proverb
How does culture affect the generalized trust radius in fragile states?
H3: Increasing individualism widens the generalized trust radius in fragile states.
Individualism-Collectivism is the third control criterion for widening or
narrowing the GTR. All test and control cases have collectivist societies, ensuring it is
not what is causing wide GTR in the test cases. This passes a smoking-gun test and
rejects the null hypothesis, confirming that collectivism has a negative effect on the GTR
as hypothesized for all cases. This also passes a hoop test, disproving the individualism
alternative hypothesis, which affirms the SNC hypothesis. Both control cases have
collectivist societies and a narrow GTR as hypothesized, suggesting a good control case
fit.
Individualism and collectivism are but two of many cultural traits these cases’
populations exhibit, yet they are the ones that most affect the GTR. Pragmatically,
individualism and collectivism are strategies for controlling norms, scripts, and behaviors
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in a given space (Mitchell et al. 2000, 980). Prior to the implementation of modernizing
policies first through colonialism in most of the cases and then through structural
adjustment programs for all, collectivism served as an effective means of organizing their
groups and societies. Because their groups tend to be highly dense actual small-world
networks (see Milgram 1967), sustained transitivity is difficult to achieve between
groups. However, when a society values individualism, in-group ties and biases weaken,
which tends to reduce information asymmetry of other groups, increasing the possibility
of inter-group interaction and having interests met outside the group, which widens the
GTR.
These cases did not experience the Enlightenment in the same way Western
Europe did. Martin Luther’s 95 Theses served as the sparking event to diminish the
Catholic Church as the institutional intermediary between God and man. John Calvin
subsequently removed collective dualism from its cultural prominence, putting in its
place less restricted individual agents (Buss 2000, 13). Made possible from this de- and
re-institutionalization, were the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen
(1789) and the American Bill of Rights (1774), which have served as isomorphic
templates for so many subsequent constitutions. Mostly free of Enlightenment
institutions, children in these cases and across SSA are taught collectivist scripts that
subordinate the individual to the community, so they do not even imagine it is in the
realm of possibility that they as individuals can solve problems alone (Poovan et al. 2006,
18). They have an unknown unknown problem.
There are known knowns. These are things we know that we know. There
are known unknowns. That is to say, there are things that we know we
don't know. But there are also unknown unknowns. There are things we
236

don't know we don't know – Donald Rumsfeld (2002)
All cases are highly collectivist and exhibit a broad or moderately institutional,
vertical exclusionist collectivism. While they have high urbanization rates, they are some
of the least industrialized and least wealthy countries globally. When comparing
available data for the Hofstede (2001) individualism and House et al. (2004) collectivism
measures, Nigeria, followed by Zambia, the two cases that entered globalization earliest,
are also the least collectivist; this is not to say they are individualist societies as they are
still quite collectivist. Ethiopia, Burkina Faso, and Zimbabwe, the three cases with
stronger socialist histories, remain more collectivist.
Burkinabé society, most being poor and rural, revolves around the dominant
Mossi culture, which has a strong preference for the values of honor, loyalty, solidarity,
compassion, and Familism. Universalists require trustworthy institutions; these are not
present in fragile states. Thus Burkina Faso and the other cases are institutional
exclusionist collectivists that weigh and preference personal relationships when making
behavioral choices.
Ethiopia appears only moderately poor when consulting standard economic
measures, but most of its population is very poor. It is also one of the most rural
populations with most living in small villages. Some of its ethnic groups are more
collectivist than others are. Of its two largest ethnic groups, the Amhara are more
hierarchically individualist and the Oromo more egalitarian collectivist. The Tigray has
played off these cultural differences to shape political institutions to its benefit. Ethiopia
is often measured pre-derg and post-derg. Pre-derg Ethiopian society was shaped by
competing horizontal (equality and nationalism) and vertical (self-reliance and
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centralized economy) collectivism. The derg oddly strengthened vertical collectivism by
isolating society from western influences; providing a common cause, fate, and identity;
and severely restricting resources. The derg’s scientific socialism continues to influence
modern ethnic and class structures.
Nigeria is one of the more industrialized countries in SSA and is wealthy, but
most of its people are not. While most of the population is highly collectivist, there are
pockets of individualism that are increasing. Nigeria exhibits extreme diversity from
group to group along the individualism-collectivism continuum. Christians and Muslims
tend to remain loyal to their members regardless of merit. There is widespread
miscommunication between hierarchical Nigerian Hausa, representational Yoruba, and
equity-oriented egalitarian and participatory individualist Igbo. Urban populations are
less collectivist than rural ones. As urbanization increases, ethnic groups move gradually
from collectivism towards individualism and tend to feel less solidarity within their group
and greater solidarity with multiple other groups. However, while Nigeria is rapidly
urbanizing, nearly half its people remain rural.
Zambia’s moderately poor, non-industrialized, rural-majority population remains
centered on collectivist ethnic identity; as much of society claims some variation of
Christian identity, there is less need for religious positioning between groups. There is
growing tension between the state’s individualism-driven policies and entrenched highly
collectivist ethnic and religious leaders. Zambia’s extremely high inequality stems from
a combination of its higher vertical, rather than horizontal collectivism and increasingly
capitalistic policies. The privilege of shaping culture and institutions is reserved for the
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elite in this highly collectivist and unequal context. While Burkina Faso, Nigeria, and
Zimbabwe are moderately vertical, Zambia is exceptionally so and Ethiopia, mildly so.
Zimbabwe, the once relatively prosperous breadbasket of Southern Africa, is now
mired in maladministration-induced poverty. Zimbabweans value ascribed family roles,
status, and Familism, which make their rigid social hierarchies change slowly. The
highly collectivist Zimbabwean environment encourages the perpetuation of flawed
scripts about the “Other” between Shona and Northern Ndebele, which tend to remain
loyal to their members regardless of merit.
Inter-State Market Forces
It can be plausibly argued that much of the economic backwardness in the
world can be explained by the lack of mutual confidence.
—Kenneth J. Arrow, Gifts and Exchanges
How do inter-state market forces affect the generalized trust radius in fragile states?
H4a: Increasing trade, FDI, and FPI widen the generalized trust radius in fragile states.
H4b: Decreasing remittances, non-military aid, and military aid widen the generalized
trust radius in fragile states.
Inter-state market forces is the fourth and final control criterion for widening or
narrowing the GTR. While state security and contract institutions and individualism are
long-standing and well-supported hypotheses in the trust literature, inter-state market
forces is multifaceted and, therefore, more complicated. Trade, investment (FDI and
FPI), remittances, and aid (military and non-military) compose the majority of financial
and physical capital that flows between countries; varying combinations of these inputs
affect the GTR differently. A state’s economic model (command, mixed, or market)
affects how it integrates into the global market and how readily coercive and normative
isomorphic influences affect the trajectory of its economic institutions. While most
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developed economies are market/mixed hybrids, four of the five cases, excluding Nigeria,
have experienced extensive vacillations in economic policy between command
(Marxist/socialist) and market (neo-liberal structural adjustment) and all cases have
lingering, strongly embedded and pervasive traditional economies that they have found
challenging to reduce. The below tables sort the hypotheses, results, and level of support
for each facet of this control variable. The low investment hypothesis is the strongest in
all test and control cases, followed by high aid, low trade, and finally high remittances.
Table 47
Inter-State Market Forces: Trade
Country
Burkina Faso
Ethiopia
Nigeria
Zambia
Zimbabwe

Test Cases

Control
Cases

Hypothesis
Low
Low
Low

Result
Moderate
Low
Low

Support
Strong
Strong
Strong

Low
Low

High
Moderate

Weak
Moderate

The majority of the trust literature agrees that low trade produces narrow GTR
and high trade produces wide GTR; however, not all types of trade have an equal or even
positive effect. Increasing trade increases economic growth, but growth is not a
sufficient proxy measure for the GTR. Trade diversification provides greater
macroeconomic stability, a more competitive market environment forces greater
efficiency, and low labor costs increase competitiveness. However, there are some
potential negative externalities. All types of trust may diminish in the short-term when
an economy opens itself to the global market before rebounding in the long-term after a
critical mass of its population feels the benefits of trade and growth. Increasing trade
increases exposure to external shocks and in the short-term, structural adjustments in
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uncompetitive sectors hurt the poor the most. While absolute poverty is decreasing in
these cases, relative wealth is not catching up so quickly to rising global averages.
Two of the three test cases (Ethiopia and Nigeria) have low trade, ensuring it is
not what is causing wide GTR in those cases. The remaining test case (Burkina Faso) has
moderate trade; however, due to subsequent detailed analysis, it is also clear that trade is
not what is causing its wide GTR. The majority of Burkinabé are poor. Burkina Faso
lacks quality economic institutions, which affects how increasing trade translates into
increasing growth and the positive externalities associated with it (see Rodriguez and
Rodrik 2000). For its increasing economic growth to benefit the poor and widen the
GTR, low tariffs, infrastructure, and access to technology and finance are required
(World Bank and the World Trade Organization 2015, 7), all things Burkina Faso still
lacks. Therefore, a smoking-gun test is passed and the null hypothesis rejected,
confirming that low trade has a negative effect on the GTR as hypothesized for all test
cases. This also passes a hoop test, disproving the trade alternative hypothesis, which
affirms the SNC hypothesis.
Zimbabwe’s moderate and Zambia’s high trade and a narrow GTR means trade is
present but is not having a GTR widening effect. This indicates either that there is a
control case misfit or that not all forms of trade are equal in their ability to widen the
GTR, requiring further analysis. The latter is more plausible because high trade as
percent of GDP does not indicate how well a country fares in the trade relationship, only
that it is deeply connected to the global market. Zambia (84 percent), Burkina Faso (63
percent), and Zimbabwe (60 percent) get more than half their GDP from trade, while
Ethiopia (36 percent) and Nigeria (21 percent) much less. For Zimbabwe, this measure
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does not indicate how broadly connected it is to the global market because it is heavily
dependent on only two countries, South Africa to purchase the majority of its gold and
tobacco and secondarily, China its iron ore in exchange for petroleum. The World
Bank’s Net Barter Terms of Trade Index (2015) suggests none of the cases is being taken
advantage of in the global market as they have positive terms of trade between 113.50
and 165.10; whereas another SSA country, the global low, Sierra Leone, is much lower
(44.09). However, all cases have a negative Current Account Balance between -3.28 and
-9.46, whereas another SSA country, the global low, Liberia, is much lower (-42.26).
Zimbabwe (5.0) and Zambia (4.0) have low tariffs, which provide a stronger trade
environment than the test cases of Burkina Faso (7.4), Nigeria (11.3), and Ethiopia
(12.4), yet they have narrow GTRs. Zambia’s economic growth rate has been high and
relatively stable, along with Burkina Faso and Ethiopia’s, while Zimbabwe’s has been
erratic and Nigeria’s negative. Uneven growth may have more detrimental effects on a
society’s generalized trust than negative growth that is spread relatively evenly
throughout society. Therefore, these control cases have a weak to moderate case fit. It is
more likely that the type of trade present in Zambia and Zimbabwe serve to narrow rather
than widen the GTR, rejecting alternative hypotheses claiming all types of trade have the
same effect on the GTR. Also weakened are neo-colonial (e.g., dependency and to a
lesser degree, world-systems theory), claims that high trade produces greater negative
(e.g., inequality, poverty, and uneven development) than positive externalities.
Increasing trade and resulting economic growth does not increase inequality (Dollar and
Kraay 2004, 47). Trade is but one facet of inter-state market forces. When other interstate market forces have a GTR narrowing effect as they do in most of these cases,
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increasing trade alone may not be sufficient to produce positive externalities (e.g., reduce
poverty or widen the GTR). Therefore, both control cases support the trade hypothesis
through a straw-in-the-wind test. This does not affect the strength of the test case
hypotheses, only their control case fit.
Table 48
Inter-State Market Forces: Investment
Country
Burkina Faso
Ethiopia
Nigeria
Zambia
Zimbabwe

Test Cases

Control
Cases

Hypothesis
Low
Low
Low

Result
Low
Low
Low

Support
Strong
Strong
Strong

Low
Low

Low
Low

Strong
Strong

The majority of the trust literature agrees that low investment (FDI and FPI)
produces narrow GTR and high investment produces wide GTR. Increasing investment
increases economic growth. All test and control cases have low investment, ensuring it is
not what is causing wide GTR in the test cases. The World Bank’s Foreign Direct
Investment (2015) and Portfolio Equity (2015) scores reveal that none of these cases is a
corporate or personal investment destination. All cases have single digit FDI and little
FPI. Having a large Portfolio Equity deficit is not detrimental to Nigeria. It means that
Nigerians have financial capital to play in the global market, but the rest of the world is
not betting on Nigeria. Neither are corporations betting on Nigeria because it is not a
low-corruption investment-friendly environment. This passes a smoking-gun test and
rejects the null hypothesis, confirming that low investment has a negative effect on the
GTR as hypothesized for all cases. This also passes a hoop test, disproving the
investment alternative hypothesis, which affirms the SNC hypothesis. Both control cases
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have low investment and a narrow GTR as hypothesized, suggesting a good control case
fit.
Table 49
Inter-State Market Forces: Remittances
Country
Burkina Faso
Ethiopia
Nigeria
Zambia
Zimbabwe

Test Cases

Control
Cases

Hypothesis
High
High
High

Result
Low
Low
High

Support
Weak
Weak
Strong

High
High

Low
High

Weak
Strong

Much of the trust literature agrees that high remittances produce a narrow GTR
and low remittances produce a wide GTR in fragile states. Increasing remittances does
not increase economic growth in fragile states; only in environments where trade and
investment are not available and basic needs go unmet regularly (collapsed and failed
states), may remittances have temporary economic growth and GTR widening effect.
Some in the trust literature and many development practitioners claim remittances are
holistically good for society (International Monetary Fund 2005, 6). However, the longterm costs of remittances far exceed the benefits. While a country’s balance of payments
may enlarge, and the receiving community may consume more (Cattaneo 2005, 2) and
enhance their job prospects (Woodruff and Zenteno, 2001, 6), remittances increase
inequality for the rural segment of the population (see Capistrano and Santa Maria, 2007,
9) and “create incentives that lead to moral hazard problems…they have negative effects
on economic growth” (Chami et al. (2003, 21). Narrowly allocated, large remittance
infusions to particular communities or groups have the potential to increase inequality,
disrupt the labor market, and weaken the economy. The IMF’s 2005 Financial Action
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Task Force on money laundering (FATF) recommendations for regulating remittance
transfer services may restrict illicit transfers, but do little to correct these problems.
One test case (Nigeria) has high remittances, ensuring it is not what is causing a
wide GTR. This passes a smoking-gun test and rejects the null hypothesis, confirming
that high remittances have a negative effect on the GTR as hypothesized for Nigeria.
This also passes a hoop test, disproving the alternative remittances hypothesis, which
affirms the SNC hypothesis. The other two test cases (Burkina Faso and Ethiopia) have
low remittances; however, when analyzing in detail, this does not appear to have a
substantial positive effect on their GTR. These cases fail to pass a smoking-gun test in
neither case having high remittances; this weakens the hypotheses but does not disprove
it. One control case (Zimbabwe) has very high remittances and a narrow GTR as
hypothesized, suggesting a good control case fit. The other control case (Zambia) has
very low remittances and a narrow GTR, suggesting a control case misfit. However, this
does not affect the test case hypothesis. Instead, it indicates that of the inter-state market
forces, high remittances is often, but not always, a necessary condition for a narrow GTR.
The intention of receiving communities and their diaspora may be to invest their
community’s human capital in stronger markets to live off the dividends produced
(Chami et al. 2003, 22). This may produce positive externalities for the receiving
community but often produces negative externalities for other groups. This does not
indicate that all receiving communities are inherently lazy as Schapiro et al. (2013, 57)
explore, but the institutions that form around communities receiving large remittance
allocations tend to create a script of entitlement and inter-group inequality. Therefore,
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there is variation in remittance effectiveness, but most often, it has a narrowing effect on
the GTR.
A community’s dependence on its diaspora’s remittances is not an indicator of a
stable home economy. A country like Liberia (30.6 percent of GDP) is highly dependent
on remittances and has an inactive economy. The World Bank’s Personal Remittances
Received (2016) indicator shows Zimbabwe (12.7 percent of GDP) to be the only of the
cases with substantial per capita remittances. While Nigeria has nine times more absolute
remittance inflows than Zimbabwe, it is only 4.7 percent of its GDP—still high globally.
For each of the other three cases, remittances make up a relatively small percentage of
GDP, particularly Zambia (0.2 percent of GDP), yet this is an indicator that their
populations have less ability to migrate to developed economies to produce human capital
dividends for their home country communities than populations in other regions.
Table 50
Inter-State Market Forces: Aid
Country
Burkina Faso
Ethiopia
Nigeria
Zambia
Zimbabwe

Test Cases

Control
Cases

Hypothesis
High
High
High

Result
High
High
Moderate

Support
Strong
Strong
Moderate

High
High

High
High

Strong
Strong

Of the seeming and real innovations which the modern age has introduced
into the practice of foreign policy, none has proven more baffling to both
understanding and action than foreign aid – Morgenthau (1962, 301)
There is variation in aid effectiveness, but most often, it has a narrowing effect on
the GTR. Much of the trust literature agrees that high aid (military and non-military)
produces narrow GTR and low aid produces wide GTR in fragile states. Increasing aid
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does not increase economic growth in fragile states; only in environments where trade
and investment are not available and basic needs go unmet regularly (collapsed and failed
states), may aid have a temporary positive economic and trust effect. This is not to
discount the postive effects of aid as there have been major advancements in the
eradication of diseases. This does not excuse the fact that most often, massive aid
infusions increase currency fluctuations, encourage corruption without sufficient
accountability and transparency, and are often mismanaged. So much of the 100 billion
dollars allocated annually in aid is untraceable (Easterly and Pfutze 2008, 23). The aid
industry too easily makes the causal leap from capital and technology to peaceful regimes
without fully considering the many potential causal paths of economic development,
social stability, and democratic institutions intervening variables (Morgenthau 1962, 3045). It is unlikely that a program constructed for Dire Dawa, Ethiopia will be effective in
Choma, Zambia because of these many potential differences. Aid data quality and
availability are sub-par because there are too many donors and practitioners seeking
short-term returns on their time, energy, and capital investments in fragile state markets
that are unlikely to provide anything but long-term dividends.
Two of the three test cases (Burkina Faso and Ethiopia) have high aid and wide
GTR as hypothesized; ensuring aid is not what is causing a wide GTR in those cases.
The remaining test case (Nigeria) has only moderate aid; however, due to subsequent
detailed analysis, it is also ensured that its lower aid is not what is causing a wider GTR.
While Nigeria’s aid as a percentage of its GDP is smaller than the other cases, the
absolute amount of aid it receives is quite large. Therefore, a smoking-gun test is passed
for all test cases, rejecting the null hypothesis and confirming that high-moderate aid has
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a negative effect on the GTR as hypothesized for all test cases. All test cases also pass a
hoop test, disproving the high aid alternative hypothesis, which affirms the SNC
hypothesis. All control cases have high aid and a narrow GTR, meaning aid’s presence is
not having a GTR widening effect. This indicates a good control case fit.
There is a minority voice in the trust literature and among practitioners in the
development industry claiming aid widens the GTR in fragile states (see D’Onofrio and
Maggio 2015). While strong claims may be made for increasing inequality narrowing the
GTR (see Uslaner and Brown 2005), there is less evidence that increasing aid decreases
inequality, not that it is impossible. In cases where aid is effective in reducing economic
inequality, it could widen the GTR (D’Onofrio and Maggio 2015, 25). However, donors
are attracted to “invest” in low-income countries that demonstrate relatively wide GTR
where there is a higher likelihood of a return on investment; therefore, they self-select
trusting populations. It is unlikely that aid has much of a GTR widening effect on a
society that is already relatively trusting. Therefore, reverse causality is a problem when
claiming increasing aid widens the GTR. This alternative hypothesis may be rejected.
Israel is the majority recipient of US military aid as measured by the USAID 10Year Average Disbursement (2006-2015). Ethiopia and Nigeria, being strategic states,
have received the most of the cases, while Zambia and Burkina Faso, relatively nonstrategic states, have received little, and Zimbabwe, being under EU and US sanctions,
has received none recently. Aid and its effects are complicated to measure; measuring
absolute versus per capita makes a substantial difference in these cases. Nigeria is more
than 11 times the size of Zimbabwe’s population, and all of the other cases populations
together are less than Nigeria alone. While Nigeria, as measured by the OECD (2014)
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Net ODA 10-Year Average Disbursement (2005-2014), has received an extensive
absolute amount of aid, when measuring per capita and as a percentage of its economy
(0.5 percent of GNI), it is quite small. The other four cases, exhibit a history of aid
dependence with it composing between 4.6 and 11 percent of GNI).
Burkina Faso came to embrace neo-liberal structural adjustment later than most
SSA countries. This is because, on the supply side, it has never been high on the west’s
priority list as it is not highly geo-politically strategic. On the demand side, the
Burkinabé have an anti-imperialist Marxist isolationist history that has resisted all types
of isomorphic reach of the global market. The politically motivated Mossi, benefiting
from their isolationist status quo, had an interest in not globalizing too rapidly. During
President Sankara’s administration, he resisted capitalist influences longer than many
other countries. However, this anti-globalization script must not have been embedded too
deeply in Burkinabé society, because it only took the assassination of President Sankara
to rewrite it. With the President Sankara-Compaoré leadership transition, Burkina Faso
rapidly deregulated and privatized its economy, becoming a structural adjustment model
reformer, which produced more FDI and social conflict. The Burkinabé are only now
beginning to embrace globalization norms, behaviors, and scripts because of reaping the
positive effects that a mixed economy and increased trade and investment have begun to
bring.
Ethiopia is among the top 10 percent of least-developed countries, in part, because
its government economic institutions make investing and obtaining land and financing
laborious and risky. Many potential investors have concluded that the risk-reward
proposition is not worth it. Its economic institutions produce insufficient incentives to
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trigger and embed neo-liberal behavior and norm changes. It retains some institutional
remnants of a command economy from its communist derg legacy when it was caught in
an ideological tug-of-war between the former Soviet Union and the west. It has resisted
deinstitutionalizing and structurally adjusting its economy but has been glad to accept
aid, which has produced a deeply embedded culture of aid dependence. Excessive food
aid disincentivizes domestic food production among the Oromo and Somali regions.
Thus, the Ethiopian state is held together by non-military aid and remittances, which
subsidize nearly 50 percent of the federal budget.
Nigeria has a different economic development pattern than the other four cases as
fluctuating petroleum revenues compose a large part of its economy, which along with
large remittances and some aid has produced economic shocks and uneven development.
It is an insecure place to do business, yet that does not dissuade many western petroleum
investors. The West considers Nigeria one of the most geo-politically important states in
SSA for its petroleum, its massive population, and its global reach. The Nigerian
economy is 21st largest globally and largest in SSA when measured by GDP, PPP, and
3.5 times larger than all the other four cases’ economies combined. However, because it
is also a highly populated country, its per capita economy (GDP, per capita PPP) is only a
little over half the size of the other four economies combined—still, a large economy that
faces different constraints and opportunities than the other cases. Economic institutions
governing natural resources are deeply embedded but not very agile, making it difficult
for other sectors to adjust when the global oil market shifts. The federal government’s
dependence on petroleum revenue has bred state- and LGA-level dependence, which has
isomorphically transferred flawed economic institutions throughout Nigeria, providing
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little incentive for productivity in other sectors. As state and LGA governments rely on
federal petroleum revenues to meet basic needs, norms, behaviors, and scripts are being
rewritten.
Zambia was one of the earliest and most successful SSA post-colonial states to
pursue democratic governance and a mixed market economy. It has the highest Polity IV
democratic ranking (Marshall et al. 2016) and human development index (HDI) score
(hdr.undp.org 2015) of the cases. However, democratization and high trade as a
percentage of GDP have not produced the norms and behaviors that lead to a wide GTR.
Due to a paucity of bureaucratic expertise, the Zambian state has found itself in a
borderline mercantilist relationship with China, depending on its copper exports to fund
the government. This has weakened its other sectors of the economy. Paired with high
inequality, an ineffective social safety net, fragile security and contract institutions, and a
collectivist society, this has produced a narrow GTR.
Zimbabwe is not necessarily geo-politically significant, but it initially garnered
the global community’s attention due to its conflict spillover into neighboring states and
subsequently due to its self-destructive pattern. Former President Mugabe was—is—a
Zimbabwean institution. Over 37 years he shaped its formal institutions, which have
affected Shona and countrywide norms, which will make them difficult to change. Even
in his absence, the Mugabe political network remains mostly intact embedded in the
ZANU-PF party. Mugabe institutions have not only produced many unintended
economic consequences but have produced an institutional and generalized trust poor
environment. As Mugabe did not take queues from the west; therefore, Zimbabwean
institutions have been largely shielded from those coercive and normative isomorphic
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pressures, producing unique, though not particularly effective institutions. It has tried to
insulate itself from the global market through isolationism and a command economy,
which has made it less prosperous. Zimbabwe’s Land Acquisition Amendment Act of
2000 damaged the economy. Trade, investment, and aid all decreased sharply and
remittances, food insecurity, hyperinflation and sanctions increased. China has been one
of Zimbabwe’s only trade and investment partners through these tough times as Mugabe
drove its economy into the ground. Zimbabwe’s Indigenization Law (2016) amended in
2017, has threatened even that relationship, requiring large foreign-owned natural
resource companies to sell majority ownership to the government or indigenous
Zimbabweans.
Disrupted economies and uneven development can hurt institutional and
generalized trust. Economic shocks, even by wide trade swings, may increase volatility;
the smaller the economy or sector, the more shocking (Giovanni and Levchenko 2009,
562; Easterly and Kraay 2000). Volatility triggered by years of violent conflict and
socialist leanings has encouraged the small economies of Ethiopia and Zimbabwe to
insulate their economies against external shocks by growing or retaining large public
sectors (see Ebeke 2011, 89; Rodrik 1998, 1011). Public sector employment statistics are
notoriously inaccurate for SSA (Hoffmann 2003, 1); particularly for Burkina Faso that
does not report them plainly anywhere and Nigeria that reports an obviously
underreported 1.6 percent (Nigerian National Bureau of Statistics 2010). Ethiopia (29.5
percent) and Zimbabwe (20.9 percent) have the most extensive public sectors of the
cases, and Zambia (9.7 percent) possibly the smallest, having more so liberalized its
economy (International Labour Organization 2017). Nigeria, once rid of military
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regimes, has grown its economy steadily. Ethiopia and Burkina Faso the smallest of the
economies when measuring GDP, per capita PPP, have had modest growth since
instituting select market reforms, doubling their economies over the last quarter century,
while Zimbabwe, avoiding most reforms has lost half its economy. The bloated
Ethiopian and Zimbabwean bureaucracies paired with their weak economies is a repellant
to GTR widening forces of trade and investment and a magnet for the GTR narrowing
forces of remittances and aid, as these cases demonstrate. Therefore, many economic
model changes can be made in each of these cases, particularly Ethiopia and Zimbabwe,
to make inter-state market forces a more positive force on the GTR.

Social Network Composition
For we are by nature social, before we are political or economic, beings.
—Michael Walzer, The Civil Society Argument
How does social network composition affect the generalized trust radius in fragile states?
H1: Increasing fractionalization, proximity, and power differential widen the generalized
trust radius in fragile states.
The most fractionalized, proximate, and power differentiated societies have the
most potential generalized trust. However, this potential often goes unrealized in fragile
SSA states and has gone mostly unrealized in these control cases. Most fragile SSA
states are highly ethnically, linguistically, and religiously fractionalized (Alesina et al.
2003, 183), to the point that many have no ethnic, linguistic, or religious majority
(multipolar) (Fearon 2003, 207). Colonial divisions increased African states’ already
high ethnic fragmentation of tribal divisions (Scarritt 2008). The trust literature has
relied too heavily on fractionalization to explain social effects on the GTR, ignoring
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alternative social explanations. The fractionalization measure alone is limited in its
ability to capture highly fragmented, bipolar, multipolar and balanced, dominant
majority, or dominant minority (Reilly 2000, 163) social network compositions. As well,
temporal variability of ethnic, linguistic, and religious identity produces potential
collinearity and endogeneity of fractionalization indices.
Advancement of the trust literature requires explaining how incentivization and
coercion increase inter-group interaction to widen the GTR. This explanation requires
the addition of measuring groups’ physical, technological, and social proximity and
power differential. Fractionalization and proximity increase inter-group interaction,
while power differential and incentivization structure determine if it is positive or
negative. The test variable, Social Network Composition, is an improved and wellrounded social variable adding physical, technological, and social proximity, and power
differential to fractionalization, which broadens the social effect being measured,
reducing omitted variable bias of fractionalization alone. This section answers the social
research question by interpreting, comparing, and analyzing each component’s
configurational effect on the GTR across the five cases, demonstrating what set of
conditions is required to produce the hypothesized outcome. Analysis either confirms,
affirms, weakens, or rejects the hypothesis through straw-in-the-wind, hoop, smoking
gun, or doubly decisive tests of necessity and sufficiency. This analysis is limited to the
five SSA fragile state cases, with an emphasis on the test cases. Generalizations are
made to theoretical types of cases rather than specific empirical cases.
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Fractionalization
The more fractionalized a fragile state, the more likely strangers are to interact
and therefore, the more potential GTR variability exists, whether negative or positive.
The level and combination of types of fractionalization have only a small effect on
whether the outcome is negative or positive, instead, that is more a function of the
combination of a society’s power differential and whether interaction is incentivized or
coerced. The fractionalization hypothesis is strongly supported overall when considering
each of the ethnic, linguistic, and religious fractionalization indicators.
Table 51
Social Network Composition: Fractionalization
Country
Burkina
Faso
Ethiopia
Nigeria

Test
Cases

Zambia
Zimbabwe

Control
Cases

Hyp
High

Ethnic
Result
Support
High
Strong

Hyp
High

Linguistic
Result
Support
High
Strong

Hyp
High

Religious
Result
Support
High
Strong

High
High

High
High

Strong
Strong

High
High

High
High

Strong
Strong

High
High

High
High

Strong
Strong

Low
Low

High
Low

Reject
Strong

Low
Low

High
Low

Reject
Strong

Low
Low

Mod
Mod

Weak
Weak

Ethnic Fractionalization
Ethnic fractionalization is the first test criterion for increasing inter-group
interaction and widening or narrowing the GTR. All test cases are highly ethnically
fractionalized according to Alesina et al. (2003); each case is in the top 32nd most
ethnically fractionalized countries globally (Nigeria 9th; Burkina Faso 28th; and Ethiopia
32nd) and has a wide GTR as hypothesized. Ethnic fractionalization does not determine
whether the interaction is negative or positive. Therefore, a smoking-gun test is passed
for all test cases, rejecting the null hypothesis and confirming that ethnic fractionalization
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has a positive effect on the GTR as hypothesized for all test cases. All test cases also
pass a hoop test, disproving the homogenization alternative hypothesis, which affirms the
SNC hypothesis. One control case (Zimbabwe) has low ethnic fractionalization and a
narrow GTR as hypothesized, while the other one (Zambia) has high ethnic
fractionalization (21st) (Alesina et al. 2003) and a narrow GTR. This does not affect the
test case hypothesis, but instead suggests an imperfect, yet expected, control case fit.
There is no doubt in the fractionalization literature that Nigeria is one of the most
holistically fractionalized countries globally. There are many ways to describe Nigeria,
but regarding ethnic fractionalization, dividing the country into three types of regions is
instructive. The first type is rural Muslim regions. The northeastern and northwestern
corners of the country characterize this type, where its large and insular Muslim-majority
Hausa, Fulani, and Kanuri ethnic groups have high homophily, propinquity, transitivity,
and reciprocity. These areas are not highly fractionalized, but are more homogenous;
since these are highly rural regions, they compose only a small percentage of the total
population. The second type is home areas of Nigeria’s hundreds of small ethnic
minority groups, most being concentrated in the Middle Belt region. Besides rising
urbanization and ethnic groups converging on each other, another primary driver of high
ethnic fractionalization is the government’s bifurcation of ethnic home areas to reduce the
cohesion and tie strength of politically engaged ethnic networks. The state purposed to
promote state-based identities over ethnic but has had limited success. State-based
identities have not formed; instead politicized ethnoreligious identities have formed.
Paired with indigene-settler policies that incentivize protecting one’s ethnic home area,
these policies have increased inter-group interaction in already highly fractionalized
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regions, producing intense social conflict, which has overshadowed the GTR widening
occurring in the third type of region. The third type, and making up the largest
population, is highly dense and ethnically diverse southern urban centers such as Lagos,
Ibadan, Ogbomosho, Benin City, Warri, Aba, and Port Harcourt, where urban life
requires inter-group interaction, toleration, and compromise, which widens the GTR.
From an etic perspective, the high levels of inter-group interaction in these urban centers
may appear conflictual, but urban Nigerians view this chaos positively.
The Mossi have long represented the geographic, cultural, economic, and political
heart of Burkinabé society and institutions and therefore, exert a centripetal force on the
many much smaller surrounding ethnic groups, drawing them into its network orbit. This
serves to increase inter-group interaction and multiplexity and transitivity of network ties
between groups. Because the Mossi have not been a heavily coercive force, increased
inter-group interaction has resulted in a wider GTR.
Ethiopia’s ethnic-based federal system, a response to its high ethnic
fractionalization, has produced some unintended consequences. In some ways, this
system is the antithesis of Nigerian federalism, yet it has produced some of the same
results. This system is not built to cannibalize ethnic groups as Nigeria’s does, but
instead provide greater regional autonomy and opportunities for coalition building for
smaller, less powerful ethnic groups that rarely have a voice in parliament. What has
become institutionalized instead is a four-way ethnopolitical tug-of-war between the
Amhara, Oromo, Southern Nations, and Tigray, leading to an unusual and fragile alliance
between them that has strengthened their ties and increased institutional gridlock, leaving
smaller ethnic groups regionally isolated without the means or venue for expressing their
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political interests to obtain a piece of the federal pie. The Tigray ethnic minority’s highly
active and unusual political role has generated much political agitation among Ethiopia’s
many smaller ethnic groups, but it has not turned into violent conflict. Atomization of
political interest seeking based on ethnic, regional, and national interests has developed
rather than a coalition-building atmosphere, which has made inter-group interaction
uneven and less predictable. The result is relatively positive, yet fragile high inter-group
interaction based on a variety of ethnopolitical interests.
It is evident that Zambia has high ethnic fractionalization, given the existence of
73 ethnic groups in a country a little larger than the state of Texas. It is difficult to find
an SSA country with low ethnic fractionalization, thus compromises on control case
selection are necessary. The Bemba and Tonga do not possess the cultural magnetism of
the Mossi of Burkina Faso; however, the pull of the promise of wealth and the push of
rural poverty have drawn Zambia’s 71 smaller ethnic groups into the Bemba’s Copperbelt
Province and subsequently to the Tonga’s Lusaka Province and consequently to a small
degree, into their social networks. However, the extremely high economic inequality that
has resulted from development policies has served to decrease in-group trust, but not
increase generalized trust, producing a narrow GTR.
Zimbabwe is not ethnically fractionalized, ranking 109th of 190 countries with the
dominant Shona far outnumbering the next largest Northern Ndebele and twelve much
smaller ethnic minorities, each making up less than 1 percent of the population. The
Shona social network dominates Zimbabwean economic and political institutions and has
a repellant centrifugal effect on surrounding ethnic groups, resulting in weak inter-ethnic
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network ties and strongly rooted regional ethnic identities. In this environment, the GTR
is much more likely to narrow or remain stable than to widen.
Linguistic Fractionalization
Ethnicities and languages often share the same boundaries, but not always.
Linguistic fractionalization is the second test criterion for increasing inter-group
interaction and widening or narrowing the GTR. Linguistic fractionalization may serve
as a barrier to inter-group interaction in the absence of an institutionalized unifying trade
language through which groups may easily communicate while retaining their linguistic
distinctiveness. Therefore, the presence of a trade language weakens this variable’s claim
on affecting the GTR. All test cases are highly linguistically fractionalized according to
Alesina et al. (2003); each being in the top 32nd most linguistically fractionalized
countries globally (Nigeria 11th; Ethiopia 18th; and Burkina Faso 32nd) and have a wide
GTR as hypothesized. Groups are more likely to interact if there is a common trade
language tying their networks together, but as a result become less linguistically diverse.
As with ethnic fractionalization, linguistic fractionalization does not determine whether
the interaction is negative or positive. Therefore, a smoking-gun test is passed for all test
cases, rejecting the null hypothesis and confirming that linguistic fractionalization has a
positive effect on the GTR as hypothesized for all test cases, yet its effect is weaker than
ethnic and fractionalization. All test cases also pass a hoop test, disproving the
homogenization alternative hypothesis, which affirms the SNC hypothesis. While
Burkina Faso confirms the hypothesis more strongly, its lack of a widespread trade
language is an interesting issue that may have adverse repercussions for future positive
inter-group interaction. One control case (Zimbabwe) has low linguistic fractionalization
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and a narrow GTR as hypothesized, while the other one (Zambia) has high linguistic
fractionalization (7th) (Alesina et al. 2003) and a narrow GTR. This does not affect the
test case hypothesis, but instead suggests an imperfect, yet expected, control case fit.
The mimetic isomorphic transfer and resulting institutionalization of the English
language in Ethiopian and Nigerian urban centers and educational institutions bridges
their high linguistic fractionalization, increasing network transitivity between those social
networks, but less so in rural areas. English produces greater inter-group interaction in
Nigeria than Ethiopia because its population is more highly urbanized and educated.
Having a common language for market exchanges eases tensions between groups that
have myriad other differences; therefore, a common trade language serves to widen the
GTR in these cases. While the Mossi draws smaller ethnolinguistic groups into its orbit
and social networks, communication is more challenging because Burkina Faso lacks a
widespread unifying and institutionalized trade language to tie its many ethnic and
ethnolinguistic groups’ networks together. The Mossi compose half the population and
speak Mòoré, but the smaller ethnic groups do not. Moreover, while French may be the
official language, its normative isomorphic colonial transfer adhered weakly to society
and is only spoken regularly by 15 percent of the population (Kone 2010, 9). While
increased positive inter-group interaction occurs because of increased multiplexity and
transitivity of network ties between groups, the quality of communication without a
common trade language may be questionable.
While Zambia has 73 ethnic groups, it has about half that number of linguistic
groups. Bemba is such a dominant language that nearly half the population speaks it
while the Bemba ethnic group only comprises 21 percent of the population. While
260

English is not the first language of many, it serves as a bridge between linguistic group
networks. Zimbabwe, the one exception again, ranks at 85 of 102 countries for linguistic
fractionalization with the dominant Shona far outnumbering all other ethnolinguistic
groups. While having little linguistic fractionalization has the potential to increase
communication quality within the Shona ethnolinguistic group, it also means there is less
generalized trust potential between groups. In this environment, the GTR is much more
likely to narrow or remain stable than to widen.
Religious Fractionalization
Religious fractionalization is the third test criterion for increasing inter-group
interaction and widening or narrowing the GTR. The trust literature is divided on how
religious fractionalization affects the GTR producing a rival hypothesis that must be
addressed. Like linguistic fractionalization, religious fractionalization may serve as a
barrier to inter-group interaction when two conditions are present. If religious groups are
incredibly different (e.g., Buddhist and Muslim), sharing very little ideological common
ground and have few other drivers of inter-group interaction, their members will be
insulated from other religious groups and unprepared to interact when it does occur. In
this situation, the barriers produced by information asymmetry and demonizing myths are
too pronounced for the GTR to widen. This occurs in the Middle Belt states of Nigeria
where Christian and Muslim groups do not realize the ideological commonality that
exists. However, outside of this region, this is not the case. While all three test cases
have mixed Christian-Muslim populations, Burkina Faso and Ethiopia’s have been
integrated longer. French colonialism did so for Burkina Faso in the 19th and 20th
Centuries and for Ethiopia, their Christian and Muslim populations have been mixed for
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many centuries, allowing them to build some common ideological language to ease
communication. Nigeria does not have an extensive inter-religious history, but there are
many modern drivers of inter-group interaction, hence, there is intense social conflict.
Therefore, religious fractionalization increases inter-group interaction in all test cases,
widening it more in Burkina Faso and Ethiopia than in Nigeria where the incentive
structure differs.
One test case (Nigeria) is highly religious fractionalized according to Alesina et
al. (2003), being the 15th most religiously fractionalized country globally and has a wide
GTR as hypothesized. The remaining two test cases, Ethiopia 56th and Burkina Faso
72nd, out of 214 countries, are still moderately religiously fractionalized, ranking in the
top 34 percent of countries globally, meaning their religious groups are more likely to
interact and much more so if they share some ideological commonalities. As with ethnic
and linguistic fractionalization, this does not determine whether the interaction is
negative or positive. Therefore, a wide GTR always occurs when high religious
fractionalization is present in all three test cases. Religious fractionalization is readily
observable in Nigeria, and in Ethiopia, due to its unique inter-religious history and
Burkina Faso due to its cross-cutting of ethnic and religious adherence. Therefore, a
smoking-gun test is passed for all test cases, rejecting the null hypothesis and confirming
that religious fractionalization has a positive effect on the GTR as hypothesized for all
test cases. All test cases also pass a hoop test, disproving the homogenization alternative
hypothesis, which affirms the SNC hypothesis. According to the Alesina et al. (2003)
fractionalization measure, the two control cases are religiously fractionalized at 16th
(Zimbabwe) and 17th (Zambia) globally; however, when factoring how different religious
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groups are from each other, these cases become only moderately fractionalized. Still,
because they were hypothesized to have low religious fractionalization and a narrow
GTR, they both have a slight control case misfit. This does not affect the test case
hypothesis.
Religious fractionalization does not sufficiently account for how different
religious groups are from each other; instead, it focuses on how many different groups
there are. One society may be 97.6 percent Christian (Zambia), but because there are
numerous relatively similar evangelical sects and African Initiated Churches (AICs), the
measure considers it as religiously fractionalized as a country (Nigeria) that has a parity
of much more different Christian and Muslim sects. Zambian and Zimbabwean religious
fractionalization is primarily based on Christian denominationalism, so most share a
common Christian ideological language. Ethiopian Orthodox Christians and Muslims,
because they have resided in proximity for centuries, have also cultivated a common
Abrahamic ideological language, while the Burkinabé have a little less so and Nigerian
Christians and Muslims have much less so. Therefore, the quality of religious difference
matters, not only the quantity of the groups.
Christian- and Muslim-majority countries also differ systematically in their
religious fractionalization with the latter being the least religiously fractionalized
globally. The cases include two clear Christian-majorities (Zambia and Zimbabwe), one
slight Christian-majority (Ethiopia), one Christian-Muslim parity (Nigeria), and one
slight Muslim-majority (Burkina Faso). In SSA, the presence of AICs and high overall
syncretism is an indicator of high religious fractionalization; however, some are more
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different than others are. While Burkina Faso is Muslim-majority, it is one of the more
religiously syncretistic Muslim populations globally, influenced heavily by Sufism.
Religious fractionalization varies widely by region in Nigeria. While there are
many different Christian sects in the Niger Delta and surrounding states, there are very
few Muslims, lowering its actual religious diversity. Similarly, in northern regions,
Christian populations range between only 10-20 percent, lowering their religious
fractionalization. Oppositely, in Middle Belt states and the South West Region, there is
higher religious, ethnic, and linguistic fractionalization. The strongly felt presence of
AICs in Nigeria indicate the normative isomorphic transfer of colonial Christian
institutions had difficulty sticking. Although, its relatively low level of syncretism
indicates the opposite may be true. What is certain is Nigerians feel they are the most
religious people on earth (Christians and Muslims alike) and prove it by their global
highest self-reported weekly religious service attendance (World Values Survey 2014).
Nigerian Christians and Muslims imbue all things with religious significance. Therefore,
when there are indigene-settler conflicts in Middle Belt states, religion often escalates the
conflict into violence. Because Nigerians identify most readily by religion, network
transitivity increases within Christian and Muslim networks but less so between them, as
there are few weakly tied nodes. Separate Christian and Muslim civil societies take care
of their own first, providing little incentive for Christians to have their interests met by
Muslims and vice versa. However, substantial centripetal coercive forces are pushing
them together in this region, producing extreme social conflict and a narrower GTR,
opposite of those incentivizing forces in southern urban centers producing a wider GTR.
Ethiopia is highly religiously fractionalized, and its people identify religiously, but more
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so ethnically. The large and deeply embedded Ethiopian Orthodox Church and slightly
smaller and less embedded Muslims have a long and unique shared religious history that
goes back millennia, producing connected networks with high homophily and
multiplexity, but low propinquity, which results in a wider GTR. The Ethiopian
Orthodox Church is an institutional marvel as it is not the result of coercive or memetic
isomorphic pressures as are so many modern SSA religious institutions. Instead, its
norms, behaviors, and scripts are largely emically produced and sustained. The
Burkinabé population is also highly religiously fractionalized with a Muslim majority and
a Catholic minority. Its people are highly syncretistic with many of its ethnic groups
crosscut by religious adherence. It is a small enough and religiously mixed enough
country that there has not been an attempt to institute Shari ‘a, even in Muslim majority
areas, which is a sign of peaceful inter-religious relations and a wider GTR.
Zambia’s moderate religious fractionalization is due primarily to highly religious
and syncretistic Christian (Protestant majority and Catholic minority) populations. There
are many small evangelical and AIC sects, but a tiny non-Christian population, meaning
there are few religious differences across the population. While colonial Christian
institutions have affected Zambia’s religious trajectory, AICs have had such a strong and
atomizing effect that there has not been an isomorphic convergence of Zambian religious
institutions. Zimbabwe’s moderate religious fractionalization is also due primarily to
highly religious and syncretistic Christian (Protestant majority and Catholic minority)
populations. Their AICs differ from their Protestant and Catholic religious groups, but
not nearly as much as from other world religions, therefore, the spectrum of religious
difference is quite small across the society. Colonial Christian institutions have weakly
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transferred to Zimbabwe—the Rhodesian Bush War served to sever ties with many
outside influences. Zimbabwean AICs are also quite independent, producing little
network transitivity between religious social networks. There are regional differences in
religious fractionalization and trust between religious groups. Populations in
Zimbabwe’s heavily Shona Mashonaland East Province do not trust those of other
religions the most. There is no single religious center of gravity for these populations.
Therefore, Zimbabwean and Zambian populations occupy a narrow band on the religious
spectrum and are less religiously fractionalized than the Alesina et al. (2003) measure
suggests.

Proximity
The Proximity Principle states that humans assume proximate objects are of the
same type. Therefore, groups with increasing physical, technological, and social
proximity are perceived by all as more similar, deeming interaction to be more
appropriate and likely, increasing social ties and social cohesion. The proximity
hypothesis is strongly supported overall when considering all of the physical,
technological, and social proximity indicators.
Table 52
Social Network Composition: Proximity
Country
Burkina
Faso
Ethiopia
Nigeria

Test
Cases

Physical
Hyp Result
High High

Support
Strong

Technological
Hyp Result
High Low

Support
Reject

Social
Hyp Result
High High

Support
Strong

High
High

Strong
Strong

High
High

Reject
Mod

High
High

Strong
Mod

High
High
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Low
Mod

High
Mod

Table Continued
Zambia
Zimbabwe

Control
Cases

Low
Low

Low
Low

Strong
Strong

Low
Low

Low
Low

Strong
Strong

Low
Low

Low
Low

Strong
Strong

Physical Proximity
Physical proximity, also termed geographic or spatial proximity in other literature,
is the fourth test criterion for increasing inter-group interaction and widening or
narrowing the GTR. Whole society or group physical proximity may be measured using
a combination of population density, urbanization, terrain, and mobility and migration
patterns. All three of the test cases are highly physically proximate as hypothesized.
While SSA societies are urbanizing at a high rate, they remain the most rural region
globally. All three of the test cases are in the top 14 for highest urbanization rates
globally (Burkina Faso 3rd, Ethiopia 10th, and Nigeria 14th), meaning their ethnic,
linguistic, and religious groups are increasingly likely to interact. Therefore, a wide GTR
always occurs when high physical proximity is present in all three test cases. A smokinggun test is passed for all test cases, rejecting the null hypothesis and confirming that
physical proximity has a positive effect on the GTR as hypothesized for all test cases.
All test cases also pass a hoop test, disproving the non-proximate alternative hypothesis,
which affirms the SNC hypothesis. Both control cases have low physical proximity
because they are highly rural. Zimbabwe is 108th out of 231 for urban growth. While
Zambia has the 22nd highest urbanization rate, it remains highly rural. This does not
affect the test case hypothesis but instead suggests a good control case fit for Zimbabwe
and a little less so for Zambia.
Science fiction and perhaps e-commerce, the stock market, online education, or
the drone industry can imagine a future where little physical proximity is required to meet
interests. However, fragile state institutions are ill-equipped to provide sufficient

safeguards for non-proximate interaction to produce generalized trust. There are too
many negative externalities present for agents to ensure compliance with contracts
between principles, the primary one being information asymmetry. Principles are unable
to use their full assortment of senses to collect and process information about other
principles and potential cost and effort required of them, to arrive at sound decisions.
Inadequately monitored agents may take advantage of information asymmetry through
adverse selection, producing a moral hazard by taking on more risk than principles were
expecting, negatively influencing future interactions.
In the cases of Ethiopia and Nigeria, the high physical proximity between their
ethnic, linguistic, and religious groups is a mixture of incentivization and coercion, due to
high population density, urbanization growth, and a history of war and famine. The few
young, urban, wealthy, and educated Ethiopians have a deficiency of generalized trust
with other ethnic and linguistic groups, but not religious groups. Ethiopia has an
overpopulation problem even though it is highly rural and rugged. Due to its high
urbanization rate of 4.8 percent (World Bank 2016) and its population’s concentration in
the center of the country, there is less of a chance of in-group network cliques and
structurally cohesive blocks forming, meaning inter-group interaction will be higher.
Although it has a history of war, famine, and ethnic division, its low inequality has
produced a relatively more trusting environment where the GTR may widen.
Nigeria has a highly dense population and a high urbanization rate of 4.3 percent
(World Bank 2016) concentrated in seven cities with over 1 million highly mobile
residents spread throughout the country, which has increased competition intensity
without the required institutions to manage it. Past conflictual relations can affect
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modern relations, such as the intense mistrust Christian Igbo continue to have for HausaFulani Muslims stemming from the Biafra War. Ethnic, linguistic, and religious groups
that were once able to keep their distance are finding themselves incentivized or coerced
into greater inter-group interaction. Often one group is incentivized while another is
coerced. In moderately urbanized Middle Belt states, inter-ethnic and inter-religious
interaction is perceived as incentivized for settler groups seeking better economic
opportunity and perceived as coerced for indigene groups, which feel trespassed. In
southern urban centers, populations are becoming more socially atomized, lowering ingroup trust, which produces incentives for inter-group interaction. Because state
institutions are fragile, this has, however, not resulted in increased institutional trust.
Highly rural Burkina Faso lacks a history of violence; however, rapidly rising
urbanization to Ouagadougou and Bobo-Dioulasso by young people incentivized by the
promise of jobs, independence, and a life that is not possible in their ethnic home areas, is
producing uneven trust development. Its border regions that do experience conflict
spillover and intense migration have trust problems. Regions bordering Mali where
spillover conflict is most prevalent, have a deficiency in generalized trust, while regions
bordering Cote d’Ivoire, where there is a history of heavy migration, have a deficiency of
in-group and generalized trust. Burkina Faso’s high physical proximity is incentivized by
recent economic opportunity, being a geographically small country with gentle terrain,
and its 5.7 percent urban growth rate (World Bank 2016). When Burkinabé contract
institutions do not function well—which is often—physical proximity makes norms and
behaviors more easily monitored, enhancing inter-group knowledge, which keeps
principles more honest and reduces myth building about other groups. Principles are also
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more predictable because they can observe multiple interactions of other principles,
thereby better understanding the scripts they follow. This environment made it easier for
disparate groups to build sufficient momentum for the collective action that resulted in
the 2014 Burkinabé Uprising, which was a sign of growing generalized trust throughout
its civil society rather than its decrease. A reorganization of social networks through the
moving from in-group trust to generalized trust can be a conflictual process in the shortterm that results in long-term stability.
Zambia has low physical proximity due primarily to having one of the lowest
population densities in SSA—half the density of the next lowest case (Zimbabwe) and
ten times less than the highest case (Nigeria). Its incredibly high economic inequality
and high urban growth rate (4.1 percent) (World Bank 2016) from rural areas to the
Copperbelt Province and from there to Lusaka Province, incentivized by economic
opportunity, has driven a divide between urban and rural populations, even between those
of the same ethnic and/or religious group. Those remaining in ethnic home areas have
high propinquity and are doubly or triply isolated from interaction with other groups. As
urban Copperbelt and Lusaka continue to grow and as capitalist and democratic
competition continues to increase, class instability will increase, producing a narrower
GTR.
Zimbabwe’s low physical proximity is a product of having a low urban growth
rate and two strongly independent, but highly rural nations residing in one state. Even in
Shona and Northern Ndebele ethnic regions, there is only a modest urban growth rate (2.4
percent) (World Bank 2016). Its people have a history of violence, deprivation, turmoil,
and mistrust, which has increased ethnic groups’ regional entrenchment rather than
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mobilizing them to interact to meet their interests. This physical distance and
disconnected networks increase the creation of demonizing and dehumanizing myths
about other groups, particularly between the Shona and Northern Ndebele.
Technological Proximity
Technological proximity (communications and transportation) is the fifth test
criterion for increasing inter-group interaction and widening or narrowing the GTR.
Finding highly technologically proximate states in SSA is difficult. Technological
proximity is measured through the prevalence and strength of communications and
transportation infrastructures, technologies, and institutions that govern their use and
constrain populations’ behavior. While most communications technology and
transportation services increase inter-group interaction, mobile phones actually increase
in-group communication and trust more so.
Only one of the three test cases (Nigeria) is moderately technologically
proximate. It passes a smoking-gun test, rejecting the null hypothesis and confirming
that technological proximity has a GTR widening effect in Nigeria as is hypothesized. It
also passes a hoop test, disproving the non-proximate alternative hypothesis, which
affirms the SNC hypothesis. Burkina Faso has low technological proximity because of
its weak infrastructure, while Ethiopia because of the state’s authoritarian control of
technology. Neither pass a smoking-gun test, so are not able to reject the null hypothesis
and confirm the hypothesis. They also do not pass a hoop test, unable to disprove the
non-proximate alternative hypothesis. Zambia and Zimbabwe have a good control case
fit. Zambia, like Burkina Faso, has low technological proximity because of its weak
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infrastructure, while Zimbabwe, like Ethiopia, has low technological proximity because
of the state’s authoritarian control of technology.
Technological proximity adds to the multiplexity of ties throughout society, but
each type does so differently. Increased availability of mobile technology may increase
the proximity of non-proximate nodes in an existing network but is rarely used to create
new ties between networks. Radio and television are one-way communication
technologies that have the potential to connect a large segment of society indirectly.
Increased availability of private vehicle transport may increase the physical proximity of
non-proximate nodes in a network, but strangers are not interacting during the process of
transportation, whereas public forms of transportation place strangers in proximity to
generate new network ties as well as strengthen ties in existing networks.
Increasing transportation technological proximity (roads, rails, and ports) also
increases physical proximity. When roads do not wash out during the rainy season, and
public transportation runs on time, proximity is increased between communities, reducing
the effort and time required to interact, making inter-group interaction more likely.
Unaccompanied by physical proximity, communications technological proximity via
radio, media, internet, and television, is a recipe for miscommunication and exploitation.
However, as globalization increases, it provides additional means for monitoring agents
and principles that were once unavailable or unnecessary. These technologies serve as a
one-way conduit between groups that may either enhance existing out-group myths or
discredit them. With the increasing globalization of capitalism and democracy and the
emergence of big data, the internet of things (IoT) has the potential to change how
communication, monitoring, and transactions occur. This has already begun to transform
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the principle-agent relationship in developed countries and will slowly, but eventually do
so in developing countries. When the principle-agent relationship becomes better
monitored through technological proximity, researchers must decipher how much is
generalized trust shared between principles and how much is institutional trust credited to
the monitoring institutions.
Communications and transportation innovations disseminate isomorphically, but
unevenly. Mobile telecommunications technology—and there are many types (e.g.,
voice, text, social media)—may have a GTR narrowing or widening effect. Maintaining
strong in-group ties with non-physically proximate group members via technology makes
it more difficult to establish new network ties with other physically proximate groups.
While there are cases where social media has served to produce collective action among a
wide diversity of people (e.g., Arab Spring), when used by tightly bounded groups, there
are not weakly tied nodes to serve as a communications bridge between groups. While
the democratization of information through the internet has not developed strongly in
SSA, mobile telecommunications networks have become a lifeline between nonproximate group members separated by urbanization, serving to perpetuate and
strengthen group norms, scripts, and in-group trust. In all cases but Ethiopia, which is
much lower, around 80 percent of populations have mobile subscriptions, and many of
their neighboring countries (e.g., Botswana, South Africa, and Ghana) have nearly 1.5
mobile subscriptions per resident. This indicates that Botswana, South Africa, and Ghana
are more economically developed and that Burkina Faso, Nigeria, Zambia, and
Zimbabwe have the technological means for keeping non-physically proximate group
members’ networks tied. Even though Nigeria is equally industrialized as South Africa
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and much more so than Botswana, Ghana, and the other cases, because such a high
percentage of its people are poor, they are not able to utilize mobile technology as
readily, which suggests Nigerians also may have slightly reduced in-group trust. A high
percentage of Ethiopians are also poor. Ethiopia has one of the lowest per capita mobile
phone usage rates in SSA at 50 percent (World Factbook 2017), with only wealthy
urbanites in Addis Ababa using mobile technology regularly. Therefore, Ethiopians are
more likely to have lower in-group trust as well.
Large and deeply embedded radio and television networks play a unique role in
Nigerian society. Wealthy expansionist religious groups are permitted to spread their
message and misinformation about other religious groups freely through these
technologies because they keep these media institutions in business. This has shaped a
hostile one-way communications environment between religious groups, perpetuating
religious conflict. The Ethiopian and Zimbabwean governments attempt to control
information about groups through their ownership of the few radio and television
stations, which instead of producing stability, has the unintended consequence of
reducing institutional trust and fomenting out-group myths in the absence of accurate
information. The more free-market oriented Burkinabé and Zambians—at least more so
than Ethiopians and Zimbabweans—have relatively free and accurate one-way
communication through private radio networks.
Many Nigerians are poor, but the state is not. The government funds many poorly
managed urban transportation infrastructure projects, which makes some regions more
technologically proximate than others are. Lagos is the most technologically proximate,
while rural North West and North East Muslim populations are mostly left out of
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technological proximity. Because there are many relatively inexpensive domestic air
carriers, an extensive airport infrastructure, and poor road and rail networks, the wealthy
tend to fly domestically, while the poor utilize more interactive public transportation such
as busses. Many Ethiopians are poor, and so is the state. Regional differences in
technological proximity are also urban-rural. While Addis Ababa residents and
surrounding areas enjoy access to greater communications and transportation
infrastructure, including SSA’s first light-rail system, the more rural eastern and western
regions have reduced technological proximity. Because Ethiopian roads are some of the
most deadly in the world and most are too poor to own private vehicles, the wealthy take
advantage of the state-owned airlines, while the poor utilize more interactive public
transportation such as busses. Burkina Faso has little communications or transportation
infrastructure because it is a late developer. Road, rail, and air transportation
infrastructures are meager, and most Burkinabé remain poor, so all utilize more
interactive forms of public transportation such as busses. Similar to Lagos and Addis
Ababa, Zambian residents of Lusaka and Copperbelt provinces are more technologically
proximate, while their rural Western, North-Western, and Northern provinces are much
less so. Boom and bust road infrastructural development has produced a fragmented
transportation network, but years of peace have enabled the construction of a decent rail
network. Therefore, all Zambians travel by the more interactive public transportation of
trains and buses. Zimbabwe’s prosperous history allowed it to build decent road and rail
networks that are now in disrepair. The poor travel by public rail and bus within their
home regions and the few wealthy by private vehicle as the state-owned Air Zimbabwe
airline is now defunct, being replaced by the Mugabe-owned Zimbabwe Airways.
275

Social Proximity
Social proximity is an indicator of sustained negative or positive network
connectivity and the sixth test criterion for narrowing or widening the GTR respectively.
Two of the three test cases (Burkina Faso and Ethiopia) have high social proximity and
wide GTR as hypothesized; ensuring social proximity is one of the causes affecting a
wide GTR in those cases. The remaining test case (Nigeria) has moderate social
proximity due to its unique religious parity. Therefore, a smoking-gun test is passed for
all test cases, rejecting the null hypothesis and confirming that high-moderate social
proximity has a positive effect on the GTR as hypothesized for all test cases. All test
cases also pass a hoop test, disproving the socially non-proximate alternative hypothesis,
which affirms the SNC hypothesis. All control cases have low social proximity and a
narrow GTR as hypothesized. This indicates a good control case fit.
Social proximity occurs in two phases: initial interaction and sustained interaction
and is measurable through a variety of descriptive network measures. Initial interaction
may occur between strangers, but if the incentivized or coercive force is removed, future
interaction is less likely. While sustained interaction is a requirement for a narrower or
wider GTR, a wider GTR is dependent on sustained positive interaction. Inter-group
interaction is driven by either incentivization or coercion, tools for getting someone to do
what one wants.
An incentive is an offer of something of value, sometimes with a cash
equivalent and sometimes not, meant to influence the payoff structure of a
utility calculation so as to alter a person’s course of action – Ruth W.
Grant (2006, 29)
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Sociological institutionalism and social capital theory provide a framework for
explaining how incentives and coercion are applied through institutions within and across
networks and how network structure affects how it flows to affect inter-group interaction
through bridging ties. Incentivized and coerced inter-group interaction establish or
strengthen negative or positive ties between networks. These may take the form of
pushing or pulling forces. A pushing force may be a group not meeting its members’
instrumental interests, while a pulling force may be if another group can meet a group
member’s instrumental interest more efficiently or effectively. These forces influence
whether group members seek to have their interests met within or outside the group.
Communal magnetism is a pulling force attracting group members to the group. In
individualist societies, communal magnetism is weak, because other groups can provide
similar positive communal externalities. However, in collectivist societies (all of the
cases), communal magnetism and in-group trust are strong, requiring greater force to
produce inter-group interaction. Fragile states provide plenty of coercive pushing force;
what is lacking in the typical control cases is greater incentivized pulling forces. This
dissertation explains how there are greater incentivized pulling forces in the test cases
than in the control cases, producing a wider GTR.
Every inter-group interaction consists of part in-group, generalized, and
institutional trust, which require separation for analysis. While the interest of community
and solidarity drives in-group trust and derivative out-group trust, this is not true of
generalized trust. The amount of cultural attraction between principles and trust credited
to strong institutions responsible for managing the interaction, limit the amount of
generalized trust. When principles perceive their sustained interaction as mutually
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positive, the GTR widens; how much it widens depends on how much the positive
interaction is credited to cultural attraction and institutions.
Coercive interactions limit one or more principles’ choices, resulting in
unbalanced interest outcomes, while incentivized interactions are more often balanced.
Principles behave differently when the source is external to the principles (e.g., the state,
and agent, external intervention, sanction) than when the source is one of the principles.
This can lead to dynamic enemy-of-my-enemy triadic relations.
Incentivization and coercion are best understood as a continuum, where most
often the more coercive the environment, the narrower the GTR; however, coercion is
conditional. At the coercive end of the continuum are unbalanced, violent zero-sum
interactions between untrusting and untrustworthy powerful and powerless principles
governed by incompetent or corrupt agents and inflexible and untrustworthy institutions.
A little less coercive are proscriptive and prescriptive state laws that provide few options
for adherence and where penalties far outweigh the crimes (e.g., Wilson and Kelling’s
(1982) broken windows theory). At the incentivization end are mutually positive
interactions between trusting and trustworthy free, well-resourced, and equally powerful
principles governed by competent agents and flexible and trustworthy institutions. A
little less incentivized are relatively peaceful, yet imbalanced interactions between
slightly bounded principles governed by decent agents in a competitive institutional
environment.
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Inter-Group Interaction Continuum
Coercive
Zero Sum

Incentivized
Unjust

Competitive

Cooperative

Figure 19. Inter-Group Interaction Continuum.

The longer mutually positive inter-group interaction is sustained, the more
generalized trust is created, and the fewer negative externalities associated with agent and
principle monitoring are present because expectations are regularly met, and scripts are
better understood. The homophily, propinquity, and transitivity of principles’ ties
strengthen, serving as a bridge between group networks. Fractionalized, proximate, and
incentivized societies usually, but not always, produce wider GTR and fractionalized,
proximate, and coercive societies often produce narrower GTR, while the less
fractionalized, proximate, and incentivized or coerced societies are, the less they interact.
All cases, being fragile states, have more coercive than incentivized
environments. However, this does not preclude the widening of the GTR, as it is possible
for generalized trust to increase in coercive environments. Fragile states utilize coercion
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more than incentivization because it is more effective for meeting short-term, though not
long-term, interests5. Since these cases are fragile, the state is not the only source of
coercion and incentivization for their populations. Depending on a state’s fragility
composition, a dominant group may exert sufficient coercive or incentivizing influence as
it seeks its interests or the international community may employ coercion and
incentivization through structural adjustment, sanctions, and military pressure. Some, but
not all, of these meaningful nuances are observable through the security and contract
institutions and inter-state market forces control variables. There is broad variation
among the cases’ social proximity. Ethiopia, Nigeria, and Zimbabwe have the most
coercive environments of the cases, while Burkina Faso has recently moved from a rather
non-coercive and non-incentivized environment to one that is more incentive-rich and
Zambia tends towards policies that do not highly incentivize nor coerce inter-group
interaction.
Ethiopia’s history is full of many coercive and incentivized institutions, which
have produced a socially proximate environment. The deeply embedded Ethiopian
Orthodox and Muslim religious groups, together composing more than three-fourths of
the population, have a long shared history that has established a multiplexity of relatively
weak, but peaceable network ties over many centuries. The Ethiopian derg (1974-87)
established many coercive institutions that forced physical proximity and negative intergroup interaction. The Ethiopian government had a difficult time rebounding from the
derg-induced economic depression of the 1980s, but from 1991-2004, it finally regained

5

This is not to say that non-fragile states do not also give preference to short-term implications when making policy choices. The

Achilles heel of all statecraft is the short-term incentivization of politics that produces moral hazard for subsequent administrations.
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traction and began to develop on an above global average trajectory. China has shown
some interest in Ethiopia by investing in Ethiopian water supply, wastewater, and
hydroelectric supply and the state has responded by developing military collaborations
with China. While the derg legacy has produced many negative externalities for modern
Ethiopians, one positive effect is the lower-than-average inequality, which eases positive
network ties between groups and classes. Following the fall of the derg, the Eritrean
secession in 1991, strengthened some and weakened other social networks. That which
remains has been restructured through the institution of ethnic-based federalism designed
to decrease ethnic tension through making ethnic groups more regionally autonomous
and less physically, technologically, and socially proximate. What has happened instead
is the Tigray minority group has manipulated this institution to embed itself in state
institutions and use the military to both coerce and incentivize the Amhara, Oromo, and
Southern Nations ethnic groups into a coalition to sustain the political status quo. This
has served to disconnect smaller regional ethnic groups from federal political networks,
though not social ones, relegating them to concentrate their political efforts and network
building regionally and through extrajudicial means than through the stacked parliament
where they do not have a voice. This constant political and social upheaval has
weakened the homophily, propinquity, and cohesion of both ethnic and nationwide
networks and strengthened multi-ethnic regional ones.
China has courted Nigeria, and it has reciprocated by exporting large amounts of
petroleum and developing military collaborations with China. As of 2010, Nigeria and
Zambia had the most Chinese investment offerings of the cases (China Business Review
2010). This trade relationship is valuable enough to China to have sent the Chinese
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National People’s Congress Chairman, Wu Bangguo, to visit in 2004. The primary
means by which Nigerians identify has shifted since independence from ethnic to
religious. The Nigerian military’s many successful coup d'états and the state’s attempt to
manage increasing inter-group interaction inherent to modernization through an
increasingly granulated federal power structure purposed to weaken ethnic identities and
strengthen state-based identity has had the unintended consequence of strengthening
religious identities instead. Nigerians have always been religiously bifurcated Christian
and Muslim, south and north respectively, but the British, during their colonial rule,
purposefully isolated their networks and institutions, leaving them unpracticed in the art
of living peaceably together. As a result, modern Christian and Muslim networks often
lack ties and difficulty locating structurally equivalent nodes between them. The federal
government’s attempted monopolization of the provision of public goods by controlling
so many of the resources groups require has made state governments overly dependent,
creating a “climate of passive clientelism” (Gray 1993, 157) as they follow the
government gravy train rather than seek to have their interests met through other groups
in the market or civil society. The federal and state governments, however, are not
effective in meeting groups’ interests. They often distribute goods unevenly, producing a
sense of inequality between groups (Rabushka and Shepsle 1972, 82). Gaps in
government services create unintended opportunities for inter-group interaction;
however, religious groups attempt to fill these gaps for their members only, unless
sufficient incentivization or coercive force prompts engagement. Religious identity
touches every other area of life: cultural, economic, familial, political, spatial, and social.
Neighborhoods in the Middle Belt cities of Jos and Kaduna have become institutionalized
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as nearly 100 percent Christian or Muslim. This combination of deeply embedded
homogenous ethnoreligious indigene communities and mobile settler communities,
fragile land tenure policies, and deficiency of resources has pitted these religious groups
operating on very different scripts against each other in a competitive race for a piece of
the LGA, state, and federal resource pies. This has resulted in perceived indivisibility
and spiritualization of land disputes, what the literature calls sacred space conflicts (see
Hassner 2003). Each of these ethnoreligious networks is highly dense, structurally
cohesive blocks with strong homophily and propinquity. This has served to tie
expansionist Christian and Muslim social networks together temporarily and sporadically
through negative ties. Rapidly urbanizing Lagos, nine percent of the Nigerian population
and other southern urban centers, are a different context, one that is religiously mixed,
but where religion is not the only important identity of its residents. These cities are
chaotic, but not violent. Their residents have learned better than most how to manage a
plurality of interests in a weak institutional environment, which has produced a wider
GTR.
Burkina Faso has a less coercive history of state maladministration, sanctions,
structural adjustment, and military pressure than Ethiopia or Nigeria. The Burkinabé lack
deeply embedded ethnic and religious animosities, which has allowed their social
networks to build ties. The 27 years of President Compaoré’s strongman rule served to
keep group networks reasonably connected rather than isolated. The active
Burkinabé protest culture resulting in recent social upheaval has created positive network
ties between allied groups, increasing homophily and propinquity between their social
networks, however, decreasing institutional trust in the government, producing negative
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ties with groups tied to the government. It may have benefited Burkina Faso delaying the
opening its economy to inter-state market forces longer than many other SSA states.
Since 1991, Burkina Faso has been a model neo-liberal structural adjustment reformer in
partnership with the IMF and the World Bank and has been rewarded by a relatively
consistent and even development path, following a nearly identical trajectory as the
global GDP per capita, PPP average (World Bank 2016). It has not engaged with China
as the other cases have; even going so far as to maintain diplomatic relations with
Taiwan.
Zambia has also not experienced as coercive of an environment as Ethiopia and
Nigeria through internal pressures of dominant groups and the state or external pressures
of sanctions and military intervention. It does though share a similar economic history
with these states, one where the 1990s was a severe economic decline, which has affected
its groups’ social proximity. It was an early casualty of flawed IMF and World Bank
structural adjustment programs in the 1980s (Dollar and Svensson 2000, 895) that were
more coercive than incentivizing. They did not realize Zambia did not have embedded
political institutions conducive to economic and political reform (Van de Walle and
Johnston 1996)—conditions such as a democratically elected government with regular
term limits (Dollar and Svensson 2000, 911). The Zambian economy, therefore,
stagnated in the 1990s under these coercive external forces, until 1998, when it began
having consistent incremental improvements in development. Some of this growth was
due to its increased trade relationship with China rather than successful structural
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adjustment6, where it exports large amounts of copper for petroleum7. This trade
relationship is valuable enough to China to have also sent the Chinese National People’s
Congress Chairman, Wu Bangguo, to visit in 2004. Many in Zambia consider modern
Chinese influence to be kinder and gentler than Western structural adjustment
(Afrobarometer 2016). Even more than its burgeoning relationship with China, Zambia’s
social network structure and resulting social proximity has shifted greatly due to the more
coercive than incentivizing forces of economic inequality, the HIV/AIDS epidemic,
regional differences, and religious syncretism. Rapidly rising economic inequality has
driven a class rift within and between ethnic groups, so that high-income and low-income
Bemba and Tonga social networks are doubly isolated, now also by class. HIV/AIDS has
taken a physical and social toll on Zambians, isolating the infected from some in their
groups and doubly so from other groups. These three factors together make some
segments of groups triply isolated from each other. Another factor is regional
differences. Zambian in-group trust varies and is affected greatly by economic inequality
between provinces. Zambia’s Eastern Province populated by Nsenga, Senga, Nyanja,
and Tubuka ethnic minority groups, has a deficiency of familial trust, while its Southern
Province, almost totally populated by the Tonga ethnic group, has a deficiency of trust for
those known personally. Coercive and incentivizing development forces have produced a
modernization path from the ethnic home areas to the Copperbelt, and finally to Lusaka.
In this way, it is also driving a further urban-wealthy/rural-poor social divide. Zambia’s

6

In the late 1990s, the IMF and World Bank did begin restructuring their incentivization structures, which did have some effect on

Zambia’s economic reversal.
7

Switzerland is the largest recipient of Zambian copper exports, three times more than China, the next largest.
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highly religiously syncretistic Christian populations tend to reduce societal conflict
because religious expansionism is lessened and because they share similar ideological
foundations; however, it consequently decreases inter-group interaction. Tie strength and
duration (homophily) and intensity (propinquity) are breaking down within religious
groups that once had high in-group trust, but this is not resulting in more weakly tied
nodes that may connect group networks.
Zimbabwe has a very different economic story than the other cases. From 20012008, the Zimbabwean economy severely declined and only regained less than half its
size over the next eight years. To maintain the post-independence Mugabe-Shona status
quo, the Zimbabwean state coerced, isolated, and disempowered white farmers and their
Northern Ndebele ethnic rivals. As a result, many in the international community have
heavily sanctioned Zimbabwe to coerce policy changes, leaving it with few allies. China,
however, has been an economic lifeline during this time being the recipient of large
amounts of Zimbabwe’s iron exports (Watts and Meldrum 2005)8. China values this
trade relationship sufficiently to send the Chinese National People’s Congress Chairman,
Wu Bangguo, to visit in 2004 in addition to Nigeria and Zambia. However, more than
half of Zimbabweans regret modern Chinese influence, feeling it borders on a coercive
mercantilist system (Afrobarometer 2016). Zimbabwean development and innovation
have suffered, not only due to coercive bureaucratic maladministration but also because
ethnic groups are relatively closed networks. Zimbabwean society is not a structurally

8

China is not Zimbabwe’s only or greatest trade partner. South Africa has been a long-time trade partner, exchanging Zimbabwean

tobacco and gold for South African petroleum. Zimbabwe’s trade volume is almost six times greater with South Africa than with
China.
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cohesive network; instead the Shona and Northern Ndebele form relatively large
disconnected networks. While they are not so separate and insular that they are dense
network cliques, they instead resemble structurally cohesive blocks. HIV/AIDS has
ravaged Zimbabwe over the last three decades, ranging between the third and sixth
highest infection rate globally9. Zimbabwe welcomed the new millennium with a quarter
of its adult population HIV positive (Burkett 2000, 471) and “unemployment, inflation,
poverty rates, and interest rates all running above 50 percent” (MacLean 2002, 513).
This has taken a physical and social toll, particularly on the Northern Ndebele where
infection rates are highest. All Zimbabweans have altered their scripts to be more
cautious of inter-group interaction, due to the stigma and not knowing who is infected,
making the infected doubly or triply isolated from other groups. Even if ethnic or
religious groups are physically proximate (living in the same district or village), intergroup interaction is less likely, decreasing their physical proximity’s effect. In the
absence of inter-group interaction, groups tend to devalue the lives of other group
members they do not understand, leading to an ethical double standard, which is the case
between the Shona and Northern Ndebele.
Power Differential
Table 53
Social Network Composition: Power Differential
Country

9

Hypothesis

Result

Support

Swaziland, Lesotho, Botswana, South Africa, Namibia, and Zimbabwe, currently have the highest HIV/AIDS infection rates

globally.
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Table Continued
Burkina
Faso
Ethiopia
Nigeria

Test
Cases

Zambia
Zimbabwe

Control
Cases

High

Multipolar

Strong

High
High

Multipolar
Bipolar

Mod
Mod

Low
Low

Multipolar
Unipolar

Weak
Strong

Power differential is the seventh test criterion for narrowing or widening the
GTR; its hypothesis is moderately supported. Power differential explains the relative
competitiveness of groups within a society assessing the distribution of power and
relative access to and ability to obtain desired interests. It is measured by groups’ size,
duration, embeddedness, access to government, military, and the market, capital
ownership, and overall ability to meet group interests. This dissertation advances the
trust literature’s understanding of how unipolar, bipolar, and multipolar societies affect
the GTR. Inter-group interaction (negative and positive) occurs most in multipolar
societies and least in unipolar societies. When inter-group interaction does occur in
unipolar societies, it is at the command of the dominant group, and when inter-group
inter-action occurs in bipolar societies, it is often more intense and conflictual.
One test case (Burkina Faso) has a high power differential (multipolar) as
hypothesized and the other two (Ethiopia and Nigeria) have moderate power differentials
(multipolar and bipolar respectively), ensuring it is one of the factors affecting their wide
GTR. Therefore, a smoking-gun test is passed for all test cases, rejecting the null
hypothesis and confirming that high-moderate power differential has a positive effect on
the GTR as hypothesized for all test cases. All test cases also pass a hoop test, disproving
the low power differential alternative hypothesis, which affirms the SNC hypothesis.
One control case (Zimbabwe) has a low power differential (unipolar) and a narrow GTR

as hypothesized, while the other one (Zambia) has a moderate power differential
(multipolar) and a narrow GTR, suggesting a control case misfit for Zambia.
Multipolar societies such as Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, and Zambia, which lack a
dominant group, have the largest power differentials because there are many small groups
of varying power, while bipolar societies such as Nigeria (parity of dominant groups)
exhibit the next largest power differentials. In the absence of a unipole in these states,
groups may enter into either a fruitless competitive race for dominance (most common in
bipolar societies) or pragmatic coalition building relationships (most common in
multipolar societies). Diffusion of power in these societies does not guarantee
democracy. To deal with high ethnic, linguistic and religious fractionalization and a vast
territory, Ethiopia and Nigeria have chosen different types of federal models of
governance. Both systems are intended to accommodate divergent interests through
multiple parties, which enhance federal decision-making power of groups and provide
increased regional autonomy. Achievement of these goals is measurable by the presence
of viable competing parties in both cases. The presence of national parties crosscut by
ethnicity and religion indicates the beginning of successful coalition building in Nigeria.
Unipolar societies produce less inter-group interaction than bipolar and multipolar
societies. While the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) is the most intensely
authoritarian region, SSA is the second most and has the largest number of authoritarian
regimes (Kaufmann et al. 2009). However, many SSA states are transitioning from
unipolar and authoritarian to multipolar and democratic. Unipolar societies such as
Zimbabwe with a single dominant group are relatively stable and have the smallest power
differential because minority groups are unable to challenge the unipole’s dominance.
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Most authoritarian societies are unipolar, but not all unipolar societies are authoritarian.
Unipolarity indicates that a society may be more homogenous where there is less
opportunity to widen the GTR. A centralized political system or a one-party state
indicates a more homogenous society or unipolar power differential, which makes it
easier and more efficient for the unipole to maintain the status quo. Strongman leader
longevity in all cases except Nigeria (e.g., President’s Mugabe, Compaoré, Zenawi, and
Kaunda) results from the insufficient political will to establish term limits. In this
environment, the unipole may further sustain the status quo if it has support from an
external state or non-state actor.
Table 54
Power Differentials
Country

Diff

Identity

Political
System
Unitary
SemiPresidential
Republic

Burkina
Faso

Multi

Ethnic

Ethiopia

Multi

Ethnic

Federal
Parliamentary
Republic

Nigeria

Bi

Religion

Zambia

Multi

Ethnic/
Class

Federal
Presidential
Republic
Unitary
Presidential
Republic

Zimbabwe

Uni

Ethnic

Unitary
Presidential
Republic

Party
Structure
SingleParty
turned
MultiParty
MultiParty

MultiParty (two
dominant)
SingleParty
turned
MultiParty
(three
dominant)
Dominant
Party

Group(s)

Political
Longevity
35 Years

Enhanced
Access
Military

Tigray,
Amhara,
Oromo,
Southern
Nations
Christian

17 Years

Military
and
Market

5 Years

Market

Muslim
Bemba/
Tonga
Socialist/
Liberal

34 Years
27 Years

Military
Market

Shona

37 Years

Military

Mossi

Indicators of unipolarity include if a single ethnic or religious group: a) controls a one-party state; b) has held the highest civilian
political office for more than 75 percent (22.5 non-consecutive yrs.) in the last 30 years; c) has held the highest military office for
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Table Continued
more than 75 percent (22.5 non-consecutive yrs.) in the last 30 years; d) controls over 50 percent of trade; or e) has another state or
non-state actor willing to intervene on its behalf if its power is challenged.

Table 55
Changing Power Differentials over Five Decades
Country
Burkina Faso
Ethiopia
Nigeria
Zambia
Zimbabwe

1970s
Unipolar
Unipolar
Unipolar
Unipolar
Civil War

1980s
Unipolar
Unipolar
Unipolar
Unipolar
Unipolar

1990s
Unipolar
Transitional
Unipolar
Multipolar
Unipolar

2000s
Unipolar
Multipolar
Bipolar
Multipolar
Unipolar

2010s
Multipolar
Multipolar
Bipolar
Multipolar
Unipolar

All cases’ histories (sans Ethiopia) are not their own because of their colonial
experience. The two types of leaders that have emerged from these cases are socialist
revolutionaries who rail against neo-colonial intervention and pragmatic structural
adjustment apologists who want to make the best of a bad situation. Burkina Faso has
produced both. The most powerful of them, Presidents Sankara and Compaoré, both
Christian Mossi military leaders, differed greatly in their ideology, Sankara a Mossi
Christian Marxist and Compaoré a mixed Mossi-Fulani capitalist. President Compaoré
constructed a de facto single-party state through the unitary semi-presidential republican
governance model from 1996-2014 to enact neo-liberal market reforms that President
Sankara had opposed. President Kaboré, also a Mossi Christian, is the first elected
civilian leader in 50 years since President Yaméogo was deposed in a 1966 military coup
d'état. He has overseen the transition to a multi-party system and further market
liberalization.
Burkina Faso had been isolated and autonomous for a long time after its
independence from France. In a similar way that the United States benefited from

relative non-intervention in the years following the War of 1812, Burkina Faso has had
time and space to choose its developmental path, albeit, not a highly growth-oriented
one—nonetheless, its own path. For most of its post-colonial history, it chose a unipolar
power differential along with an assortment of military and civilian strongman leaders—
more of the former than latter—but even Burkina Faso’s authoritarianism has not been
very coercive. Even so, no minority groups alone or together were able to mount a strong
opposition to Mossi dominance, so they did not try to do so, which produced a relatively
static and peaceful Mossi ethnic unipolar power differential since independence. During
this time, Mossi institutions have isomorphically transferred to surrounding minorities, in
part, due to its dominance and status as one of the only ethnic groups that are native to
the region, which has afforded it creditability and respect from surrounding groups.
Jumping into market liberalization full force, late in the game, has begun
developing state institutions and the economy and has transitioned the Mossi unipolarity
into a multipolarity, reconfiguring group incentives for interaction. Now, with a
multipolar power differential, there are competing Mossi, Fulani, Bobo, Gurma, Mandé,
Senufo, Gurunsi, Lobi, and Tuareg scripts. This has increased opportunities to form ties
between networks, making the likelihood of cooperative ties higher. For sure, structural
adjustment has been a difficult transition, yet the Burkinabé have benefited from
watching neighboring countries inter into globalization first. Recent structural
adjustment tensions have served to unite more so than divide social networks, widening
the GTR.
Ethiopia has had an assortment of civilian leaders interrupted by a coercive
Marxist military government, producing swings between multipolar and unipolar ethnic
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power differentials for much of its history. The most powerful of Ethiopian leaders,
President Meles Zenawi (1995-2012), a Tigray, was both a Marxist revolutionary and a
western reformer. Since the fall of the derg in 1991, there were four years of Worker’s
Party leadership followed by four years of transitional government led by the Amhara
National Democratic Movement. Since its ethnic-based federation was established in
1995, Meles Zenawi of the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front was reelected Prime
Minister three times, dying in office, followed in leadership by his Deputy Prime
Minister, Hailemariam Desalegn of the Southern Ethiopian People’s Democratic
Movement.
Following the derg, Ethiopians wanted a decentralized system that would provide
minority groups greater regional autonomy because there are competing Oromo, Amhara,
Tigray, Somali, Sidama, Gurage, Welayta, Hadiya, Afar, and Gamo ethnic scripts. The
result was a de jure multipolar power differential and ethnic-based federalism with a
parliament and multiple parties, but that allowed the four most powerful ethnic groups
(Amhara, Oromo, Southern Nations, and Tigray) to form a relatively coercive coalition,
essentially locking out all other groups from federal decision-making processes. This
variation of ethnic-based federalism has allowed regional ethnic scripts to strengthen,
enhancing ethnic identities, but none has taken on national significance, meeting one goal
of the system. The closest any one group has gotten is the Tigray that has locked in its
place in the political structure by building a deeply connected social network throughout
the military. Although the Tigray ethnic group make up about six percent of the
population, it constitutes 95 percent of the command posts in the military (Ginbot 7
Report 2009).
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The economic and conflict stakes are higher in Nigeria than the other cases. It is
a complex state composed of populations with competing religious, ethnic, and regional
identities. The strongest of these was ethnic but is now religious and only relatively
recently has its power differential shifted from a strongly coercive unipolar military state
to a highly tense bipolar federation based on politicized religious identities, where
Christians and Muslims are hopeful they will each prevail to control the Nigerian script.
Nigerian Christians and Muslims have two strong and opposing scripts and sets of norms
and behaviors. Their deeply embedded religious institutions have developed mostly in
isolation from each other. Therefore, isomorphic forces have not historically transferred
between groups, instead have circulated within each group, strengthening institutional
similarity, homophily, and propinquity within groups but not between them. This is not
to say there is not possible institutional likeness. Christians and Muslims share the
foundations of Abrahamic faith, which makes them substantially more similar than other
world religions. However, they have not proactively capitalized on this similarity to
build inter-network ties until recently.
Nigeria has had an assortment of military and civilian leaders, but more years
under coercive military dictatorships. In most cases, this would produce a unipolar
power differential; however, in Nigeria the northern Muslim Hausa-Fulani have
controlled politics and the military while the southern Christian Yoruba, Igbo, and many
other minority ethnolinguistic groups have controlled the economy, producing a religious
bipolar power differential. A Muslim head of state has led Nigeria since the Second
Republic in 1979 for 34 of 39 years. Its history is one of numerous strongman military
generals taking over “incompetent” civilian governments, but since the Fourth Republic,
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civilian rule has been unbroken for 19 years. Its current political party configuration has
produced two religiously mixed parties. Time will tell if the informal Christian-Muslim
power-sharing agreement within the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) where the
candidacy for president alternates between Christian and Muslim will hold if/when they
regain the presidency.
Nigeria’s federal system reflects extreme ethnolinguistic, religious, cultural, and
regional diversity and differences and its presidential system reflects its culture’s desire
for strongman leadership. The Constitution prohibits the establishment of a state religion
or parties that restrict ethnic and religious membership (Constitution of the Federal
Republic of Nigeria 1999, Part III, Chapter VI, D. 222). Its de jure multi-party structure
and de facto two-party system reflect the complexity of aligning sufficient inter-faith and
-ethnic political agreement to form cohesive and sustainable national political parties.
While the Hausa-Fulani are highly Muslim and the Igbo and Ijaw highly Christian, the
Yoruba are religiously mixed. These majorities heavily influence the Nigerian political
landscape and shape political institutions to their favor, coercing minority groups to
cluster by religious allegiances. With the expansion of federal sub-units (states and
LGAs), states have been incentivized to form political alliances with religiously-similar
states. Nigeria has reached a near religious saturation point with its bipolar parity.
Nigerians strongly identify as either Christian or Muslim. For each to enlarge its network
in this context, it must interact with and build ties with members of other religious
groups. This has resulted in differences in inter-group interaction across regions where
these groups are driven together by economic incentives in southern urban centers, by
coercive land policies in Middle Belt states, and lack any strong driving force in northern
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rural Muslim regions where these groups are not in physical proximity. Therefore, the
GTR is narrowing in the Middle Belt, remaining the same in northern rural areas, and
widening in southern urban centers.
For much of Zambia’s unipolar post-colonial history, Bemba institutions have
coercively isomorphically transferred to surrounding minorities. Now with a multipolar
ethnic and class-based power differential due to high inequality, there are Bemba, Tonga,
Nyanja-Chewa, Lozi, and many more competing scripts. Having so many relatively
small, dense, and cohesive ethnic groups provides many opportunities to form ties
between ethnic networks, but this has not occurred. Zambia’s extremely high inequality
is primarily a product of the difference between its large agricultural sector, employing
over 50 percent of the population and its small but profitable industrial and service
sectors. University educated Zambians (only 1 percent of the population) employed in
the industrial and service sectors earn six times more than those with only a primary
education (World Bank 2016); only they have access to banks and credit. As agriculture
continues to bring less value to countries’ GDPs and industry and service sectors
increase, Zambian inequality may increase, further narrowing its GTR.
This whole process formed under the watchful eye of strongman-unifier multiethnic Protestant Christian and socialist President Kaunda (1964-1991). Zambia was a
one-party state from 1972-1990 under his leadership of the United National
Independence Party (UNIP). He was as much the Alexander Hamilton of Zambia (a man
without a home) as he was known to be the “Gandhi of Africa,” for his non-violent
strategies. President Kaunda was not satisfied with the status quo of ethnic politics, so he
instituted ethnic-based power sharing of military leadership so that no single ethnic group
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could wrest power from the civilian government, hence its low instance of coup d'états.
He was a son of a Malawian Tongas, meaning he should have been affiliated with the
Zambian Nyanja ethnic group; instead, he grew up Bemba in Zambia. Eventually, his
political convictions put him at odds with Bemba leadership; he from there forward
associated with the Nyanja of the Eastern Province (Posner 2005, 98). Kaunda’s multiethnic, syncretistic, and socialist Protestant Christian Zambian nationalism served him
well in unifying a highly diverse society. However, one leader does not often dictate the
trajectory of a whole country.
Modern Zambian politics under a unitary presidential republic is relatively
competitive, yet this has not served to widen the GTR. The only three parties to muster
at least 10 percent of parliamentary seats include: the Bemba Democratic Socialist
Patriotic Front (PF), which is critical of Chinese investment and intervention; the Bemba
Democratic Socialist Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD); and the Tonga
Liberal United Party for National Development (UPND). Of twenty total parties, onethird of them are newly formed. These three dominant parties have settled into a
competitive electoral convergence where bounds of each group are sufficiently broad to
attract more voters if need be, but not so broad that the base’s core interests are at risk.
Since 1991 when Zambia initiated its multi-party system, the MMD won the first five
elections (1991-2011) until the PF split off from it and won the 2011 general election.
Prior to the PF victory, the MMD margins of victory were in the 70s the first two election
cycles, but as happens in multi-party systems, the people yearn for change, and in the
subsequent two election cycles, the MMD retained the presidency with victory margins
only in the 40s (Doorenspleet and Nijzink 2013, 9).
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The Shona script drives Zimbabwe’s deeply embedded and widely disseminated
coercive institutions. In this context, isomorphic forces flow from the dominant Shona to
the Northern Ndebele, Tswa, Kunda, Nsenga, Manyika, Ndau, Venda, Kalanga, Tswana,
Lozi, Nambya, Tsoa, and Tonga ethnic minority groups. These groups need the Shona to
meet some of their interests, but the Shona do not. Zimbabwe’s unipolar Shona ethnic
power differential was established by the closure of the Rhodesian Bush War with a
Mugabe-led Zimbabwe Africa National Union (ZANU) victory and Zimbabwean
independence. Robert Mugabe was Zimbabwe’s only leader under a unitary presidential
republican, dominant party model of governance until he was pushed out in 2017. He
was a socialist revolutionary and a war hero and was one of the loudest African voices
opposing neo-colonial intervention, which produced reverence among the Shona and fear
among other ethnic groups. His idealism and coercive tactics cost Zimbabwe dearly in
the form of food insecurity and hyperinflation but were more hurtful to the Northern
Ndebele and smaller ethnic minorities. Mugabe was able to sustain his rule by entering
into a symbiotic relationship with the military elite, ensuring they had conflicts to engage
in and resources to expend. The long-time hatred between Shona and Northern Ndebele
has served to strengthen ethnic identities. If the later were larger and more powerful, it
could produce an explosive bipolar power differential, but it is not.

Cross-Variable Comparative Analysis and Synthesis
Theoretical generalizations gleaned from the analysis, comparison, and synthesis
of these case findings suggest that individualistic multipolar societies in states with strong
security and contract institutions, having greater trade and investment than remittances
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and aid and that are highly ethnically, linguistically, and religiously fractionalized and
physically, technologically, and socially proximate, have wider GTRs. This archetype
society only exists theoretically as no past or current empirically observable society, least
of all the control cases, meets all these requirements, not even developed Western states
do. However, some come closer than others. While the empirical analysis of non-SSA
states is not the focus of this dissertation, some conjecture on the theoretically optimal
case type is useful for understanding trust development patterns in non-fragile states
compared to fragile states.
The societies with the top 10 widest GTRs globally (Sweden, Norway, France,
United Kingdom, Finland, Canada, Switzerland, Australia, Mali, and the United States)
are all highly incentivized Western European and North American representative
democracies, except Mali.10 Most also have effective security and contract institutions,
are individualistic, have large inflows of trade and investment and small inflows of
remittance and aid, have little ethnolinguistic fractionalization, appear to be physically,
technologically, and socially proximate, and are multipolar, as would be hypothesized.
The Scandinavian cases share a more consociational multipolarity, and the nonScandinavian ones are highly individualistic and have some of the most religiously
fractionalized societies. Fractionalization forms differently in non-fragile and fragile
states environments. All test and control cases are more ethnolinguistically fractionalized
than any non-fragile states and nearly the opposite is true for their religious
fractionalization. Canada is the most ethnically fractionalized developed country—still

10

Mali would make an excellent follow-up study if reliable variable data can be found (it is not currently available).
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less so than these cases—followed by Belgium and Switzerland, and the United States,
which are only moderately so. Canada, Israel, Switzerland, Belgium, and the
Netherlands are the most linguistically fractionalized developed countries but are only
moderately so and all less so than these cases. The United States, Australia, New
Zealand, the Netherlands, Canada, and United Kingdom are the most religiously
fractionalized developed countries, on par with Nigeria and more so than Burkina Faso
and Ethiopia. This indicates that non-fragile states allow for greater ideological diversity
because of having trustworthy institutions for dealing with competing ideologically
driven interests, a benefit fragile states do not have.
The themes of incentivization and consociationalism have arisen in non-fragile
state contexts that are transferable to fragile state environments. Further, the theme of
trust differential has arisen as a fragile state advantage for widening the GTR. The above
listed non-fragile states have also come closest to reaching their generalized trust
differential saturation point, meaning they are close to reaching their potential, so any
effort made to widen their GTR has diminishing returns, similar to the difference of
economic growth rates between fragile and non-fragile states. The ten narrowest GTRs
globally are mostly North African countries (Peru, Tunisia, Algeria, Yemen, Palestine,
Uzbekistan, Libya, Armenia, Mexico, and Morocco) with fragile security and contract
institutions, collectivist societies, low trade and investment, and some of the lowest
ethnic, linguistic, and religious fractionalization. They also appear to have low physical,
technological, and social proximity and lean unipolar. These countries have some of the
largest trust differentials, indicating unmet potential—potential nonetheless. Adjustments
made to widen the GTR in these societies have a higher return on investment, yet are
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more difficult to implement. The most collectivist societies (Guatemala, Ecuador,
Panama, Venezuela, and Colombia) do not overlap with the narrowest GTR countries
somewhat unexpectedly and are some of the least linguistically (e.g., Spanish) and
religiously (e.g., Catholic) fractionalized societies and have moderate trust differentials.
The SSA cases reside between these two extremes and share some of their features and
not others. They share many of the same GTR narrowing factors as the narrow GTR
states and have similar trust differentials, yet have realized more of their potential.
Control Cases
This dissertation has established that all control and test cases have poor GTR
widening environments, as was intended through the high bar set by the least likely
deviant case selection design. All cases’ security and contract institutions are only
minimally functional, their societies are heavily collectivist, and the combination of their
trade, investment, remittances, and aid flows negatively affect their economies and
societies as the trust literature claims they should. Also by design, the control cases
reflect the typical case environment further where the SNC also has a GTR narrowing
effect. Further explanation is required for inconsistencies in control cases’ control and
test variables.
Ethnically, linguistically, and religiously low fractionalized country cases are
difficult to find in SSA; therefore, minimal control case selection trade-offs were made to
broaden the fractionalization boundary scope conditions. While few trade-offs were
required for Zimbabwe because its good control case fit, Zambia required more due to its
high ethnic and linguistic fractionalization. This dissertation claims fractionalization
captures only part of the social effect on the GTR; therefore, small inconsistencies in the
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fractionalization measures are not as concerning as ones are in proximity or power
differential. The high ethnic and linguistic fractionalization of Zambia is insufficient to
widen the GTR in the presence the GTR narrowing effects of all the control variables and
physical, technological, and social proximity. Zambia and Zimbabwe’s generation-long
HIV/AIDS epidemic has reconfigured their physical and social proximities and both
societies being homogenously Christian, even though there is sect and denominational
differences, has decreased the likelihood of inter-group interaction. Further, in
Zimbabwe, Mugabe’s history of coercive governance and in Zambia, its extremely high
economic inequality, also decrease the likelihood of inter-group interaction.
Hypothesis Challenges. Subsequent analysis synthesizes revealed variable
patterns, and ambiguities and inconsistencies of case findings through the emergent
incentivization, consociationalism, and trust differential themes. Presented separately are
within-case conclusions, theoretical inference from cross-case conclusions, and policy
suggestions.
Some hypotheses are better supported than others. Having appropriate
expectations set in the design of this study helps to weigh and interpret the findings
accurately. An intentionally high bar is set by employing a deviant, least likely case
selection; however, this dissertation does not claim these test cases are critical cases (see
Eckstein 2000, 119). There is no expectation of the test variable passing a doubly
decisive test for any or all test cases, nor that any would have exceedingly wide GTR.
Smoking gun and hoop support for all cases and variables, excluding
technological proximity either confirm or affirm the hypotheses. All test cases have
moderately wide GTR when compared across a global sample—which is not
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recommended—and high when compared across SSA, a single socio-culturally similar
region—which is a best practice. There is little reason to assume these test cases would
have high GTR compared to a global sample when facing so many institutional, cultural,
and market challenges. Therefore, achieving a moderate GTR in these complex trust
environments with only fractionalization, proximity (sans technological), and power
differential having a GTR widening effect, is a research accomplishment. However,
because technological proximity and power differential perform weaker than the other
criteria, further explanation is required.
Technological proximity increases inter-group interaction, but these test cases
were unable to assess this empirically. Infrastructure building is expensive, and
communications and transportation infrastructures are more dependent on reliable state
security and contract institutions than was initially assumed. Even if these test cases
build communications and transportation infrastructure, many projects fail over time due
to inability or unwillingness to maintain them. Even Nigeria, the most technologically
proximate of all cases, has been unable to bring electricity to much of its rural regions.
There are pockets of technological proximity in each case, generally in urban areas. As
the cases’ continue to urbanize, more of their populations will become technologically
proximate, but they are not yet. However, technological proximity is not simply a
function of the level of development, but rather for Burkina Faso, it is also due to the
timing of its development, as it began on its development path much later than other
cases. It may be that in another decade because its terrain is flat and size is small, that
infrastructure will proliferate if there is a will, budget, and institutions to do so. For
Ethiopia, its fragile communications and transportation infrastructures are largely due to
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the controlling nature of the federal government, which has hampered innovation. As it
becomes more de facto federal, rather than only de jure, its infrastructure will also grow,
but not as rapidly, since its terrain is much more uneven and expansive making
infrastructure projects much more expensive. Communications technology, less
dependent on physical infrastructure than transportation, has grown more in these cases.
Mobile technology in Burkina Faso and Nigeria have increase in-group trust, while this is
less a factor in Ethiopia. Radio and television are uni-directional script enhancing
technologies, that without the presence of physical proximity or principle monitoring
systems increase miscommunication. In Nigeria, script competition is high, and the radio
and television market has grown to support it, extending religious conflict. In Burkina
Faso and Ethiopia, by contrast, their infrastructures are much smaller and more rigidly
controlled by the government, especially in Ethiopia. Therefore, it is most likely that
Nigeria and Burkina Faso’s communications and transportation technological proximity
will increase in the mid-term.
The power differential hypothesis claims test cases should have multipolar and
control cases unipolar societies. Therefore, Nigeria’s bipolar and Zambia’s multipolar
societies are not quite as hypothesized. With a bipolar power differential and a coercive
environment, Nigeria produces a wider than expected GTR. The complexity of Nigeria
has incentivized and coerced religious networks to form bipolarly and political networks
multipolarly. Nigerian Christian outsized access to economic resources and outsized
Muslim access to the political system and military is diminishing. The federal system is
distributing petroleum revenues nationally, yet still unevenly. This has increased
resource conflict among Niger Delta ethnic minorities that feel they are subject to moral
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hazard, deserving greater access to those revenues since they bear the majority of the
environmental harms.
The hypothesis for Zambia claims its narrow GTR should be associated with a
unipolar power differential; however, it is a multipolar society and has been for longer
than any other case. Zambia’s early adoption of capitalism made it a guinea pig for
unproven structural adjustment programs, which have institutionalized inequality11 that
has established a unipolar class divide. This suggests a combination of factors are
converging in these two cases to form their power differentials. Because they have the
most enduring development paths of the cases, their power differentials are becoming
more culturally, economically, politically, and socially segmented. Nigeria features
religious bipolarity and political multipolarity, while Zambia features political
multipolarity and class unipolarity. This suggests that as fragile states develop, they are
more prone to power differential segmentation across their cultures, economies, political
systems, and societies. These findings suggest Nigeria is more multipolar than its
apparent religious bipolarity suggests and Zambia is more unipolar than its political
multipolarity suggests.
Themes. The most apparent patterns across test cases that explain their wider
GTR include trust differential potential, multipolar consociationalism, and civil society
incentivization and network structures. These patterns do not occur in isolation but are
instead interconnected. Just as societies vary by all sorts of demographic measures (e.g.,
physical and population size, natural resources, human capital, and technology), so too

11

Zambia has the highest economic inequality (57.1) globally as measured by the World Bank’s GINI Index estimates for 2015.
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trust composition, potential, and realization differ. The trust differential measures these
differences. States may drive multipolarity through formal institutions, which is
necessary, but not sufficient alone to produce wider GTR. In some cases, even in the
absence of a multipolar state, civil society incentivization and network structures are
sufficient to widen the GTR. The more autonomous a civil society is from its state and
external forces, the less isomorphic forces affect its network structure and the freer it is to
develop consociational informal institutions.
Trust Differential Potential
While the test cases are moving away from a unipolar power differential, this does
not explain how or which of their formal and informal institutions are strengthening—
they have mixed records. Institutional trust is a product of a society’s aggregate
trustingness and the trustworthiness of its institutions. The less trusting a society is and
the more the state violates the principle-agent agreement, the less trust it credits to
institutions. Because fragile state institutions are less trustworthy, the isolation of
generalized from institutional trust is more straightforward in that context, but because
in-group trust remains high, it is more difficult. In-group trust has a high and narrow
global range (0.56 Peru to 0.86 Egypt) and case range (0.61 Zambia to 0.73 Ethiopia).
Out-group trust has a low and broad global range with twice as much variation (0.20 Peru
to 0.63 Sweden) and case range (0.31 Zimbabwe to 0.44 Burkina Faso) (Welzel and
Delhey 2015, 885-6). Descriptive network analysis is useful for separating in-group from
generalized trust. The more isolated group networks are from each other, the more ingroup trust and the more connected they are, the more generalized trust.
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Out-group trust (an unweighted average of the WVS three stranger questions) is
the trust literature’s best proxy measure for the GTR; however, two improvements are
possible. First, in its current form, it does not recognize that some strangers are stranger
than others are, giving equal weight to the three sub-categories composing out-group
trust: “People you meet for the first time,” “People of another religion,” and “People of
another nationality.” Weighting these measures differently to reflect the relationship
between religion, ethnicity, and initial versus sustained inter-group interaction may
provide a more accurate measure. Second, in out-group trust’s current form, in-group
trust is not entirely separated from it. Identifying and isolating derivative trust based on
cultural attraction from transcendent trust based on instrumental interests produces a
more analytically pure measure of generalized trust. Transcendent out-group trust is
what widens the GTR (Welzel and Delhey 2015, 883). The more socio-culturally similar
groups are, the more derivative and the less transcendent out-group trust they generate
when interacting. Therefore, inter-group interaction is easier the more similar groups are,
but there is more GTR widening potential between more different groups. Welzel and
Delhey (2015) recognize this limitation of the current measure and attempt a sweeping
quantitative separation of derivative and transcendent out-group trusts through their
highly aggregated Human Empowerment proxy measure. They rightly identify
derivative out-group trust capturing social separation and transcendent out-group trust
capturing religious pluralism, yet they confuse derivative out-group trust with
institutional trust when claiming strong security institutions are captured by derivative
and the absence of a repressive state is captured by transcendent. They claim their
findings are preliminary and that further work in this area should be a trust literature
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research priority (Welzel and Delhey 2015, 893). This dissertation’s theoretical
framework identifies and separates cultural attractors qualitatively on a case-by-case
basis. Once derivative and transcendent out-group trusts are separated, the GTR and trust
differential may be analyzed more accurately.
Every society has an upper and lower range of experienced in-group, generalized,
and institutional trust measurable at different times and units of analysis. Predicting a
society’s potential trust levels is more complicated. In-group trust is always higher than
generalized trust, lest a society atomizes and institutional trust is a function of a society’s
legitimization of its institutions, sometimes regardless of their merit. The most
fractionalized, proximate, and power differentiated societies have the highest potential
transcendent generalized trust and GTR; non-fragile states have reached more of their
GTR trust potential than fragile states; therefore, fragile states have the most unrealized
GTR potential. The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and Western Europe have
the highest in-group trust levels globally, while the former has the lowest out-group trust
levels and the later have the highest. This means MENA has the most unrealized GTR
widening potential of all regions and Western Europe is closer to its generalized trust
saturation point. The trust differential and GTR are usefully analyzed together; the
former identifies states’ GTR widening potential and the GTR identifies states’ actualized
potential. Cases with high trust differentials and high GTR are of most interest as
archetype cases that may provide a model for GTR widening in low GTR cases. The
cases perform as follows:
•

Burkina Faso has above average realized out-group trust (0.4408) 20th 76 globally
and highest of the cases and in-group trust (0.6840) 59th of 76, that is average for
SSA, but below the global mean. This makes its trust differential (0.2432) 66th of
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76, the lowest of the cases, and second lowest in SSA, meaning it has the most
realized GTR potential of the cases and lowest potential growth.
•

Ethiopia has above average realized out-group trust (0.3998) 35th of 76 globally
and above average in-group trust (0.7310) 40th of 76 globally and highest of the
cases. This makes its trust differential (0.3312) 39th of 76, average, meaning it
has an average amount of realized GTR potential and growth.

•

Nigeria has average realized out-group trust (0.3693) 42nd of 76 globally and
average in-group trust (0.7179) 51st of 76 for SSA and globally. This makes its
trust differential (0.3486) 31st of 76, average, meaning it has an average amount of
realized GTR potential and growth.

•

Zambia also has low realized out-group trust (0.3280) 51st of 76 globally and the
lowest in-group trust (0.6098) 73rd of 76, of the cases and in SSA. This makes its
trust differential (0.2818) 54th of 76, the second lowest of the cases, meaning it
has the second most realized GTR potential of the cases and the second lowest
growth potential.

•

Zimbabwe has the lowest realized out-group trust (0.3064) 58th of 76 globally and
lowest in SSA, while its in-group trust (0.6825) 60th of 76, is average for SSA and
below the global mean. This makes its trust differential (0.3761) 22nd of 76, the
highest of the cases, meaning it has the least realized GTR potential of the cases
and the highest potential growth.
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Figure 20. Trust Differential.
Note: High potential (over 0.7); Low potential (under 0.7); High realized (over 0.4); Low realized (under 0.4).

Generalized Trust

Source: Delhey et al. (2011)
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In-Group Trust
Figure 21. Trust Differential: Potential versus Realized.
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Burkina Faso and Zimbabwe form the bookends of the five cases. The top of
each bar represents the society’s in-group trust level and the bottom its out-group trust
level. In-group and out-group trust levels are higher for each test case than for each
control case. The length of the bar represents its trust differential. The shorter the bar is,
the more of its GTR potential has been reached (Burkina Faso), which makes it an
excellent example for other cases, but also the less GTR potential remains because it is
closer to its generalized trust saturation point. Oppositely, the longer the bar is less of its
GTR potential has been reached (Zimbabwe), which makes it a poor example for other
cases, but means it has more potential to be reached. Zambia has the least absolute GTR
potential. Its in-group trust level (0.6098) is so low—nearly two SD below the global
mean (0.7288)—that it will reach its generalized trust saturation point much sooner than
the other cases. Ethiopia and Nigeria’s in-group, generalized, and trust differential scores
are average-above average and similar. They have realized more of their GTR potential
than the trust literature suggests they should and have plenty of room for growth.
Multipolar Consociationalism
Institutional structures differ between unipolar, bipolar, and multipolar societies,
with multipolar institutions, generally being more flexible, responsive, and equitable.
Institutions are purposed to reduce uncertainty in the social contract (North 1988, 15).
Their primary function in multipolar societies is not efficiency, but instead the weighing
of competing interests—they are therefore consociational compromises (DiMaggio and
Powell 1991, 4). The extension of co-operative norms does not come easily in any of
these highly fractionalized test cases. They are not like Botswana where reciprocity,
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social sanction, contracts, and collective action come more easily due to a homogenous
society. Instead, they require greater effort as there are many competing scripts in the
absence of a unipole. However, in this environment, the values of compromise and
coalition building are more likely to embed as social scripts than in unipolar societies.
The post-independence political models constructed in these test cases reflect
some of Lijphart’s consociationalism goals, such as multiple balances of power,
socioeconomic equality, flexible and accommodating elites that can rise above group
allegiances (1969, 216), small population, nationalism stronger than regionalism,
isolation of ethnic groups, and the presence of a common external threat (Kerr 2006, 27).
In all cases, the implementation of these goals has been flawed. Burkina Faso reflects
typical ethnic consociationalism, Nigeria, more of a religious confessionalism, and
Ethiopia, in its goal to produce segmental autonomy for ethnic minority groups, has
produced consociationalism bordering on corporatism. In Ethiopia, Horowitz’s (1985,
575) nightmare is being realized in the strengthening of ethnic identities when the goal
was regional ethnic autonomy, and in Nigeria, the fragile states literature is surprised by
its strong transition from ethnic to religious identity formation.
Table 56
Achievement of Consociational Goals
Country

Burkina
Faso
Ethiopia

Nigeria

Multiple
Balances
of Power
Yes

Socioeconomic
Equality
Yes

Flexible
Elites

Small
Population
Yes

Nationalism
Valued over
Regionalism
Yes

Isolation
of Ethnic
Groups
Mod

Yes

Mod

Yes

Mod

No

No

Mod

Yes

Mod

Mod

No

No

Mod
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External
Threat
Mod (Malian
spillover)
Mod
(Somalian
spillover)
No

Table Continued
Zambia
Zimbabwe

Mod
No

No
Mod

Mod
No

Yes
Yes

Mod
No

Mod
No

No
Mod
(Sanctions)

Note: Goals come from Lijphart (1969, 216).

The test cases share many similarities. Burkina Faso and Ethiopia have a
multipolar ethnic system; Ethiopia and Nigeria have a federal system; Burkina Faso and
Nigeria have a presidential system and share a slave trade and colonial history, and
structural adjustment has shaped all of them. Even though Burkina Faso is a multipolar
society, the Mossi ethnic group remains dominant, though not coercive. Nigeria is
divided Christian and Muslim, but because religious political parties are made illegal in
the Constitution, a couple of dominant Christian-Muslim coalition parties have formed.
This has allowed isomorphic forces to begin to flow between these groups, serving to
increase their network transitivity slowly. Urban Christians and Muslims involved in
Nigerian party politics are diversifying their religious identities with other slightly less
intense identities (e.g., regional, ethnic, and linguistic) or much less intense (e.g.,
professional associations and economic interests). Perhaps this could begin breaking the
stronghold that religious identity has on Nigerians. Ethiopia has two tiers of ethnic
groups, the Tigray, Amhara, Oromo, and Southern Nations who form a coalition and then
all the rest. Balance theory provides a way to understand the triadic relations of
Ethiopian ethnopolitics. Ethiopian politics has transitioned into a three-cycles
relationship where one majority ethnic group favors one group over the other. The fall of
the derg placed the Amhara in a weakened position due to its association with it, which
allowed the Tigray to subsume some of its political capital to gain a position where it
could play the Oromo and Amhara off each other to its advantage. This has set off a
chain reaction throughout ethno political networks forming a closed cycle of reciprocity

(see Salehyan et al. 2012; Snijders 2009) between the Amhara, Oromo, and Tigray. What
has not fully formed is an “enemy of my enemy is my friend” (Strogatz 2010) temporary
coalition between the Amhara and Oromo against the Tigray. The Tigray have instead
been able to institutionalize its political position through an alliance with the Southern
Nations.
The more connected multipolar societies are to other multipolar societies, the
greater the isomorphic effect on their institutions is. Institutions growing out of structural
adjustment will share some similarities because they were formed in similar coercive and
incentivized isomorphic environments. Structural adjustment has a mixed record; while
many SSA economies have grown absolutely, most are also more unstable. Therefore,
the more Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, and Nigeria integrate into the global community of
states, the more their formal institutions will reflect others. If these cases become more
integrated as equals into the global community, their institutions will become more
aligned with peer institutions through normative isomorphism. Instead, what occurs most
often in fragile states is memetic isomorphism where their institutional environments are
so uncertain, that they seek successful models to mimic, not always transferring well to
their unique local conditions. Isomorphic forces may induce inter-group interaction
prematurely causing conflict, between groups that do not typically interact where
structurally equivalent nodes could have formed ties. There are often unparalleled
hierarchies (one vertical and the other horizontal) between interacting groups making the
selection of structurally equivalent agents more difficult (Gopin 2000, 200). In this
environment, powerful agents can shape networks to their advantage and sabotage
cooperative opportunities if they stand to gain little from them (Druckman 2005, 297).
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This is particularly a problem between Christian and Muslim groups. Christians and
Muslims are often portrayed and often buy into scripts and behave as if they have little in
common. However, they share some commonalities that are rarely capitalized on for
building positive network ties: Abrahamic monotheism, absolute truth, religious
expansionism, treatment of the poor (17:26 – 27 Quran; Bukhari, Hadith; Luke 3:10-11;
Mark 10:21). They also have some differences in how their religious texts encourage or
command adherents to treat the “other” that has often been capitalized on to generate
conflict (5:51 Quran; Matthew 25:35-40; Romans 12:13).
Transitioning away from a unipolar power differential is necessary, but not
sufficient to widen the GTR. This transition has not occurred quickly or cleanly in these
cases. The longevity of strongman military leadership sustained unipolar power
differentials in each test case. However, none of the test cases remains unipolar today, in
part, because these leaders were also market reformers. How dominant a unipole is may
influence its transition away from unipolarity. The Mossi are a long-time dominant
ethnic group that is not so dominant that it does not have to consider minority interests,
nor is it so wealthy that it does not need to interact with them. In Ethiopia, since the fall
of the derg, it has benefited from having a leader that was not from one of the two largest
ethnic groups (Amhara and Oromo)—not from the Amhara because of its association
with the derg and not from the Oromo because of its Muslim majority status in a nonMuslim majority country. Each test case has a sparking event that marks its transition
away from unipolarity—yet they are only sparking events, and the transitions have begun
long before and will continue long after them. For Burkina Faso, the most recent
transition, it was the 2014 Burkinabé uprising and subsequent removal of President
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Compaoré from office and reordering of the CDP-stacked Parliament. Because Burkina
Faso’s transition is the most recent, there is concern that it has yet to experience the full
adverse effect in these early stages. Nigeria’s transition occurred in 1999 with the sudden
death of military dictator President Abacha in 1998 and subsequent revision of the
Constitution. While many of its institutions are fragile, its Constitution is reasonably
well crafted, safeguarding from unipolar reemergence. Because of this, Nigeria has a
living generation that has not experienced military leadership. Ethiopia’s transition
occurred in 1991 when it rid itself of the derg. In subsequent years, its civil society has
grown in uneven spurts as the federal government seeks to contain it.
Civil Society Incentivization through Network Structures
Many of the cases’ formal institutions are the result of global isomorphism but
have not been legitimized by the culture, producing a misalignment of de jure encoding
of laws and de facto enforcement; this is true for unipolar, bipolar, and multipolar cases.
It produces a corruption-rich environment and zombie institutions that outlive the original
purpose of their creators (see Zucker 1986). These institutions can become so embedded
in the formal structure of a state that the cost of changing them substantially or quickly is
too high (see North 1988). In this institutional environment, there is a threshold of
institutional dysfunction that when crossed, civil societies may decide to disengage from
formal institutions to go it alone; this has occurred in many regions of Nigeria.
Incentivization structures differ between the state, the market, and civil society,
yet the trust literature rarely distinguishes between them for analysis. Individuals are
rarely incentivized to seek the common good in any state type, but rather seek rents from
and loopholes around competitors (Putnam 1993, 176 quoting Olson 1971, 28). Because
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fractionalized non-fragile states have strong security and contract institutions,
information asymmetry, adverse selection, and moral hazard are reduced. In these cases,
there are not trustworthy institutions, but the more socially proximate their civil society
is, the shorter network distance exists between nodes of different groups and the easier it
is to transmit information between them for collaboration.
Fragile state government and market behavior are better understood than that of
civil society. The state uses coercion more often than market or civil society actors do
because it has a monopoly on the use of force and security stakes are higher than those of
economic growth or social cohesion. In heavily coercive environments (e.g., the Soviet
Union and Zimbabwe), the market and civil society contract. These tend to be fragile
states with a strong authoritarian veneer where there is little institutional trust. Civil
society is most often the mechanism through which individuals enact their agency in
fragile states since they are usually passive recipients (e.g., remittances and aid) rather
than active exchangers (e.g., trade and investment) in the market and can do little to
change coercive state institutions. Typical fragile state civil societies are segmented
along ethnic, linguistic, religious, cultural, or class lines due to their higher than average
in-group trust and lower than average generalized trust. The test cases are low
institutional trust environments that exhibit greater network connectivity and wider GTR
than typical fragile states. The choices civil society actors make in these cases are
affected by their location within their networks (Hanneman and Riddle 2011, 367) and by
the number of nodes between them and other nodes (geodesic distance) (2011, 343).
Even if states remain coercive and markets weak, there may be consociational forces
acting within civil society. This is mostly a function of civil society’s network structure.
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Burkinabé, Ethiopian, and Nigerian civil society environments are more
incentivized than the trust literature assumes. Burkina Faso and Ethiopia are some of the
poorest countries globally; therefore, many individuals do not have all of their basic
needs met. This makes these civil societies inter-group interaction rich environments due
to this pushing force, leading to conflict or cooperation and more clearly narrower or
wider GTR. Because the Burkinabé have so many interests unmet by their groups, it is
the easiest case to demonstrate that incentivized inter-group interaction produces civil
society cooperation despite a fragile state. Burkinabé civil society, emerging most
recently of the cases from a unipolar power differential, is young, but active. Ethiopia
and Nigeria’s high conflict societies make it more challenging to isolate incentivizing
forces from coercive. Ethiopian civil society was nearly non-existent because of derg
policies until 1991, so it is also young, but less active. In 2009, the Charities and Society
Proclamation Act prohibited NGOs from political engagement and created extraneous
bureaucratic hoops with the purpose of thinning the large number of NGOs that had
become unrestrained, channeling large amounts of capital while producing very little
development. Ethiopia remains a violent place. Ethiopian civil society is learning how to
push back against government coercion through peaceful protest, but the government is
slow to respond through incentives rather than coercion. Nigerian civil society is active,
yet chaotic and largely religiously segmented (Rosenblum and Post 2001, 15), creating
many service inefficiencies and miscommunication. Nigerians think highly of their civil
society, but it is likely they have only either Christian or Muslim segments of civil
society in mind. Nigeria and Burkina Faso are becoming more urbanized than Ethiopia.
Having a greater diversity of identity formation in urban areas increases initial conflict as
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has been observed in Nigeria, but leads to more incentivized and diversified inter-group
interaction based on civil society coalition forming in the mid- and long-term.
Incentivization and coercion are dependent on proximity. Because these cases are
not highly technologically proximate, physical and social proximity have a greater effect
on the GTR. Each case has strong incentivizing and coercive forces centripetally pulling
ethnic, linguistic, and religious groups into greater physical and social proximity,
producing greater multiplexity and transitivity of network ties between groups. For
Burkinabé it is the long-time Mossi, for Ethiopians, it is the ambitious Tigray, and for
Nigerians, it is the two-pronged ambitiousness of Christians and Muslims forming a
bipolar parity. Each of these cases has highly religious Christian and Muslim civil
societies, which are different from each other, but not nearly as different as many other
world religions. Many drivers of inter-group interaction push and pull Christian and
Muslim civil societies together into greater proximity. Ethiopian Orthodox Christians
and Muslims have a relatively peaceful shared inter-religious history, while a similar
parity has stoked religious competition in Nigeria. Burkina Faso’s peaceful history has
allowed its many highly syncretistic religiously mixed ethnic groups to form weak
network ties through which information may flow, helping to deinstitutionalize out-group
myths (Varshney 2002, 21). Sustained network connections rather than temporary are
more effective in information transmittal that combats inter-group myths and alters
behavior and scripts (Svensson and Brouneus 2013, 573). Christian and Muslim civil
societies in Nigeria’s Middle Belt have high physical proximity, but low social proximity
with few sustained network connections and fewer options for backchanneling to
dissipate violence when interaction does occur. It is much easier to anticipate and
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dissipate conflict in civil society when religion is not highly associated with the
interaction (see Varshney 2000, 266).
Nigerian Middle Belt states, Ethiopian Oromo and Amhara farming areas, and
Burkina Faso’s Malian and Ivoirian border areas are subject to high fractionalization and
fragile institutions, while urban centers tend to be more physically and socially proximate
with stronger multipolar institutions. Pluralized identities and many weak ties rather than
few strong ones in urban centers help civil societies to reduce in-group trust in these
highly religious societies. Urban civil society interaction is more incentivized than rural.
It is a good sign that these cases have some of the highest urbanization rates globally,
meaning their physical proximity will only increase in the short- and mid-term. The
increase of physical and social proximity is essential for managing inter-group interaction
in these fragile state environments where institutions are ill-equipped to monitor
principles and manage moral hazard. Past coercive forces of war and famine have driven
Ethiopians and Nigerians together physically, while Burkina Faso has been subjected to
fewer of these coercive forces. While unipolar societies (e.g., Zimbabwe) exhibit an
obvious coercive power differential between dominant and minority groups, in multipolar
and bipolar societies (our test cases), there is regional or sectoral variation of
incentivization and coercion on civil society.
The social networks of the poor are one of the primary resources they have
for managing risk and vulnerability, and outside agents therefore need to
ﬁnd ways to complement these resources, rather than substitute for them –
Woolcock and Narayan (2000, 17)
Sociological institutionalism and social capital theory together explain how civil
society principles and agents embedded in thick webs of social relations (Borgatti et al.
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2009, 892) apply incentivizing and coercive pushing and pulling forces to meet their
interests. These forces are applied through the levers of formal and informal institutions
within and across dynamic networks, which influences their outcomes, often different
from what was intended (Marin and Wellman 2011, 17). Fragile states tend to rely on
coercive force while coercion and incentivization are utilized in inter-state market forces
and civil society. Social capital is a much more critical incentivization tool in these
cases’ civil societies because other forms of capital are less available. Civil societies
must expand their social networks and become more socially proximate to gain access to
their human and physical capital interests. Social proximity indicates sustained intergroup interaction and sustained positive inter-group interaction indicates mutual interests
are being met between civil societies. The more different their scripts are, and the more
coercive forces, the more conflictual and violent the interaction will be. Oppositely, the
better structurally equivalent nodes understand their civil society counterparts’ scripted
behavior and expectations, the more likely positive inter-group interaction is to result
(Hafner-Burton and Montgomery 2006, 571).
In these heterogeneous societies, civil society actors have to adapt to changing
institutional configurations. As they do this, nodes from other civil societies with similar
structural environments learn similar coping mechanisms (Erickson 1988, 175) making
them more structurally equivalent and accessible (see Lorrain and White 1971; Burt,
1976). With sufficient understanding of fragile state civil society network structures, it
may be possible to map out potential network paths per society to anticipate fragile state
behavior or even induce isomorphism across very different religious or ethnic-based civil
society segments to produce connections between structurally equivalent bridging nodes
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(Hafner-Burton and Montgomery 2006, 581). This dissertation is the first step in that
direction.

Conclusions
It seems plausible, therefore, that the secret of the economic and political
success of small and open countries, like Switzerland, Austria, Denmark
or the Netherlands, lies precisely in their ability to conduct policy
discourses that are based on a realistic understanding of their own
capabilities and constraints…
—Visser and Hemerijck, A Dutch Miracle
Trust is the fuel and the glue of society. In-group trust drives communal
solidarity; institutional trust drives state legitimacy and national cohesion, and
generalized trust unlocks new network connections through which interests may be met.
This research asks what most affects the GTR in fragile states, which has proved to be a
critical question. The trust literature’s answer to this question has included the control
variables and fractionalization. This dissertation has demonstrated that there are more
social pushing and pulling forces acting on the GTR than the trust literature assumes.
These forces come in the form of groups’ physical, technological, and social proximity
and society’s power differential. Together, the control and test variables provide greater
explanatory power for how the GTR functions in fragile states broadly, more specifically
in SSA, and clearly in the five cases analyzed. This dissertation has demonstrated the
value of SNC’s effect on the GTR and has explained in detail how each control variable
affects the GTR.
This dissertation has produced an enhanced theoretically generalizable model that
captures narrowing and widening forces on the GTR in five fragile SSA states. The three
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GTR models presented simulate societies with increasing, decreasing, and static intergroup interaction, incentivization, and coercion leading to narrower or wider GTR. They
also are flexible to allow changes in society’s trust composition through increasing or
decreasing in-group and institutional trust. Moving from model two or three to one
requires changes in these inputs and time. Outside of post-World War II Germany and
Japan, post-Cold War South Korea, the Asian Tigers, and perhaps Botswana and South
Africa, there are few examples of short- to mid-term development success. Most
developed non-fragile countries have been so for many decades or centuries and exhibit
long-term economic and political development models. Most fragile states will remain
so; therefore, their pragmatic goals and models and processes should differ from those of
non-fragile states. There is not only one development trajectory for all states at all times,
but instead many depending on their history and potential. Therefore, an archetype
model for non-fragile states’ trust composition differs from that for fragile states as
follows:
Non-Fragile States
•
•
•
•
•
•

Strong, trustworthy, and legitimated formal state institutions
Individualist society, though not at risk of social atomization
Diversified imports and exports and trade partners with fair terms of trade
Large bi-directional flows of FDI and FPI and minimal amounts of remittances
and aid
Increasing religious fractionalization and decreasing ethnic and linguistic
fractionalization
Communications and transportation infrastructures place the whole society in
greater proximity

Fragile States
•

State security institutions provide a safe environment for diverse civil society
groups to interact
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•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

The state does not take advantage of principles when managing principle-agent
transactions
Land tenure institutions designate ownership and are legitimated by society
Collectivist society learns how to build network ties through civil society
interaction
Diversified imports and exports and trade partners with fair terms of trade
Increasing FDI inflows and evenly spread remittances and aid
Static religious fractionalization and decreasing ethnic and linguistic
fractionalization
Increasing honest messaging through uni-directional radio, television, and internet
media
Increasing whole society proximity through access to affordable public
transportation
Groups meet members’ basic needs in the absence of a strong state, but not other
interests

These goals may be categorized as economic, political, or cultural. Economic
goals are more quickly addressed and achieved; therefore, the one goal fragile and nonfragile states have in common is diversifying imports and exports and trade partners with
fair terms of trade. They nearly share a fractionalization goal, but since many fragile
states are already highly religiously fractionalized, increasing it further would only serve
to increase conflict in an insecure environment. Since cultural institutions change slowly,
it is unlikely fragile state societies will quickly transition from highly collectivist to
individualist, and if they did, it would likely be highly conflictual and disruptive. These
societies will remain collectivist for the foreseeable future; therefore, the best that can be
achieved is for collectivist groups to gain skills for connecting their civil societies.
Fragile states are not going to strengthen their institutions quickly; therefore, effort
should concentrate on increasing safe environments for groups to interact and minimizing
agent corruption, so at least the state is not the cause of conflict between groups. The
most pragmatic solution to managing land tenure conflict is through the establishment of
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an enforceable bureaucratic process. This may take the form of a coercive institution that
forces all stakeholders into a standardized system of land transactions based on market
value. This, however, risks angering ethnic leaders and hurting poor landowners and the
landless. Many rural populations are not physically proximate; therefore, increasing the
truthfulness of the media they use will serve to reduce myth building and demonizing of
other groups. Fragile states rarely have sufficient financial and human capital to produce
a well-integrated transportation infrastructure, which results in many poorly constructed
and maintained projects. Fragile states should concentrate efforts on the least expensive
and easily maintainable public transportation options, which will increase groups’
proximity. The overreaching under-resourced state is a typical fragile state model that
does not widen the GTR. Limiting state goals to ensuring all groups’ basic needs are met
gives fragile states an achievable goal that does not invite additional corruption of the
principle-agent relationship. With basic needs met, groups are more likely to work out
their additional interests within and between groups.
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CHAPTER VI – CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS
The purpose of government is to enable the people of a nation to live in
safety and happiness. Government exists for the interests of the governed,
not for the governors.
—Thomas Jefferson
More than one-third of all states are fragile, yet the trust literature has shown little
interest in explaining the variability of generalized trust in this context and still less
interest in determining its social causes. Instead, it has been more motivated to explain
the consequences of the expansion of generalized trust, namely social capital, in nonfragile states. This oversight has led to a poor understanding of the social causes of
generalized trust in states where institutions are untrustworthy, populations collectivist,
and market forces unstable. This dissertation addresses this gap in the literature by
presenting a model for the analysis of the GTR in fragile states, which includes group
proximity and power differential.
The trust and fragile states literature agree, for fragile states to become less so,
they must trade some of their high in-group trust for more generalized and institutional
trust, to balance their trust compositions. The development of institutional trust in fragile
states is resource-intensive, yet these literature and development practitioners have
chosen to focus their efforts there. Prioritizing the development of generalized trust is a
more pragmatic approach in fragile states. The case analysis in this dissertation has
explained which incentivization and coercion mechanisms and structural configurations
are most effective in producing wider GTR in fragile states.
Fragile states require unique development models for infrastructure, economic
growth, the rule of law, and trust compositions. These literature assume correctly that
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most fragile states have narrow GTR; however, they have not attempted to explain
generalized trust variation among fragile states. This dissertation agrees with the
literature that has attempted to explain generalized trust variation that state security and
contract institutions, individualism-collectivism, inter-state market forces, and social
fractionalization have substantial influence. However, fractionalization is only part of the
social effect on generalized trust.
This dissertation’s principal objective is to demonstrate that a society’s social
network composition is the missing component for explaining how trust between
strangers increases in highly collectivist societies governed by fragile state institutions
and unstable markets. This dissertation’s social explanation begins with the
fractionalization hypothesis to construct a more holistic social cause of the GTR that
includes proximity and power differential and considers a society’s incentivizationcoercion structure. This dissertation advances the trust literature through an enhanced
theoretically generalizable model for examining structural determinants of the GTR in
scripted fragile SSA states, specifically Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, and Nigeria. It is a
unique and original contribution at the intersection of the state, society, institutions, and
trust, which fills a crucial gap in the trust literature.
Findings
These findings provide strong support for the control claims found in the trust
literature as well as the SNC test variable proposed in this dissertation. Rival
institutionalist and non-institutionalist explanations do not sufficiently account for
isomorphism’s ability to institutionalize state fragility or the dedication with which
groups adhere to their scripts. Further, they misunderstand the function of in-group,
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institutional, and generalized trust and do not address the difference between derivative
and transcendent out-group trust nor the trust differential. The sociological
institutionalism-social capital theory theoretical framework makes clear that each control
variable narrows the GTR, ensuring the SNC effects are what is causing wider GTR in
Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, and Nigeria. The aggregate hypothesized effects of
fractionalization, proximity, and power differentials of the test cases widen their GTR
while narrowing it in control cases. Technological proximity is the lone SNC indicator
that performs poorly in Burkina Faso and Ethiopia and moderately in Nigeria because it
is challenging to test variation in communications and transportation infrastructures in
fragile states that lack them. These test and control cases represent all fragile states well,
sharing weakened security and contract institutions that are minimally functional;
societies that are highly collectivist; and common roles as attractors of remittances and
aid rather than trade and investment. There are plenty of control cases to be found but are
also likely other deviant cases in SSA and other regions from which to learn.
No state, not even the United States or Scandinavian countries, exhibits an
archetype trust composition; instead, each has unique limitations. The surest way to
transition typical fragile states to the archetype fragile state model is by applying the
lessons learned from the interlinked patterns of trust differentials, multipolar
consociationalism, and civil society incentivization found in deviant test cases. The
United States is the ultimate deviant case in its unexpected democratic development and
rise to global prominence, and yet many other countries have learned from its unique
experiment. So, too, these test cases’ deviance from the typical fragile state offer lessons
for coping with fragility. Since independence, these test cases have exhibited a pattern of
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revolutionary strongman leaders who are also structural reformers. While this has
extended the longevity of unipolarity in Burkina Faso and does little to improve
institutional fragility in the short-term, it has eventually resulted in modest market
reforms, unexpected civil society strengthening, and trust composition balancing in all
test cases, which allows their civil societies to function within a context of dysfunction.
These chaotic, yet relatively civil society-friendly environments have allowed their civil
societies to make a fuller transition from coercive unipolar authoritarianism to
incentivized multipolar consociationalism than have their states or the control cases’
states and civil societies.
Limitations
This dissertation has addressed the inherent bounding limitations, self-imposed
delimitations, and methodological concerns related to this research. Knowing the current
sophistication of the trust and fragile states literature has allowed for the appropriate
limitation of the research questions asked to ensure this dissertation fills a crucial gap in
the literature. It was deemed most appropriate at this early stage of working with the
WVS new trust battery question and related generalized trust measurement to delimit the
bounds to SSA, which has ensured claims are not overgeneralized as past trust research
did with the old “standard” trust question. This results in the limitation of appropriate
methods. This research is also limited by data availability, a common feature of fragile
states. Fragile states have a poor record of producing reliable and trustworthy data;
hence, the reliance on global data sources such as the WVS and the World Bank. With
the eventual emergence of more reliable fragile states data, there will be future research
opportunities to expand the available methodologies. This research is limited to the
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theoretical generalization of types of fragile states and empirical generalization across the
five cases analyzed. However, it is reasonable to assume these fragile state types exist
globally and therefore may be examined using the theoretical framework and model
presented here.
The potential omitted variable bias, endogeneity, and reverse causation concerns
identified in the methodology chapter are addressed satisfactorily. First, the construction
of the SNC variable improves the long-standing omitted social variable bias in the trust
literature. Second, the several valid endogeneity concerns do not positively measurably
affect the dependent variable and, therefore, do not weaken the test variable claims.
Contract institutions and investment through FDI and FPI are endogenous through states’
foreign capital management policies. However, because the test cases have little
investment inflow and their contract institutions are fragile, there is little positive
interaction between these independent variables affecting the dependent variable.
Additionally, collectivism and social proximity are endogenous through highly
collectivist groups having high network density, which decreases groups’ social
proximity. However, because this does not affect the hypothesis positively, it does not
weaken the test variable claim. Third, because in-group, generalized, and institutional
trust are also causes of social and political phenomena, reverse causation is a concern.
Fragile states have untrustworthy institutions and resulting low institutional trust;
therefore, the tests cases’ wider GTR is not positively affecting state institutions. Their
wide GTR may also have a small effect on their societies’ movement from collectivism to
individualism. Once again, these societies are all highly collectivist, and this does not
change quickly, so there is no measurable effect. Wider GTR could also have a positive
330

effect on making states more attractive trade partners and investment magnets. This does
not appear to affect the test cases strongly enough for investment, as they all remain quite
low and not the case for trade in Ethiopia and Nigeria, as they also remain quite low.
Wide GTR may have a small positive effect on Burkina Faso’s increasing attractiveness
as a trade partner.
Implications of Findings
The findings validate the selection the research question, hypotheses, variables,
theoretical framework, and method. The fragile states literature has long assumed there
is variation among fragile states but has struggled to agree on typologies to categorize
them. This dissertation successfully categorizes and then models different trust
environments in fragile states. By inter-connecting the trust, fragile states,
institutionalism, and social capital literature, this dissertation has helped them move
closer to sharing a common analytical language and unified theoretical framework
through which to examine trust in fragile states.
The narrowing or widening of the GTR largely hinges on whether groups are
forced or incentivized to interact to meet their interests. Identifying and understanding a
society’s incentivization and coercion environment, trust differential, and GTR makes
explaining its likely trust trajectory more possible. Societies with many unmet interests
(fragile states) have different trust needs than societies with trustworthy institutions (nonfragile states) or few to no functioning institutions (failed and collapsed states).
Generalized trust cannot expand in failed or collapsed states because groups never move
beyond their preoccupation with survival. Oppositely, when societies credit trustworthy
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institutions in non-fragile states with too much trust, it breeds dependence on institutions
and reduces opportunities for generalized trust.
The transition from in-group to generalized trust in fragile states is complicated.
It is human to take the perceived path of least resistance; however, fragile state
populations rarely choose the most efficient path. The benefits of inter-group interaction
are not readily apparent in fragile states because it requires vulnerability and the ability to
monitor principles. The monitoring of group members is much easier than strangers,
especially when the state is not an honest agent; therefore, the interest a stranger can meet
must overcome the additional effort it takes to ensure mutually positive inter-group
interaction. Without inter-group interaction, group members rarely question their strong
preference for intra-group meeting of interests. However, windows of opportunity open
for inter-group interaction in civil society when groups cannot meet all of their members’
interests. In fragile states, civil society is most often the mechanism through which
individuals enact their agency since they are usually passive recipients (e.g., remittances
and aid) rather than active exchangers (e.g., trade and investment) in the market and can
do little to change coercive state institutions.
The trust differential and the GTR are useful conceptual tools when used jointly
to assess societies’ trust compositions. Every fragile state has an optimal, yet unrealized,
trust composition; the methodology presented here provides a process for examining it
and hypothesizing on its structural effects. Because in-group trust is always greater than
generalized trust, there exists a generalized trust ceiling, resulting in a measurable trust
differential, a measurement introduced in this dissertation for understanding the
difference between potential and realized generalized trust. The four categories of trust
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differential measurement include low potential/high realized, low potential/low realized,
high potential/high realized, and high potential/low realized. The trust differential is an
important measure because societies with large and small trust differentials function
differently than ones with high and low generalized trust and ones with high and low ingroup trust. This research makes it easier to isolate in-group, institutional, and
generalized trust in fragile states for this analysis. Knowing societies and even subregions’ trust differentials, GTR, and generalized trust saturation points will help craft
more effective policies for managing civil society, market, and the state and for widening
the GTR. Civil society is the underestimated conduit for widening the GTR in fragile
states.
Recommendations
The three trust composition models presented capture all theoretically possible
types of fragile states, making this research design replicable in other socio-culturally
similar regions of the developing world where sufficient fragile states exist (e.g., Latin
America, Middle East, and Asia). This dissertation set a high standard of reliability for
its data. Replicating this research design in other regions or expanding it in SSA requires
further data. Several ways of accomplishing this include proxy measures and waiting for
improved data. The individualism-collectivism variable presents the tightest restriction
of all independent variables. Future research could loosen these requirements marginally
to expand the case selection. Instead of limiting individualism-collectivism data to the
literature standard Hofstede (2003) and House (2004) data, the aggregation of several
WVS individualism and collectivism related questions may be able to serve as a lesser
proxy. However, this would reduce the construct validity since this data would come
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from the same source as the dependent variable. Future releases of the WVS will provide
more cases and questions related to the dependent variable. The WVS Wave 7 survey
(available in early 2020) increases its emphasis on the topics of social capital, trust and
organizational membership (49 of 290 questions) (World Values Survey 2018), which is
the most of any thematic category in the WVS. The survey will expand from 76 to 80
countries; expand its presence in 11 SSA countries (including four of this dissertation’s
five cases); add six new SSA countries and 16 globally.12 Using additional available data
may address related research questions. For future research in SSA and Latin America,
additional data on social conflict events using the Social Conflict Analysis Database
(SCAD) and Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) datasets would be
useful for examining the relationship between violent conflict and generalized trust.
Cookie cutter structural adjustment programs implemented prior to the
Washington Consensus have proven largely unsuccessful, wasteful, and even hurtful.
Modern development policies increasingly recognize that states have unique
combinations of dysfunctions requiring specifically tailored policy solutions. This
dissertation identifies common trust composition patterns across the test cases and
suggests specific policy solutions for improving their trust environments. Fragile state
leaders and the development industry need to realize that these states do not have the
same development nor trust potential as most non-fragile states and likely never will.

12

The World Values Survey Wave 7 will provide greater detail for the SSA countries of Zambia, Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Ethiopia,

Nigeria, Mali, Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Uganda, Ghana, Rwanda; Latin American countries of Guatemala, Panama,
Costa Rica, Ecuador, Paraguay, and Venezuela; Central Asian countries of Mongolia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan; North
African/Middle East countries of Algeria, Libya, Israel, Lebanon, and Iran; and Southeast Asian countries of Vietnam, Cambodia, and
Indonesia.
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There are too many isomorphic forces keeping fragile states’ institutions fragile.
Therefore, fragile states should scale down their development goals to providing basic
needs and simple security and contract gains that provide their segmented civil societies a
place to have mutually positive interaction. It is a broad enough goal for fragile states to
ensure the state is not its own worst enemy when it comes to building its trust
composition.
When considering fragility-reversing policy solutions that affect the GTR, one
may address cultural, economic, or political institutions. While economic solutions are
not as effective in widening the GTR as providing stable security and contract
institutions, moving from collectivism to individualism, and increasing the SNC, they are
easier and quicker to implement and so should be prioritized in the short-term, while also
making progress on cultural and political policy solutions. Economically, increasing
trade and investment and lowering remittances and aid, widen the GTR. This dissertation
has demonstrated that these five cases are fragile, but they are not only fragile, they are
also poorly developed. All but Zambia reside in the UN Human Development Index
(HDI) “Low Human Development” category (United Nations Development Programme
2018). Fragile state institutions are the primary determinant of economic decline for
fragile states and their neighbors. Fragile institutions drop initial GDP by five times and
0.65 times due to violence. “Neighbours lose around 0.6 percentage points of growth
each year” (Chauvet et al. 2007, 6). Others claim fragile SSA states “lose an opportunity
to double their initial GDP per capita after a period of 20 years” (Ncube et al. 2014, 2).
Two economic issues that may be addressed by fragile states and the global
community jointly is ensuring fair terms of trade for fragile states and the diversification
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of their exports. Some, but not all fragile states suffer from unbalanced and unfair terms
of trade. Making terms of trade fairer may be addressed through the World Trade
Organization, perhaps in partnership with the IMF or World Bank. Diversifying a
country’s exports is more challenging. While most fragile states have high ethnic,
linguistic, and religious fractionalization, many do not have diversity in the areas of
natural resources, industry, education, innovation, and agricultural products; instead,
many have become single commodity exporters. Modern structural adjustment programs
that have learned from mistakes of the past may appropriately leverage some of the
dysfunctional institutions in these areas to expand into industries that are a good fit and
will diversify tradable products. Finding niches where fragile states have and can keep a
competitive advantage is no easy task in a dynamic global market. For these cases and
others like them to become more than single product raw material exporters, policies
must focus on reorganizing the Clientist cycle of Western product design and ownership,
African mineral extraction, and Asian manufacture. The first step to doing this is
attracting FDI, which may establish an innovation-friendly environment. However,
innovation is wasted if these populations’ are not educated to receive and translate it into
production and further innovation. Keeping their educated populations from being swept
away in the brain drain to join the diaspora or incentivizing them to return after receiving
their education requires an innovation-friendly environment that most fragile states lack.
Therefore, policy should also focus on security and contract institutions providing
innovation-friendly environments for the market and civil society.
Security will always remain the preeminent concern of fragile states; therefore,
immediate political policy solutions should focus on ensuring state security and contract
336

institutions do not drop below their current minimally functional status to slip into failure
or collapse. Incremental gains are possible to ensure their segmented civil societies have
a safe enough environment and understood rules for engagement to produce mutually
positive interactions. Civil society can be quite resilient and has the potential to advance
in effectiveness and connectedness in a minimally secure contracting environment. Intergroup myths and demonizing diminish when groups are proximate in a safe contract
environment. However, in fragile states, resources spent over-and-above what it requires
to produce minimally functional security and contract institutions risk waste and
corruption. The policy-budget question is how fragile states allocate more of their
severely limited resources to GTR widening policies without becoming more fragile in
other areas. Moving fragile states from coercive to incentivized policies requires
substantial effort. In the short-term, it may be pragmatic to identify currently
institutionalized coercive policy solutions that have the potential to lead to wider GTR.
The state’s coercive force may be useful as it has in other places (e.g., Singapore) to
produce understandable and enforceable principle-agent relationships. Through coercion
fragile states may enforce land tenure systems that can capitalize on its second and first
most valuable resources respectively, placing land in the hands of its most productive and
responsible citizens without hurting their most vulnerable populations.
Cultural policy solutions—the slowest moving, but most effective—should focus
on the diversification of highly religious identities and the slow transition from
collectivism to individualism. States’ attempts to social engineer massive culture shifts
quickly usually fail (e.g., Soviet Union and China). Coercing a rapid shift from
collectivism to individualism would be detrimental to fragile states. In-group trust serves
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an essential stabilizing function in highly fractionalized fragile states and should only be
decreased slowly. Fragile states civil societies will remain collectivist, but this does not
mean it is impossible to incentivize positive network connections between ethnic and
religious groups. Rather than focusing on policy that weakens the core foundations of ingroup trust, which would likely destabilize groups in an already dysfunctional
environment, they should focus on increasing transcendent out-group trust, which entails
incrementally and strategically increasing the difference of groups interacting.
Since fragile states are dysfunctional, who then implements effective policy
solutions? There is a place for external engagement of the international community in the
specific policy areas addressed here. The international business community, for example,
may help establish industry associations that cross ethnic, religious, and political lines.
This is needed because many fragile state populations are highly religious; this may help
to diversify their identities to include market- and trade-based vocational identities.
Indigenous civil society leaders that can leverage international civil society to locate what
Fox (1992) calls “pockets of efficiency in the state” may construct limited iron triangles
to attempt policy reform (Woolcock and Narayan 2000, 236).
Contribution
The growing generalized trust research program initiated by the new WVS trust
question battery and advanced by Delhey et al. (2011) to Welzel and Delhey (2015) and
many in between, has made possible many new research avenues and produced a
framework for accurately measuring, defining, and conceptualizing generalized trust.
This dissertation builds on this progress and advances it further through identifying,
measuring, and explaining the full social effect on the GTR in the fragile SSA states of
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Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, and Nigeria. Progress is most needed on this question in SSA
because it is the region most negatively affected by the old “standard” trust question’s
misassumption about cultural perceptions of trust. Due to this inaccuracy, a whole
generation of SSA and Asian generalized trust literature findings warrant reexamination
and should make those who conducted global analysis using the old “standard” trust
question reconsider doing so with the new trust question.
This dissertation has embarked on the first of many regional analyses using the
new GTR measure. Sociological institutionalism and social capital theory together
provide a holistic, well defined, and flexible theoretical framework for explaining the
GTR in fragile states, revealing clear consociationalism and civil society incentivization
trends among the test cases that may apply to other fragile states. This is accomplished
through a mixed methodology that considers and weighs quantitative and qualitative
findings, selects clear boundary conditions, produces strong construct and internal
validity and moderate external validity, addresses rival explanations, and transparently
reveals limitations and concerns. Framing the bounds of the study to a specific type of
state in a single region increases its external validity. Selecting cases that are least likely
and deviant increases its internal validity because hypothesis claims are more difficult to
confirm. The use of multiple data sources for variables gives it strong construct validity.
The well-specified and defined boundary conditions for cases and variables allows for
reliable replication of this research design. Future research using this design may be
conducted in SSA using additional cases as data allows to enhance theoretical
generalizability or in other regions of socio-culturally similar states where there exist
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sufficient fragile states present. Subsequent analyses in Latin America, Asia, and the
Middle East are the best candidates.
The development industry has been asking, how much institutional re-engineering
is required to reverse fragile states. Some development optimists claim much is needed
and much is possible for increasing their stability and prosperity (see Kaplan 2008, 11).
However, state security and contract institution and market composition fixes are difficult
to implement, and those tried have a mixed record. While institution-building efforts
should continue—to cut them off now would be detrimental—this dissertation suggests
there are opportunities to address the internal condition of fragile state civil societies
through better understanding their complex trust environments. Even while fragile state
security and contract institutions and high remittances and aid persist in these highly
collectivist societies, gains are possible in bridging network divides through appropriate
incentivization structures, for increasing positive inter-group interaction leading to a
wider GTR. In this way, civil societies may develop wider GTR even while their states
remain fragile. States such as Burkina Faso with greater realized GTR may have less
potential growth remaining but may serve as a model for states with little realized GTR
potential like Zimbabwe. Cases with higher than expected GTR potential and growth
(Ethiopia and Nigeria) are of most interest for proposing and implementing policy
solutions.
This dissertation has woven together the interrelated concepts of trust, selfinterest, incentivization, strangers, inter-group interaction, and generalized trust in fragile
states to produce a unique and original contribution to the trust and fragile states
literature. It has addressed the research questions regarding the effects on the GTR in
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deviant, least likely fragile SSA states by thoroughly testing research hypotheses for each
variable through within- and cross-case analysis of necessary and sufficient conditions
through most similar multiple comparative case analysis, confirming or affirming most
hypotheses. The successful testing of the SNC test variable should provide optimism for
the application of this model elsewhere.
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